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THE BOURGEOISIE OPPOSITION’S SPEECH ON THE ROLE OF THE STORTING 
UNDER A ONE-PARTY RULE 1945-1953 
 
INTRODUCTION 
House of the elected representatives, called Congress, Parliament or Storting, it is 
the legislative branch which embodies the highest symbol of democracy in Western 
societies. Its absolute rule, one could rationalise, would be the rule of the people that 
has shown their will through their vote. This assumption can be faulty, we can even 
call it a myth, but it holds up to the present as a strong influence in our views on 
politics. 
 In this work we put forward the question of how the role of the legislative 
branch in Norway changed from the times of Liberal democracy to the post-war era in 
the context of corporate developments and the effective rule of one political party. 
The post-war era has been seen by many as an era of the common man. 
There is no doubt that living standards, job and social security of the citizens in the 
industrialised world outmatches anything previously witnessed in history. The 
mechanisms that allowed this economic miracle have been the combination of mixed 
economies and universal social security systems; in other words, the corporate and 
welfare states. 
A condition for these developments was the expansion in size and jurisdiction 
of the state administration. Areas previously out of its reach came to be regulated by 
a new bureaucracy of experts. It has been a long process traceable as far back as 
the beginning of the twentieth century, if not further. However, when trying to define a 
direct background of the contemporary Western corporate states, we should turn to 
the experience learned by the Great Depression. We can easily identify the influence 
of the memory of this crisis deep into the post-war era. The corporate and welfare 
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states in the U.S. and Europe were instituted, in the last instance, as a response to 
the periodical crises originated within capitalism, and the big economic crisis in the 
1930s in particular. The outcome, the breakthrough of corporatism, was a change 
comparable to that from feudalism to capitalism. Industrial conflict had been avoided, 
and class struggle was substituted by the concurrence of organised interest groups.1 
Workers and employees have been granted a security unthinkable a century ago; 
they never had it so good. It was certainly a revolution. 
This has not been a natural or lineal process. Its development as well as its 
particularities in every nation can perhaps be best understood by its apparently 
common social source: the “elite of the diploma”, the “organisation man”,2 the 
“professional elite”. But it is still not clear to what extent these professional managers, 
certainly inventors of the new social system philosophy, are also its rulers. What is 
important here is to point out that as the state becomes a great provider, a new 
bureaucracy expands, and politics becomes a trade of professional politicians. The 
rules of Liberal democracy have been left behind. And many of our preconceptions 
around what democracy is and should be are challenged. 
Previous to corporatism, organised interests exercised influence mainly 
through the political parties they supported, but nowadays they also have lobbies and 
negotiate to make their voices heard directly with the administration. For the most 
part, labour conflicts are dealt with in negotiating tables among representatives of the 
government, management and Trade Unions. Organised interests have found 
perhaps not a perfect representation but yet a rightful. This is a key feature of 
corporatism; deals at the top assure cooperation and coordination among the 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Perkin, Harold. The Rise of the Professional Society. England since 1880. London, Routledge, 
1989. Passim. 
2  These are terms coined by William H. Whyte in his study of American corporations. Cfr. The 
Organization Man. New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956. 
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different economic and social interests. These deals take place next to but not as part 
of the everyday work of the legislative branch. 
The corporate breakthrough in the post-war era was welcomed overall, but 
there was a still a parallel flow of doubt and criticism. I can only write with certain 
knowledge about the American case. Here critics on both extremes of the political 
spectrum regarded it as a threat to democracy. The intellectuals who emigrated from 
Central Europe, and who reinvigorated the American Right, shared this assumption 
with more moderate thinkers.1 Neoliberalism and the New Left could find some of its 
roots in such viewpoints where corporatism and democracy are opposite concepts.2 
However, the large consensus in American politics from the end of the Second World 
War until the sixties suffered little damage from these currents of thought.  
In America, the groups opposed to a larger state complained about the 
excessive power of the corporate oligarchies that were involved in the main decisions 
at National level. In their view, the Congress became weakened as the executive and 
the central administration expanded. A corporate axis monopolised power.3 At the 
same time, the political parties served as electoral machines that held the 
unorganised electorate powerless and captive. There were voices that spoke of 
collectivism, decadence of the democratic institutions, alienation of the individual, and 
so on.4 Is the scenario they depicted true? Most probably not. 
 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Nash, George H. The Conservative Revolt. I have read the translation to Spanish: La rebelión 
conservadora. Buenos Aires, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1987. 
2  A good example of an author who takes this belief as a leading assumption in his works is Wright C. 
Mills. The Power Elite. I have as well read it in the translation to Spanish: La élite del poder. México, FCE, 
1973. 
3  Cfr. Ibidem. 
4  Cfr. Nash. Op. Cit.Passim. 
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Our Problem 
Corporatism has been the framework of the contemporary Norwegian democracy. 
Post-war Norway was characterised by the institution of a corporate and a welfare 
states. In these, organised interests have a representation and a say in the decision-
making process outside the electoral process. Labour, in its golden age, arranged a 
set of institutions to consult and negotiate with these organised interests. The 
“bargaining table”, thus established, represented to some, such as the sociologist 
Stein Rokkan, the real government of Norway.1 To the political opposition after the 
war, the real power holder was the ruling party, which was in command of such 
scheme. The parliamentarian basis of the Norwegian democracy was in these two 
interpretations minimised by the new state of affairs. Did Norway indeed abandon 
parliamentarism? 
This work focuses on the period between Liberation and the third Storting 
election in the post-war era (1945-1953). During these years, one of the main topics 
of the political debate revolved around the ruling instruments the Labour party had 
chosen in order to run the “mixed economy” Norway adopted. The constitutional 
problem and the state of parliamentarism, summoned in the discussion on the role of 
the Storting within the corporate scheme, were key issues.  
The Labour party is the main actor in that story. An absolute majority in the 
Storting allowed it to materialise its initiatives on corporatism and welfare. From the 
first post-war parliamentarian elections to the King’s Bay accident, corporatism in 
Norway was one with the one-party rule. 
 Here, some questions come to mind. Did the One-party rule neutralised the 
Storting? If so, in which way? Was it turned into a screen that diverted attention from 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Rokkan, Stein. ”Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism.” In: Robert A. Dahl 
(ed.). Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966. 
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the real power game? Did it lose its role or did it play a different one in a new version 
of democracy? What was the actual role of the Storting, then? 
 The position of the Labour party on such issues has been thoroughly 
documented and studied. I reckon the opposition’s has been so as well. However, I 
plan to contribute to the analysis of the latter through a study of the public stand of 
the political opposition on the role the Storting played in the period 1945-1953. Three 
Storting elections took place during these years and a relevant polemic developed 
and was given a solution, namely, the enabling acts debate. Once finished, it opened 
the way for a relative consensus era that Trond Nordby extended until the 1970s.1 
 And here comes another set of related questions: who ruled the country in the 
eyes of the political opposition? Were the bourgeoisie parties willing and ready 
enough to participate in and influence the corporatism in formation? Were they 
putting forward initiatives to make the Norwegian state more efficient and 
democratic? Was there a chance for the political opposition in the context of a One-
party rule? 
We will go first over three different theories on the postwar political system in 
Norway, and then we will try to establish how the bourgeoisie political opposition 
depicted the political process in Norway during this time. In an exercise of 
historiography and of History of Ideas, we will ask them about a central question in 
their own elaborations, and which is the problem we try to solve here: what role the 
Storting played in the context of the new power relations and political ideas of the 
post-war era.   
The assumption and thesis in this work is that the Storting was not put aside 
and still occupied a relevant place alongside the corporate scheme that came to 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Nordby, Trond.  Korporatisme på norsk 1920-1990. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1994. 
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being in the post-war era. It might have been dispossessed of its unchallenged reign 
as the political arena per se, but it might as well have kept a big role in the political 
process. Our point of view is that Norwegian democracy was reinvented then. Its new 
features might have brought diverging signals to the contemporaries. Particularly 
when compared with a Liberal model, coming from the past, and accentuated for 
historical reasons in the case of Norway. The old basic assumption challenged by the 




We use in this work some of the classic studies on the question of the role of the 
Storting, namely, Seip, Rokkan and Nordby. They have established the terms of the 
discussion, and so are unavoidable sources. We also make use of general works on 
post-war Norway for an overview of the main issues and events. 
The first-hand material used in this work is electoral programmes, propaganda 
brochures and papers, reports by political parties, and a few political memoirs. We 
deal basically with political speech and not with facts and figures. Here we find 
depictions of the political scenario of that time that have passed through a filter. This 
complicates our research but widens its possibilities at the same time. What they lose 
in accuracy and impartiality, they gain in another area. They show us a perspective of 
the scenario and a picture of the viewer himself. They reflect, among other things, the 
interests, the goals, the concepts, the myths, and the prejudices. 
 However, in this context, the sources used in this work have limitations too. 
They show us basically the public face of the political debate in this period. 
Circumscribing to propaganda material, a couple of political memoirs, and second-
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hand material, we can only guess what happened in the inner circles of the political 
parties, and what the negotiation process was like.  
There are some other problems to solve on the way regarding the nature of 
our sources. In politics, the language is plagued with terms that hide, cover, or 
glamourise. Jens Arup Seip call them “substitute terms”. They dress the 
argumentation with fancy tones. In this way, when we read “individual”, we should 
sometimes think “businessman”, some other times a particular elite or organised 
group. And then “consumer” replaces “individual” and the meaning stresses with 
varied consequences, making the unveiling process a bit more complicated. 
Concepts and statements can also be vague enough to open the way for several 
interpretations that accomodate to circumstances. “Public control”, to give just one 
example, suited a range of definitions by the ruling parties and the political 
opposition.  
We also run across the problem of making sense of the rationalisations in the 
texts. It is not uncommon to find hardly compatible arguments put together in order to 
back a claim. The purpose is therefore more important than the logical sequence. 
 The ideas, ideals and values expressed in political documents might or might 
not be internalised, but they do not represent in general an outlook but a position. 
And so, they are put to negotiation in relation to the developments, the moves of the 
political opponents, the likes of the constituency and the groups they try to appeal. 
Even when they seem to remain the same for long periods and can be invoked as 
part of a dignified tradition, they are, in fact, periodically reformulated, thrown into 
different contexts, given different weight in speech; “constitution”, “freedom”, 
“parliamentarism”, to mention just a few. This does not mean that we deal with pure 
Machiavellian language, but that statements in politics have a use; they are, in the 
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last instance, ideological. In other words, we are dealing with speech in the context of 
power struggle. 
 Afterwards, comes an important question to understand the meaning of the 
speech: the relationship between the words and the deeds—and the facts. We read 
about promises; we should check against what was delivered to evaluate. We read 
claims; we should try to prove them or discard them. We read, for instance, about the 
marvels of free enterprise, but the party in question might be negotiating on the 
grounds that limits in competition are unavoidable; and the business community itself 
might have left behind long ago the principles of free competition as ineffective. 
 With those considerations in mind, we will start with a definition of some traits 
of corporatism in post-war Norway and by going over the main theories revised in this 
work. 
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CHAPTER I. THREE THEORIES:  THE STORTING, CORPORATE STATE AND 
ONE-PARTY RULE IN NORWAY 
 
The Concept of Corporatism 
What is corporatism? Following the definitions by various writers, one can describe it 
as follows: Corporatism is an informal political arrangement where the government 
and the organised interests maintain contacts of different kind for consultation, or in 
order to get to a consensus or to reach common decisions, outside the 
parliamentarian arena.1  
Definitions can sometimes work better if they are general enough. What they 
lose in precision, they get in flexibility. However, as we descend into the particular, 
we need to specify. Trond Nordby, for instance, analizes the Norwegian political 
system using both a descriptive and a functional categorisation of corporatism. In the 
first one, he breaks down the different approaches of state intervention beside the 
Storting in three categories, namely, negotiating corporatism,2 corporatism under the 
administration,3 and inner-corporatism.4 Useful as they are, we will not use as such 
these categories in this work, but we will assume the term “corporatism” includes 
them all.  As to the second classification, he makes use of the models elaborated by 
                                                 
1  This is what one can make from the definitions by Harold Perkin ( Op. Cit.),  Stein Rokkan (Op. Cit.), 
Nordby (Op. Cit., and  I politikkens sentrum. Variasjoner i Stortingets makt 1814-2000. Oslo, 
Universitetsforlaget, 2000), Terje Kili (Norway-A corporative state: Its Historical and Ideological Background. 
Sandvika, Norwegian School of Management. 1995), and others. 
2  “Forhandlingskorporatisme”, where the state and the interests involved set salaries and work relations. 
In the private sector, the state works as a mediator between labour and administration. It also embraces the 
negotiations around support to agricultural and fishing organisations. Cfr. Nordby. Korporatisme…; and by the 
same author, I politikkens sentrum... “Nye Kontakflater og endrede omgivelser”. 
3  “Korporatisme under forvaltningen”, represented by the state councils, which incorporate 
representatives of the parts involved and eventually of the government, and that work beside the political and 
administrative institutions created by the Constitution. They are linked directly to the administration and 
established by the government in council or by a department. Cfr. Ibidem. 
4  “Indre korporatisme”, or the professional organisations’ representatives’ inroads in the administration, 
in which they themselves become the political bureaucracy regarding a specific area. How influential and 
independent they are within the administrative structure is a matter to define in every case. Cfr. Idem. 
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Philippe C. Schmitters1 to describe the degree of control exercised by the state 
before the organised interests; that is to say, the categories “state corporatism”, 
“social corporatism”, and “corporate pluralism”. We will go back to these last 
definitions later on. 
 Corporatism is an important feature common to all Western democracies. 
Harold Perkin, in his study of modern England, wrote that the corporate state had an 
intrinsic connection with the welfare state. They both are products of the same ideal 
and motivation. They are the materialisation of the rising of the professional elite and 
the professional ideal it created.2  
 Corporatism, maintains Nordby, offered a solution to the problem of 
representation of the organised interests but has established another one: what 
becomes of those interests that are not organised or are left out of the negotiating 
table? Corporatism also keeps away from public debate certain handlings and the 
making of certain decisions; it operates outside the parliamentarian arena. It 
challenges, in short, the classic concept of democracy.3  
 This is one of the main issues in this work. There is a widespread pessimism 
around the role of the parliament in our societies and the fairness of our political 
systems.4 And we could add, it also easily aroused suspicions about handlings of 
vital issues in dark corners of politics. Corporatism in Norway got its breakthrough 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Nordby. Korporatisme… Apud. Schmitters, Philippe C. “Still the Century of Corporatism?” In: 
Review of Politics, No. 36, 1974. 
2  This elite embraced the professional managers representatives of shareholders, the representatives of 
particular professions and voluntary organisations, Trade Union representatives, the members of the local 
government and the lobbies, governmental ministers and civil servants. They have, according to the author, 
progressively taken control of politics and economics since early in the century, leaving behind the old 
parliamentarian rule, the hegemony of the private capitalist and his free-market mentality, as well as the 
revolutionary aspirations of the proletarian movements. They have instituted the rule of organised interests rather 
than that of individuals or social classes. Cfr. Perkin, Harold. Op. Cit. Passim. 
3  ”Ett ankepunkt [i kritikken mot korporatisme] har vært at organisasjonene får for mye makt, noe som 
blant annet bidrar til økte statsutgifter. Enkelte har dessuten hevdet at organisasjonenes maktstilling står i veien 
for åpne debatter og reelle flertallavgjørelser. Dessuten har kritikken vært rettet mot den skjevheten i 
representasjon son rammer uorganiserte interesser og organisasjoner som holdes utenfor korporative organer 
som tar seg av saker som berører deres interesser.” Nordby.  Korporatisme… P. 11 
4  Cfr. Nordby. I politikkens... 
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after the Second World War with a socialist majority in parliament. Then the 
opposition raised these issues in the electoral struggle, as we will see in another 
chapter. 
In the post-war period the controversy around corporatism and democracy had 
a clear political orientation. The opposition accused Labourite corporatism of 
intending to replace the parliamentarian rule. We might get to a different conclusion 
from theirs, but we depart from the same polemic: does the corporate system create 
an arena that substitutes, overlaps with, or complements the parliamentarian one?  
Should we consider all direct contacts between the organised interests and the 
government as the real power deals?  
 
Some Traits of Corporatism in Norway 
Corporatism in Norway follows the general trends we mentioned before, but it shows 
some particular features. Its development, even if mainly a deal at the top of the 
professional elite, has responded to claims originated in the agricultural and fishing 
organisations, as well as in the Trade Unions.1 As agricultural and fishing interests 
pushed their way into the corporate scheme, they included their demands in the 
development of the welfare state, and certainly contributed to its profile. On the other 
hand, Labour’s singular composition in membership, embracing in its ranks not only 
industrial workers, but agricultural wage earners, fishermen, and forestry workers 
                                                 
1  “I hvert fall gir norsk historie eksempler på at myndighetene, når de har grepet til korporative ordninger, 
har imøtekommet krav som har kommet fra grupper innenfor primærnæringene og arbeidsklasser.” Nordby. 
Korporatisme… P. 38. Perkin points out that the welfare states have developed according to the solutions 
coming from the professional elite. Factory workers were actually more inclined, he wrote, to improvements in 
salaries more than to the development of universal social benefits, for example. Cfr. Perkin. Op. Cit. We can say 
the same on corporatism in the last instance. It was the professional leaders of the Trade Unions and the 
agricultural and fishing interests who pushed those claims into the corporate system. 
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alike,1 and the inroads of the Bondeparti in support of its constituency, account for 
that influence.2  
Norwegian corporatism has roots older than the Labourite take-over. Venstre 
administrations had intervened in the primary economy through regulation on prices 
and through subsidies to farmers since the 1920s; and had introduced “marketing 
centrals” that coordinated efforts in the areas of production and sales to ensure a fair 
price for agricultural products.3 The negotiations on salaries, prices and tariffs in 
these areas, would become an undisputed segment of the corporate system. 
However, we find the key factor towards corporatism in the partnership 
between the Trade Unions and Labour. Labourite control of the parliament was the 
context of corporate breakthrough in Norway.4 
 A long-lasting corporate strategy on the Labour side is characteristic of 
Norway. It is true that the Venstre governments in the interwar period had started 
state expansion and Wilhelm Thagaard’s career as head of the Price Directorate 
embodied thoroughly the latent corporate orientations on the side of the radical wing 
of Venstre, but it was only Labour that stated those principles as key ones in its 
programs. Labour had already begun the professionalisation of its higher ranks in the 
1920s,5 and with it a turn to political solutions and cooperation schemes instead of 
the traditional socialistic methods. 
                                                 
1  On the peculiar composition of Labour’s constituency. Cfr. Rokkan. Op. Cit.; Salminen. Pension 
Schemes in the Making. A Comparative Study of the Scandinavian Countries. Finland, The Central Pension 
Security Institute, 1993. Chapter 2: “Economic and Political Organization of Social classes in the Scandinavian 
Countries”.  
2  Peter Baldwin (The Politics of Social Solidarity. Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975. 
England, Cambridge University Press, 1990) shows how the primary economy interests played an important role 
in the making of the welfare state in Sweden. His conclusions can also be applied to the Norwegian case, and 
they can also help us understand how these interests influence the built-up of the corporate scheme 
3  Cfr. James A. Storing. Norwegian democracy. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1963. P. 8-11. And Larsen, 
Karen. A History of Norway. New York, Princeton, University Press, 1950. P. 521-524. 
4  Cfr. Nordby. Korporatisme… “Skiftende holdninger til korporativ organisering”. 
5  Cfr. Bull, Edvard. “Fra bøndenes og husmennenes samfunn til den organiserte Kapitalisme”. In: Dahl, 
Ottar, Et al. Makt og motiv… Power has tended to concentrate in Norway in larger organisations and institutions 
since the 1920’s. The conflict between labour and capital in Norway concentrated also in the negotiations 
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 Labour’s En norsk treårsplan of 1933 was the basis for later corporate thinking 
in the labour movement, though the party did little to achieve the goals stated there. It 
did not aspire to substitute private enterprises but to create new socialised capital 
that would, in turn, cooperate with the private sector, which would also be under 
public regulation and control. The plan contemplated the creation of a National 
Planning Commission and a National Economy Department in order to coordinate the 
different policies of finance, industry, trade, labour and agriculture. A Corporate 
Council would be created and formed by members of all economic sectors. This 
council must be institutionalised through constitutional reforms and should work along 
with the Storting to reach complete political and economic democracy. 1  
 Many outside the Labour party tried to separate planning and “socialism”. 
They saw the planned economy coming and looked for ways to accommodate to it. 
Some wanted science to become a guide to neutralise politicised projects of planning 
and the party politics in general. A “middle way” without an ideological profile and 
oriented to secure social harmony looked appealing to them.2  
 Tradition, states Nordby, had given the Storting a power beyond practical and 
reasonable terms. In the 1930s, it was considered in certain circles that the executive 
branch was too limited to carry out the duties of administration. The excessive 
attention to details and too much influence of local interests above the common ones 
had already been heavily criticised in the interwar period and some solutions were 
                                                                                                                                                        
between LO and NAF, being the first major agreement involving the two in 1935 (Hovedavtalen), the same year 
Labour took over.   
1  Cfr. Kili. Op. Cit. According to him, this was the first structured speech on corporatism in Norway. 
Drafted by Ole Colbjørsen and Axel Somme, it intended to attract workers as well as farmers. It was inspired by 
the New Economic Plan of the USSR and by radical British ideologists as Keynes and Hobson. Kili suggests that 
corporatism in Norway is rooted in the early thirties when it appeared as a political strategy of the now 
democratic and reform-oriented Labour party for its purpose to enhance economic and political democracy in the 
long run, but under the immediate pressure of the problems posed by the Great Depression. 
2  Cfr. Seip, Anne-Lise. “Science and Social Policy. The Norwegian Debate in 1930s.” In: Scandinavian 
Journal of History. No. 16. She mentions the case of Throne Holst from the firm Freia as one promoter of 
corporatism from within the industrial elite. 
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suggested. The positive intervention of the state began to be seen under a different 
light as the organised interests became steadily more powerful. Solutions were 
formulated. The Labour plan written under the war and called Fremtidens Norge, or 
more commonly known as Blåboka, contained some of them.1 
 The Blåboka talked about economic democracy as an organic and harmonic 
cooperation between labour and capital, and foresaw a free Norway as a synthesis 
between planned economy and social control, on one side, and personal initiative 
and political freedom, on the other. Most important, the Storting should transfer some 
decision power, and limit its work to establish the guidelines for the government, 
grant money, and exercise control over the administration.2 Fremtidens Norge turned 
out to be the basis for the Common Political Program (Fellesprogram) of 1945, in 
which Labourite views prevailed. 
The corporate developments that took place in Norway in the pre-Second 
World War period under Venstre governments were understood as exceptional and 
only legitimate in crisis situations. The Great Depression would change that. The 
memory of the crisis and its rampant unemployment would permeate the Labour 
Party’s corporate plans in the future. 
All of this makes it difficult to include Norwegian corporatism in the all-
embracing diagrams of the welfare and corporate states like that of Peter Flora3 in 
which the built-up of the welfare-corporate states in Western Europe has been 
basically a Liberal adventure detached from the particular political processes; a 
pragmatic, rational approach towards an inner goal of the capitalist system.  
                                                 
1  Cfr. Nordby. Korporatisme… 
2  Cfr. Ibidem. 
3  Cfr. Flora, Peter. ”Introduction”. In: Peter Flora (ed.). Growth to Limits. The Western European 
Welfare States Since World War II. 2v. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1986. (Vol. I. Sweden, Norway, Finland, 
Denmark). 
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 Edvard Bull on the other hand understands the arrival of corporatism, or 
“organised capitalism”, as he calls it, as an extension or a culmination of capitalism.1 
He might have stated that as a counterbalance to the claims of socialisation through 
Labour’s policies. Labour was, indeed, the right instrument for Norway to overcome 
the cyclical economic crisis of capitalism.  
Perkin’s theory of a professional society, though not focused on the Norwegian 
case, helps us overcome the discussion about socialism or capitalism in the 
orientation of Labour policies towards corporatism. Moreover, it is the best to explain 
how an agreement in the elite circles could develop and sustain in Norway. In his 
opinion, the corporate solution has reached beyond a transformation of capitalism: 
classic capitalism finished a process of disintegration, and a new era began. In our 
opinion, the Norwegian case confirms that the classical Liberal version of capitalism 
is dead. 
 
Corporate Pluralism in Norway. Stein Rokkan’s Theory 
Stein Rokkan’s essay on “Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism”, a classic 
on the subject, depicted corporatism in Norway in the 1960s as a negotiating table. 
Issues were discussed, agreements reached, and decisions made, outside and 
beyond the Storting and the eye of the public opinion. A forum in which, according to 
Stein Rokkan, “votes count, resources decide”.2  
 Stein Rokkan also enunciated the theory of “Plural corporatism”. In this, the 
enlargement of state intervention implied the empowering of the organised interests. 
The government had started building up a large network of consultative boards and 
                                                 
1  Edvard Bull wrote to this respect: ”Den organiserte kapitalisme: Det er min påstand at under 
Arbeiderpartiets regjeringstid er kapitalismen blitt fullstendiggjort. Ikke frikonkurransens privatkapitalisme, men 
en organisert kapitalisme, der også statsbedriftene hører hjemme.” ”Fra bøndenes…” P. 233. I disagree with the 
idea that Liberal capitalism somehow was completed by entering into a new phase. 
2  Cfr. Rokkan. Op. Cit. 
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councils for the representation of all relevant interests and had turned itself into the 
nexus, a mediator, in a triangular relation among agricultural and fishing associations, 
capital and labour. At the outset of Labourite rule, Rokkan wrote that the Labour 
government could have backed the claims of the Trade Unions and made their 
interests prevail, but then it would have weakened its position in the elections and 
would have put too much tension in the bargaining process and perhaps ignited 
industrial violence. It simply could not avoid consultations and bargains with the other 
major interests.1 
 At the same time, he adds, electoral results lost influence; the key in the 
corporate system was organisational action, namely the capacity to hurt or halt the 
productive system. Relevant state decisions did not then originate in the Storting but 
in the bargaining table, the meeting point of trade union leaders, representatives of 
the farmers, of the smallholders and of the fishermen, and the delegates of the 
Employers’ Association. 
 Rokkan’s functionalistic perspective has been very influential. For instance, 
one author widely refered to in this work, Francis Sejersted, agrees with Rokkan as to 
describing the political system in Norway as “pluralist”. After discussing the outcome 
of the debate around the enabling acts in the years 1952-1953 and theorising on 
Labour’s retreat from its radical law proposals, Sejersted concludes, as Rokkan, that 
this process ended up at a bargaining table where the organised interests could 
make their voices heard as parts involved in administrative decisions.2  
 
                                                 
1  Ibidem. 
2  When discussing Lindebrække’s choice between political work in the Stortinget and chairmanship in 
the Bankforening to get to influence economic policies in Norway, Sejersted admits that Rokkan’s scheme 
applied to the situation prevailing in those times. Cfr. Francis Sejersted. Opposisjon og posisjon. 1945-1983. 
Oslo, J.V. Cappelens Forlag A/S, 1984. (Høyres Historie 3). P. 124-130.  
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Jens Arup Seip and the One-Party Rule Theory 
Another theory, coming from the side of historians, questioned the pre-eminence of 
the Storting in Post-war Norway from another point of view: the One-party rule theory. 
Contrary to the functionalistic understanding of corporatism, a structural perspective 
that reduces the influence of party politics in the actual role of the Storting, this theory 
stresses the relevance of political handlings. 
In the first parliamentarian election, the Labour party assured socialist 
absolute majority in the Storting. From that day until the King’s Bay incident, Norway 
lived under a one-party rule. The Storting remained in exile until an accident and a 
tortuous process of cooperation of the non-socialistic parties torn this rule apart. Until 
then, the political decision-making process was monopolised within the Labour 
ranks.1 Such is the famous statement by Jens Arup Seip. According to him, Labourite 
take-over meant the end of the previous regime in two ways: a one-party hegemony 
instead of an open society, and the coming of the welfare (-corporate) state.  
Seip elaborated further: The One-party rule nullified in practice the Storting 
and neutralised the opposition. Labour’s majority in the Storting occurred in the 
context of strict parliamentary group obedience to the hierarchy in the party. The 
government became an executive committee of the party. Being an electoral machine 
with huge political and administrative resources, Labour left behind any opposition 
counterbalance to its power. In the political market, they offered and provided most of 
the welfare solutions and gained an image of guardians of the reconstruction and 
prosperity to the eyes of the voters.  
The Labour party was different from the rest, with a tendency to an inner-
control structure led by the General Secretary. During the Postwar era, the Prime 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Seip, Jens Arup. To linjer i Norsk Historie. Fra embetsmannsstat til ettpartistat. Høyre gjennom 
hundre år 1880-1980. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1987. ”Ettspartistaten”. 
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Minister and the General Secretary (alternatively Gerhardsen and Torp) were the 
heads of power in Norway. At the same time, the administration in Oslo took control 
over the rest of the country. Seip used concepts as “Caesarism” and “Stalinism” to 
describe the scenario. But even knowing this, the political process in Norway, stated 
Seip, had become a mystery. 
If we accept this characterisation as correct, we have run across a striking 
similarity with what was happening in the United States and Great Britain. Wright 
Mills wrote on a post-war America1 where the Congress was relegated to a servile 
position before the executive, where the parties were big corporations themselves, 
and where the common citizen, apart from the organised interests, was powerless. 
Between this and the power elite there were the experts, the officials of the corporate 
state. Perkin affirmed that in the post-war era the British Parliament lost power before 
the executive.2 Labourites and Conservatives fought to obtain a mandate from the 
electorate to enable professional politicians to handle politics. The government 
controlled the Parliament to a larger extent than the opposite, while the National 
leadership of the parties controlled the MPs and the party members, and the Primer 
Minister ruled over the party. 
Seip also highlighted the fact that the new political scheme implied a 
bureaucratic pact that brought together the old bureaucracy and the new one 
instituted with the expansion of the state. A deal at the top between the old and the 
new elites to solve the structural failures of Liberal capitalism and maintain what 
nowadays is called corporatism and the rule of experts.3 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Op. Cit. 
2  Cfr. Perkin. Op. Cit. 
3  “Det skjer ikke som forespeilet en opphevelse av klasser i betydning sosiale elementer med egen stilling 
i produksjonsprosessen og spesielt forhold til produksjonens frukter. Men det kommer til et samarbeid på toppen 
mellom næringslivets menn og byråkratiet i utvidet –til sammen en bred samling av teknikere som gjennom 
ettpartisystemet har velgerne under kontroll.” Jens Arup Seip. Op. Cit. P. 43. 
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Labour instituted corporatism; the party would lose its hegemony, but 
corporatism stayed. Was corporatism in Norway in its earliest stage one with the 
One-party rule?  Were those two parallel phenomena? Edvard Bull understood them 
as separate ones and criticised Seip’s theory because it implied that the one-party 
rule characterised post-war Norway. The new social system, argued Bull, was not 
determined by the new political setting, but by the organised capitalism that came to 
being.1 We, on the contrary, have reasons not to disregard Seip’s assumption that 
both were intertwined. 
Before getting to a further discussion it is time to include an overview of a 
social theory with an opposite direction to these two already presented, that of Trond 
Nordby’s. 
 
The Storting at the Centre of Politics. Nordby’s Theory 
The background of Seip and Rokkan’s theories is a political tradition in which the 
Storting should rule almost alone in the political process. Trond Nordby puts this 
tradition into question and asserts that the parliamentarian tradition in Norway, 
contrary to other political systems, implied a perhaps too powerful Storting whose 
authority over the executive branch has not been properly compensated. 
 He maintains that, in spite of the continuous strenghtening of the central 
administration, parliamentarian rule in Norway has been preserved and the Storting is 
still at the centre of politics. 
                                                 
1  “Den organisering av kapitalismen som foregikk i mellomkrigstida, har først i etterkrigstida fått sine 
fulle utslag. Dermed er vi inne i den perioden Jens Seip karakteriserte som ettpartistatens. Ordet var ikke helt 
vellykket, siden Arbeiderpartiet aldri behersket situasjonen slik at regjeringen kunne være sikker på å bli sittende 
over neste valg. Men framfor alt har det vist seg, etter at Seip holdt sitt foredrag i 1963 under Lyngregjeringens 
korte uker, at den ene partis regime kunne falle sammen uten at vi merket noe større til det (…). Det kan ikke ha 
vært det ene parti som var poenget i vår nye samfunnsform.” Edvard Bull. Op. Cit. P. 233. 
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Nordby’s main thesis about the role of the Storting is a good counterweight to 
previous, less optimistic, theories on how parliamentarism has been developing in 
Norway.  
 It is through the presentation of the parliamentarian forms, traditions and 
issues in Norway that Nordby gives us a context that we can use to evaluate what the 
role of the Storting was in the post-war period. The author also gives us a practical 
parliamentarian framework to work with, that of negative parliamentarism: as long as 
the Storting can force a government to depart after a vote of no confidence we can 
talk of parliamentary rule. 1 
 The issue raised by the opposition after the Labourite take-over was of the 
increasing delegation of power from the Storting to the administration. The 
polarisation of the debate led to affirmations of a threat of dictatorship and an actual 
inner corruption of the political system. The negotiations behind closed doors, the 
influence of the big organisations, were seen as diminishing not only the jurisdiction 
but the role of the Storting to the extent of some circles of the opposition announcing 
the end of parliamentarian rule.  
Nordby conceives this pessimistic view as a result of a faulty perspective. He 
pinpointed the trends that, after the Second World War, have come to change the 
Norwegian political system, namely, those towards corporatism, pluralism2 and the 
rule of experts. These trends are related, in his analysis, with delegation of power or 
change of the forms and means of the legislative branch. Nordby admits that the 
Storting has lost influence in two directions, both limiting its area of jurisdiction, 
                                                 
1  “Etter overgangen til parlamentarisme (...) har regjeringsdannelsen vært underlagt valgdemokratiet; det 
vil si at en regjering må gå av dersom Stortinget krever det, og når regjeringsfløyen taper sitt parlamentariske 
grunnlag i valg” . Trond Nordby. I politikkens… P. 27. 
2  In Nordby’s case, ”pluralism” has two different meanings. Here it is different from that given to it by 
Rokkan and Sejersted. For Nordby: “Det pluralistiske innslaget handler, så lenge Stortinget stilles i sentrum, en 
lobbyvirksomhet og komitéhøringer.” Ibidem.  P. 206.  
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through the international agreements and through the enlargement of the 
administration. However, he does not agree with the statement that the activities of 
lobbies and interest groups weaken the Storting. He disagrees as well with those who 
affirm that the Storting is just devoted to symbolic politics or to details in the law-
making process. 
Nordby wrote that these developments were sooner or later accompanied by 
the proper counterbalances and that they never challenged,1 but reoriented, the 
supremacy of the Storting as the centre of politics.2 
  
Opposition or Complement? A Reconsideration of the Three Theories 
It is best to begin our analysis going over the criticism against Rokkan and Seip by 
Nordby. In an earlier book by Nordby, Korporatisme på norsk, the author criticised, 
on the side of social theory, Rokkan’s description of the pluralist corporatism reached 
in Norway in the fifties. The Labourite government, he stated, did not limit itself to the 
role of mediator in a system where organisations ruled to the extent their resources 
allowed.  
 Rokkan experienced an era of high political consensus around the goals of the 
welfare state in Norway. He saw the organised interests acquire representation and 
being empowered by the corporate scheme to put their demands forward, and he 
thought of it as the rule of organisations. In a perspective that might apply better to 
the American case, he stated that a plural corporatism ruled in Norway.  
                                                 
1  The contacts between the different parts involved taking place outside the Storting, according to 
Nordby, do not neccesarily break the parliamentarian order: “Med tanke på den kontakten de folkevalgte har 
med byråkrater, må vi spørre hvorfor ikke slike kontakter skulle finne sted så lenge det handler om utveksling av 
informasjon. Hvis det er tilfellet, trues verken maktfordeling eller parlamentarisme.”  Idem. P. 158. 
2  The author puts it this way: “De folkevalgte står (...) overfor en langt mer autonomi og kompleks 
forvaltning, og de er heller ikke i stand til å detaljstyre på samme måte som før gjennom lover og bevilgninger. 
Den store utfordringen er å stå fram som et normdannende sentrum i samfunnet, og legge føringer gjennom 
retningsgivende debatter.” Idem. P. 202.  
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Nordby, however, attentive to the evidence on the structure of the corporate 
handlings, focused on the state involvement, and did not find those organisations so 
freely influencing the system.1 Nordby questions the term “corporate pluralism”2 to 
describe post-war Norway. He would rather use the term “social corporatism”3 since 
corporatism was a series of deals at the top of the power elite, and in a context where 
the big organisations enjoyed a monopoly in their own area.4 These deals took place 
within a framework and an agenda set by the government.5 Nordby indeed states that 
the Labourite corporate project headed in the direction of “state corporatism”.6  
What came out of the enabling acts debate in the fifties was, in Nordby’s 
perspective, a “modus vivendi” among the Establishment that assured political 
stability in the corporate arrangement.7 The business community and the non-
socialistic opposition could feel less bound to one-sided decisions and more taken 
                                                 
1  ”Rokkans forestilling om en ’korporativ pluralisme’ har altså dominert norsk samfunnsforskning, og det 
har stått som uomtvistelig sannhet at de korporative organene i første rekke styrker organisasjonenes 
maktstilling. Den følgende analysen må leses som et forsøk på å snu dette perspektivet –slik at vekten legges på 
spørsmålet om hvorvidt de samme organene fungerte som statlige styringsredskaper”. Nordby. Korporatisme… 
P. 34-35. 
2  Here Nordby gives the term a meaning in relation to what Rokkan and Sejersted wrote about. He 
describes pluralism as a corporate scheme with “åpne diskusjoner der makten ligger enten hos organisasjonenes 
medlemmer eller hos velgerne i politiske valg og konkurrerende organisasjoner.” Ibidem. P. 13. 
3  In this scheme: “reelle overlegninger mellom eliter fra stat og organisasjoner der staten likevel sitter 
med et overtak, og topptunge organisasjoner som har monopolisert representasjonen innenfor sitt område.” Idem. 
P. 13. 
4  About Rokkan and Sejersted’s statement on a pluralist corporate system in Norway, affirms Nordby: 
“Etter mitt syn treffer denne begrepsbruken dårlig. La gå at de politiske myndighetene langt mindre enn i 
gjenreisningsårene styrte ved diktat og at det ble gitt større åpninger for reelle overlegninger og forhandlinger. 
Men det meste av virksomheten foregikk fremdeles i fast organiserte former, samtidig som lederskapet på begge 
sider av forhandlingsbordet –i hvert fall for lønnsfastsettelsens del—bygde videre på ’toppfolkenes partnerskap’. 
Til forskjell fra det som kjennetegner et pluralistisk system, beholdt også de store organisasjonene hele tiden 
monopol på å representere innenfor sine interesseområder”. Idem. P. 123. 
5  “Videre er det –i hvert fall i Norge—de offentlige myndighetene sentralt som oppnevner statlige utvalg. 
Dessuten avgjør myndighetene hvilke problemer statlige utvalg skal behandle. I tillegg utformer de mandater og 
instrukser og bestemmer hvor lenge et utvalg skal sitte sammen. Når det handler om rådgivning, er det opp til 
myndighetene å avgjøre hvorvidt de skal følge det rådet et utvalg gir. Likeledes er lønnsforhandlingene 
omgjerdet av legale og institusjonelle rammer, som gjør at organisasjonene vanskelig kan holde staten utenfor 
om den først ønsker å gripe regulerende inn (…)”. Idem. P. 26. Also Cfr. Nordby. I politikkens… 
6  Here there is complete state control. Cfr. Nordby. Korporatisme… 
7  ”Samlet sett var årene mellom striden rundt pris- og rasjonaliseringsloven og oljekrisen i 1973/74 den 
perioden av nyere norsk historie som har vært mest preget av konsensus. I hvert fall mellom ’toppfolkene’ innen 
organisasjoner og partier var det en grunnlegende enighet (…)”. Nordby. Idem. P. 67-68. 
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into account; in other words, empowered in the final corporate deal. However, this did 
not establish a pluralist rule. 
 On the other hand, the criticism by Nordby towards Seip’s theory rests on the 
assumption that the Storting was very active in the period mentioned, and that the 
opposition was not as powerless as Seip declared. Indeed, Labour had to yield to 
some pressure from the opposition to keep its electoral success. Gerhardsen, he 
adds, could not be compared to a Caesar.1 
 Nordby disagrees with the extreme parliamentarian pessimism that Seip’s 
essay represents. He replies that the Storting was and is still at the centre of politics 
and has only reduced its area of influence, given up the old detailed handling of 
issues, and dealt with a more autonomous and complex administration. Delegation of 
authority in certain limited areas is contemplated in the parliamentarian rule, and in 
the Norwegian case, this has been done without evading the necessary 
parliamentarian control over the organs established and their work. During the 
Labourite golden period, the foundations of parliamentarian rule remained intact, 
namely, the vote of no confidence, and the capacity of the Storting of getting the 
cabinet members to respond for their office; this last one, a prerogative that proved 
useful in the case of King’s Bay.2 
We can profit much from Nordby’s remarks. However, the overview Nordby 
gives us on the role of the Storting in history does not give us a definite answer to our 
main problem. We can agree that the Storting could no longer be the place where all 
political power was concentrated; it had accumulated power without the proper 
counterbalances; delegation of power was healthy and reasonable. But he has also 
given us reasons to suspect a real threat against the rule of the Storting in his 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Nordby. I politikkens… P. 281-282. 
2  Cfr. Ibidem. 
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comments on Rokkan’s theory. He himself enlists the dangers posed to the 
parliamentarian rule brought by the post-war changes, mainly the informal handlings 
between parties and parts that did not reach public light and tied the opposition 
before an issue was handled in the Storting.1 Then the existence of a bureaucracy 
with political ambitions and its correlation with the enabling acts as its tool to gain 
more room for action,2 and finally the factual shrinking of the Storting’s area of 
influence.  
Inner corruption should perhaps not be identified, and in this Nordby could be 
right, with the structural arrangement of politics in Norway, but during the post-war 
period there was a danger that a Storting controlled by the party enabled the 
administration to avoid democratic control. A “culture”, he admits, that prevailed 
during the Labourite golden age. 3  
 Even when Nordby proves that the role of the Storting preserved its centrality 
in politics during the post-war era, namely, that the corporate advances impulsed by 
the Labour government did not rule out the Storting as an arena of negotiation or as 
the law-making organ, there are still some questions to ask. What about the factual 
relation between the Storting and the government in the Labourite golden age? 
                                                 
1  ”En negativ effekt av uformelle forhandlinger kan også være at standpunktene låses før Stortinget skal 
behandle saken. Når slike forhandlinger før er avsluttet, kan det bli vanskelig for opposisjonspartiene å gå imot 
regjerings forslag – om de skulle ha skiftet standpunkt etter at forhandlingene fant sted. Ikke minst må det være 
kritikkverdig at partienes gruppeledere får anledning til å hevde sin mening uten at partienes øvrige 
gruppemedlemmer er tatt med på råd.” Idem. P. 170. 
2  Here, Nordby makes the interesting observation that experts were not independent from the politicians 
to this respect, since they enjoyed delegated power and had to wait until there was the political will for them to 
start building up policies to their benefit. “...de har aldri hatt monopol på bestemte politiske og administrative 
oppgaver. Derimot har de sluppet til når de administrative og politiske makthavere har hatt brukt for dem ---som 
under planpolitikkens æra.” Idem. P. 199. 
3  “En løpende trussel mot den etablerte maktfordelingen er indre perverteringer (…). Under et 
flertallsstyre kommer trusselen fra den andre siden, ved at regjeringen –med støtte fra regjeringsfløyen i 
Stortinget –trumfer sin vilje gjennom og unndrar seg demokratisk kontroll. Dette skjedde under Arbeiderpartiets 
storhetstid. Den gangen ble det i tilknytning til Kings Baysaken tatt et nødvendig oppgjør med denne ’kulturen’.” 
Idem. P. 173. 
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During the post-war era, did the Storting control the government or vice versa?1 Was 
it, as the bourgeoisie opposition put it, that when one knew what Labour planned, 
one knew what would happen? In other words, did the Labourite elite in fact use the 
Storting as an instrument of power? 
The theory developed by Jens A. Seip touched a key question. Namely, how 
did the party work? When Rokkan underestimated the electoral process, he also put 
aside the issue of the actual political rules or took them for granted. Nordby, faithful to 
a sociological perspective, was not consequent with the study of the political will to 
exercise control through the corporate system. Seip admitted he could not answer 
such a question, but he also provided us with some hints that make sense under the 
light of other references.  
In the relation between the government and the Storting in the period he 
studied, Seip wrote that the first dominated over the second, and that the 
government, in the hands of Labour, concentrated power in the leadership of the 
party. The initiative of the two Labour Prime Ministers, Gerhardsen and Torp, would 
be decisive in the orientation of the corporate arrangements.  
Nordby does not rule out Seip’s characterisation of personal power and wrote 
that Gerhardsen was more oriented towards state control than Torp, under which 
administration the Sjaastad’s committee’s proposal on rationalisation was dropped. 
And he mentions the case of the Coordination Council (Samordnigsråd), appointed to 
be a consultative organ for the government and the administration and where the 
main economic groups were represented and consensus among them was built. This 
                                                 
1  Jens Arup Seip gives two important teachings about political history in his review of the collection Det 
norske Stortings historie on the period 1814-1964: the relation between the government and the Storting is an 
essential question, and only getting inside political parties’ lives can we get a lot from the study of politics. Cfr. 
Seip. Tanke og handling i norsk historie. Oslo, Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1968. “Stortinget som statsmakt”.  
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Trond Bergh called a substitute of the Storting.1  Gerhardsen used this corporate 
organ as an instrument of power.2 He took advantage of the prevailing consensus 
during the reconstruction period and a majority in the Samordningsråd to pass his 
own proposals, to legitimise his own positions, and to bind the other participants in 
the negotiation. However, he would witness the fading of this council and the 
consensus around it as the reconstruction period ended. The council tried 
unsuccessfully to take charge of the making of the National Budget against heavy 
opposition and ended up as a secretariat from 1952 to 1954, when it was formally 
dissolved.3 Its successor, the Cooperation Committee (Samarbeidsnemnda) 
established in 1951 by the Ministry of Finance was founded under less ambitious 
state control guidelines, but not under pluralistic direction.4  
One of the motivations of corporatism on the government side has been to 
make the organised interests co-participants of certain decisions. To get their 
approval and bind them, as Nordby acknowledges.5 
                                                 
1  Nordby gives this reference on Bergh. In paper, this council was ”et rådgivende fellesorgan for de 
departementer og direktorater som går inn under dets mandatområde” (Nordby. Korporatisme… P. 112). Among 
those areas, it included reconstruction works, price policies, employment, currency regulation, income 
agreements, and rationalisation of production. It embraced representatives of the state administration (the Price 
director, the Labour director, and the director of the Statistik sentralbyrå), the industry, commerce, agriculture, 
fishing, and the labour movement. The government decided on the number of members and which organised 
groups could take part. Cfr. Ibidem.  
2  The council was directly under responsibility of the Primer Minister’s office. The way it worked in 
practice, the departments and directorates monopolised the right to put forward proposals. “I en tidlig fase brukte 
Gerhardsen rådet når han skulle lose i havn økonomiske politiske avgjørelser som stod strid om. Det gjaldt 
særlig subsidier, priser og lønninger. Særlig de første par årene –inntil reorganiseringen i 1946—var rådet slik 
satt sammen at Gerhardsen alltid kunne regne med flertallets støtte. I tillegg hadde han god anledning til å styre 
via sine folk i rådet –framfor noen gjaldt dette formennene (…). 
 ”De standpunktene flertallet i rådet inntok, kunne i neste omgang brukes til å legitimere den politikken 
regjeringen førte”. Idem. P. 114-115. 
 Also Cfr. Bergh, Trond. Storhetstid (1945-1965). Oslo, Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1987. 
(Arbeiderbevegelsens Historie i Norge, 5). ”Økonomisk og industrielt demokrati—innflytelse og medansvar”. 
3  ”En umiddelbar årsak til at Samordningsrådet havarerte, var at det hadde vokst fram indre spenninger 
rundt faste konstellasjoner. Den økende polariseringen skyldes at arbeiderbevegelsens ’naturlige’ fiender etter 
hvert regnet det samarbeid gjenreisningen krevde, for å være over. Dessuten hadde de ulike opposisjonsgruppene 
greid å samle seg organisatorisk (…)”. Nordy. Korporatisme... P. 64. 
4  That is the evaluation by Nordby ( Ibidem. P. 64) in his criticism to Sejersted on the same topic. 
According to Nordby, Sejersted interpreted the Samarbeidsnemnda as one corporative channel recurred to by the 
opposition in the search for opportunities outside the parliamentarian arena dominated by Labour. He gave a 
description of the work of this council that Nordby sees as more compatible with social corporatism. 
5  Cfr. Idem. 
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There is another point we should go over. The time scope of Nordby’s study 
on the role of the Storting is not the most appropriate for ours. In his, the power of the 
Storting is seen in a perspective in which the period of Labour’s attempts to direct the 
economy loses some relevance. Although his statement that Norwegian corporatism 
has never implied that the Storting have a functional nature that can be easily 
accepted, and is not necessarily rejected by assuming the validity of the theory of 
One-party rule in the post-war era, his conclusion that the authority of the Storting in 
law-making and tax setting has not been challenged can be questioned when 
referred to this specific period.  
The assumption of the Storting remaining at the centre of politics does not 
really contradict the thesis of a One-party rule. Labour, in this last theory, controlled 
the Storting through its majority. The majority responded to a party discipline not 
seen in Norway before. The government, in other words, had control over it and could 
eventually use it as an instrument of power. Labour even opposed the proposals to 
enhance referendums and the power of dissolution of the Storting put forward by the 
opposition. This could have threatened the legislative status quo now in their favour. 
One wonders whether it is possible, as Nordby interprets in the case of 
corporatist models following Schmitter, to talk about different kinds of One-party 
states. Among others, the former Soviet Union would be an example of total control 
of the political scenery by a party; Mexico under the revolutionary government would 
exemplify a society which enjoyed power division and a theoretical rule by the 
Congress, a political opposition, and free elections contemplated by the constitution, 
but where the ruling party in practice had control of the electoral process. In these 
two instances, the legislative branch could be regarded as the recording machine of 
the ruling party’s resolutions. Norway during the golden age of Labour would be 
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another type where free elections were a fact, but in which a party managed 
successfully to hold power for a couple of decades.1 We are to define what role 
parliament played in this last case. 
Corporatism vs. One-party rule. What characterises Postwar Norway best is 
perhaps a question wrongly stated. The thesis of this work is that a specific form of 
corporatism and the one-party rule represent a unity in the period right after the end 















                                                 
1  Seip himself gives us an overview on One-party-ruled countries at the time he wrote his famous essay: 
 “Det fins rene ett-partistater, hvor velgerne i valg ikke har noe valg. 
 “Det fins en annen type hvor ett eneste parti har oppsuget all politisk makt, og innforlivet den med seg 
gjennom lengre tid. Hvor der riktignok er en opposisjon, men hvor dens utsikter til å bli regjeringsdyktig er 
meget små. Vi har et slikt system i India, i Frankrike, under De Gaulle, i mange afrikanske stater. Vi har det i 
Norge”. To linjer i Norsk Historie…”Ettspartistaten”. P. 27. 
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CHAPTER II. PARLIAMENTARISM AND ONE-PARTY RULE. THE VIEWS OF THE 
POLITICAL OPPOSITION 
 
Three Issues of Parliamentarism: Electoral Law, Plebiscites and Dissolution 
Power 
It seems that the politicians of the opposition in the period here studied described 
One-party rule and corporatism as a unity. They did not make use, of course, of 
these terms, but they express them in other ways in their speeches. The main 
arguments by the political opposition against the changes Labour promoted in the 
administration and the economic system were that they were undemocratic, 
unconstitutional, and economically dangerous. They represented a threat of abuse of 
power and a rupture with the parliamentarian order. Let us go over each of these 
claims. First, that of Labour overlooking the people’s will. 
The legacy of the pre-war years was quite notorious in several key issues in 
economics and politics. There is a paragraph of the Common Political Programme 
(Fellesprogrammet) of 1945 in which we identify the heritage of a pre-war debate on 
parliamentarism, and that was mentioned and invoked several times in the political 
speeches: 
På det nye Storting må valgloven endres for at Stortinget kan bli det best 
mulige uttrykk for folkeviljen (…). Det gjennomføres en forenklet samlet 
budsjettbehandling og en parlamentarisk praksis som kan styrke Regjeringens 
stilling og ansvar. Spørsmålet om folkeavstemning og oppløsningsrett tas opp 
til ny utredning.1 
 
 In the pre-war years, the role of the government had not been seen as strong 
enough to carry out the policies and administrative work required in National politics, 
and the Storting had been criticised for its excessive detailed handling of 
                                                 
1  ”Fellesprogrammet. De politiske partienes samarbeidsprogram for gjenreisningen”. In: Norsk innenriks 
politikk. Compiled by Knut E. Eriksen and Geir Lundestad. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1972. (Kilder til moderne 
historie II.) 
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administrative questions.1 The rule of the Storting had created an imbalance among 
the three powers and it should be compensated with, on one side, a praxis in which 
the government was not so restrained and, on the other, with the resource to 
referendums and the power of dissolution of the Storting consecrated by law.2 
 On the same lines, the goal of designing a new electoral law, in which the 
proportional representation gave the parties as many representatives as the total 
percentage of voters in their favour, became an issue. 
 These questions had originally aroused from the circumstance resulting from 
coalition governments in which the administration was very dependent of the balance 
of forces within the Storting. A plebiscite or the dissolution of parliament could solve 
debates in which a decisive majority was difficult to achieve. In a few words, they 
were considered a good option regarding the problem of govern ability in the pre-war 
times.  
 A qualitative shift took place after the Second World War and the coming of a 
Labour majority. They became electoral issues during the period studied here, but 
were raised by the political opposition not as a way to set limits to the rule of the 
Storting and to enhance the power of the administration, but for the opposite: as a 
strategy to put breaks on the majority rule in parliament, as a sort of veto power 
against the government, as well as a way to press for a consensus that satisfied also 
the opposition parties.  
It was the assumption that there was a One-party rule what changed the 
nature of the debate. What could lead to a further argumentation in favour of a 
                                                 
1  Stortinget’s “Grunnlovjuristeriet”, it was called. Cfr. Bernt A. Nissen. „Demokratisk fornyelse“. In: 
Samtiden, 1945. P. 302-308; and Chr. S. Oftedal. “Folkestyrets teknikk”. In: Samtiden, 1945. P. 216-217. 
2  Trond Nordby points out accurately that the theory of balance of power contradicts a Storting rule, and 
that the exaggeratedly detailed administrative work of the Storting had been critised during the interwar period. 
This issue has not been solved properly up to our days, according to the author. Cfr. Nordby. I politikkens 
sentrum… ”Særtrekk ved norsk parlamentarisme”. 
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limitation of the power of the Storting for the sake of the division of power principle 
and an effective administration, changed directions to a discussion about the losing 
of the prerogatives of the legislative and judicial branches before the executive, and 
ultimately to the demand of a Storting rule over the government. The main issue 
became the delegation of power away from the Storting and the threat of abuse of 
power by the majority party.  
 This curious phenomenon introduced a tension in the speech that was peculiar 
to the debate on constitutionality and parliamentarism in those years. As we try to 
make sense of the electoral speech of the opposition, we find out that the 
argumentation was not always coherent. Sometimes contradictory or not very 
compatible arguments were put together to respond to the needs of the political 
struggle. Besides the demands of expressing or hiding political purposes or interests, 
the speech of the different opposition groups was also in the making, carrying a 
burden of tradition, and replying to the speech of Labour.  
 
a) Quest for a new electoral law 
The use of referendums and of the power of dissolution of the parliament was not 
included in the constitution, neither was it consecrated by costume,1 whereas the 
problem with the electoral law was the opposite. It was bound to the constitution and 
a change towards a more simplified order that represented “the people’s will” was 
thus difficult to achieve.  A two-third majority was required to pass any constitutional 
change. 2 And there was the further obstacle of the bondeparagraf, whose annulment 
                                                 
1  Idem. 
2  Nissen insisted in 1950 (”Foran siste etappe i valgordningssaken”. In: Samtiden. 1950. P. 162) that it 
was a pity that two thirds of the electoral commission were needed to change the electoral law: “Det verste ved 
grunnlovsbindingen er nettopp dette, fordi det medfører at enhver justering blir et politisk tautrekkingsspørsmål. 
For å få en forandring må det 2/3 flertall til, og dette er vanskelig å oppnå, fordi det alltid er lett å mobilisere 
minst femti distriktsrepresentanter som føler sine interesser truet hver gang det skal forandres på noe”. 
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was opposed by the Bondeparti.1 There was in the beginning a very small possibility 
of agreement among the bourgeoisie parties around the issue of a new electoral law. 
 The magazine Samtiden, a liberal publication oriented to the Old Venstre, 
offers us a couple of articles on those issues written right after the war by an editor, 
Bernt A. Nissen, and a member of the Storting, Chr. S. Oftedal, both Venstre men. 
The first added to the problem the issue of representation of organised interests and 
claimed that the constitution had to adjust to the times to make democracy 
(Folkestyre) prevail. Since the recourse to dissolution and plebiscites, necessary for a 
more effective government, was not contemplated in the constitution and could not 
be defended on the side of constitutional zeal, he used the argument that 
parliamentarism itself was not constitutionally grounded. So it was not at risk if there 
were any constitutional changes to come in this area.2 The second asked for trust in 
a strong government and the recourses mentioned, and advocated a simplified 
electoral system.3  
 The overwhelming Labourite party machine was not yet the biggest problem 
for these opposition writers. However, it soon became relevant. Among the 
bourgeoisie parties, Venstre was particularly active in the work to get the recourses 
already mentioned approved,4 and joined the others in regarding the prevalent 
                                                 
1  The bondeparagraf determined that the distribution of representatives between country and urban 
districts had to be 2 to 1. 
2  ”Det står ingen ting i Grunnloven om folkeavstemning like litt som det står noe om parlamentarismen”. 
Nissen. Demokratisk… P. 307.  
3  ”Vi må ha mot til å vise tillit [til regjeringen]. 
 ”Vi må igjen gjøre folkestyret folkelig, gjennom store linjer og et enkelt system: enmannskretser”. 
Oftedal. Op. Cit. P. 216-217. Since 1919, there was a proportional representation (forholdstallsvalg) electoral 
system in Norway based on the d’Hondts method of distribution of seats in the Storting; thanks to this, Labour 
could enjoy a majority of seats in the post-war era without enjoying a corresponding absolute majority in the 
National vote. In 1953, after negotiations between the opposition, particularly Høyre, and Labour, the 
bondeparagraf was annulled and the d’Hondts method was replaced by a modified version of the Sante-Lagües 
method. These developments advanced the cause of the bourgeoisie parties. 
4  Cfr. Nordby. I politikkens sentrum…. 
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electoral system at the end of the war as another tool in the Labourite quest for 
power: 
Regjeringens styrke har vist seg å være ensidig og smalsporet. Til sine tider 
har den hatt styrke nok til å gå sine egne politiske veger, takket være en 
urettvis valgordning, som har ført til et utrettvist flertall for Arbeiderpartiet på 
Stortinget, uten at partiet har flertall i folket. Den populært kalte Oksvikianske 
valgordningen, som ble vedtatt med odelstingspresident Oksviks 
dobbeltstemme, var midlet som sikret partiet representant-flertallet på 
Stortinget.1 
 
In 1953, Oftedal still considered a comeback of what he termed a 
“mindretallsparlamentarisme” a worse threat than a majority rule. However, he stated 
that the different political views in the Storting, meaning the different parties, should 
have a proportional representation in government. Then the lack of consensus that 
might eventually appear would be solved through plebiscites. It was a big shift from 
his original position.2  
The leadership of Venstre proposed a plural composition of government in the 
National Assembly of 1953: 
Venstre vil arbeide for en regjering sammensatt av alle store partier –ikke som 
en midlertidig ordning etter første eller neste valg,-- men som en varig ordning 
bygget på det grunnsyn at i tidens vansker vil et samvirke over partigrense 
være den viktigste og beste løsning. 
En regjering sammensatt med forholdsvis på mange representanter for 
partiene som hvert parti får i Stortinget, vil gi den politiske fasthet land og folk 
krever og trenger. 
…Slik som kommunestyret velger ordfører og formannskap kan 
Stortinget velge statsminister og regjering.3 
 
                                                 
1  Per Bergsvendsen. Venstre-politikk 1945-1951. En framstilling av Venstregruppens arbeid i Stortinget. 
Kongsvinger, Norges Venstrelag, 1951. The new electoral law did not get an approval of the majority in 
parliament, but was passed after Olav Oksvik, Labour Minister and then president of the Odelsting, used his 
decisive vote in favour of the law. 
2  ”Hovedsaken er at under de nye omstendigheter vil partipolitikk i gammeldags forstand ikke kunne 
drives. Da vil det være riktig at folkets forskjellige politiske syn, slik det har gitt seg uttrykk i Stortinget, blir 
forholdsmessig representert i regjeringen. Uenighet eller usikkerhet i avgjørende spørsmål innenfor Storting og 
regjering, eller mellom Storting og regjering, bør legges fram for folket selv med referendum…” Oftedal. 
”Stortingsvalg og regjeringsmakt”. In: Samtiden, 1953. P. 175-176. Trond Hegna replied to Oftedal from the 
Labourite side and stated that parliamentarist rule implied a majority party (Cfr. “Regjeringsparti og opposisjon”. 
Samtiden, 1953. P. 228-236). There is unfortunately no place in this work to follow debates of this nature any 
further. 
3  Venstre årsmelding for 1953. Oslo, Arne S. Mørk, 1954. P. 24. 
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The appeal to make the people’s will prevail had been mixed already with the 
claim that Labour imposed the force of its majority in both the composition of 
government and the voting of the Storting. A tyranny of the majority was being 
suffered. If plebiscites were now advocated by Oftedal as a means to go over 
disagreements within the Storting or the government, or between both, it was under 
the hope to break that majority through popular vote. A plebiscite would not have had 
the limitations of the electoral system in function. Even though it would not bind the 
government to yield to the outcome, it might, the opposition expected, prove the 
mandate of Labour not representative. 
This form of empowerment that the opposition looked for came out in the 
electoral propaganda as empowerment of the voters. On these lines, Venstre 
included the demand for a fairer electoral system and the recourses of plebiscites, 
power of dissolution in its election programs as a means to build up democracy 
(folkestyre) and, it claimed, empower the voter. In the Venstre 1949 program it said: 
Ny valgordning som gir alle stemmeberettigede samme politiske innflytelse på 
landets styre gjennom utjevningsmandater, og gir velgerne mer å si når det 
gjelder kåringen av representantene. Folkeavstemning i viktige saker. 
Spørsmålet om oppløsningsrett utredes.1 
 
The 1953 program is even clearer in its argumentation: 
Gjennom utjamningsmandat må valgordningen gi hvert parti den 
representasjon på Stortinget som det skal ha etter stemmetall in folket. Den 
enkelte velger må få mer å si ved personvalget. Hove til folkeavstemning i 
viktige prinsippsaker. Rett til å oppløse Stortinget og skrive ut nye valg.2 
 
Høyre shared in general this point of view. In its election programmes, the 
plead to revise the electoral arrangement to match the people’s will in 1945, became 
a party compromise for a fair electoral system in 1949,3 and added: 
                                                 
1  Valgprogram for Venstre 1949. Oslo, Abeco, 1949. 
2  Valgprogram for Venstre 1953. Kristiansand Fædrelandsvennens trykkeri, 1953.  
3  In 1945, Høyre’s electoral programme declared: ”Valgordningen revideres for å sikre et valgresultat 
som er overensstemmende med folkets vilje” (Høires program ved stortingsvalget 1945. Oslo, Fabritius 
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Høire vil arbeide for at velgerne gjennom folkeavstemninger gis en mer direkte 
innflytelse på avgjørelsen av viktige samfunnsspørsmål.1 
 
The Bondeparti, which did not mention the issue at all in its 1945 election 
programme, shared this last argument in 19492 and then again in the 1953 elections, 
after the case of the Bondeparagraf had been lost for the party.3 The Kristelig 
Folkeparti, which barely asked voters in 1945 to read the Common Programme on 
this issue, summarised a common argumentation of the opposition in its 1949 
electoral programme: 
Flertallstyre I samsvar med folkeviljen, men også med mindretallets rett til å 
legge fram sitt syn og hevde sine meninger. En bedre valgordning som gir 
partiene de mandater som stemmetallet tilsier.4  
 
 In 1953, the Kristelig Folkeparti only mentioned that the Common Programme 
had not been totally satisfied, and so the party would continue fighting for a truly fair 
electoral system. 5 
Opponents claimed that a fairer electoral scheme would, claimed the 
opposition, on one hand, enable the minority to take over, one condition of 
democratic rule, although the tensions among the bourgeoisie parties made this 
unattainable in practice6 and electoral results were indeed frustrating. The debate on 
                                                                                                                                                        
Rotationstrykkeri, 1945); and in 1949: ”Høire vil arbeide for en rettferdig valgordning, som sikrer at Stortingets 
sammensetning er i samsvar med folkets vilje” (Høires program ved stortingsvalget 10. oktober 1949. ?, Emil 
Moestue A.s., 1949). 
1  Høires program ved stortingsvalget 10. oktober 1949… 
2  ”[Stortinget] skal velges etter en valgordning som gir en mandatfordeling svarende til partienes virkelig 
styrke. Spørsmålet om oppløsningsrett og folkeavstemning bør tas opp til utgreiing”.  Til vern og trygd om heim 
og bygd. Bondepartiets valgprogram 1949. ?, Emil Moestue A/S, 1949. 
3  ”Arbeide for en valgordning som gir Stortinget en sammensetning i samsvar med folkeviljen, må 
fortsette”.  Bondepartiets program Stortingsvalget 1953. Stavanger, Dagbladet Rogalands Trykkeri, 1953. 
4  Kristelig Folkeparti. Program ved Stortingsvalget 10 oktober 1949. ?, 1949. 
5  Cfr. Kristelig Folkeparti. Program ved Stortingsvalget 12. oktober 1953. Drammen, Centraltrykkeriet, 
1953. 
6  ”Det foreligger en teoretisk mulighet for en såkalt ’borgerlig samling’, men også bare en teoretisk. I 
praksis er motsetningene mellom de 4 ikke-sosialistiske partier så sterke, og linjene så pass forskjellige at en 
samlingsregulering av ikke-sosialistiske partier vil være lite hensiktsmessig og ikke tilrådelig. Kristelig 
folkeparti vil si nei. Venstre også”. Oftedal. ”Stortingsvalg…” P. 176. Also Cfr. Sjur Lindebrække. Tro og tillit. 
Personlige og politiske erindringer. Oslo, Aschenhoug, 1983. ”Formene for samarbeid”. 
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the electoral law served, on the other hand, the purpose of helping try to make look 
Labour’s legitimacy questionable. 
 
b) Referendums and dissolution power 
Trond Norby states that the parties on the opposition generally turn to the recourses 
of referendums and power of dissolution in their search for influence in the policy-
making process, whereas a party in power goes in the opposite direction.1 As a 
matter of fact, the opposition in the Storting pressed to achieve these Common 
Programme goals, whereas Labour opposed them. The recourse to plebiscites and 
the power of dissolution also became part of the main electoral issues in the party 
programmes of the opposition, and it was discussed in committees of the Storting 
after the war.  
Venstre asked for plebiscites to solve important issues in both 1949 and 
1953.2 The Kristelig Folkeparti only mentioned directly the recourse to advisory 
referendums in its program of 1953.3 And so did the Bondeparti with the additon that 
they should be held as well up to a minority in the Storting.4 Høyre had asked for a 
constitutional reform to open the way to plebiscites in 1945.5 
In 1947, the government decided not to be consequent with the Common 
Programme on this issue. The power of dissolution was handled again in the 
electoral committee created by the Storting in 1948, and which presented a report in 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Nordby. I politikkens sentrum… This seems to be an accurate rule in Norway’s history. However, 
Nordby’s long-term perspective makes him put aside the particular functions of the political speech in each 
shorter period. An issue does not mean the same throughout the times. It is developing. This function and the 
particular context help us understand the actual meaning of that speech. In the same fashion, in politics the 
function of the speech implies certain concrete interests and immediate goals, and it is compelled, for the sake of 
these, to exaggerate the opposite points of view, to make something obscure or simplify it.  
2  Cfr. Valgprogram for Venstre 1949, and Valgprogram for Venstre 1953. 
3  Cfr. Kristelig Folkeparti. Program ved Stortingsvalget 12. oktober 1953.  
4  ”Bondepartiet går inn for oppløsningsrett lagt i Stortingets hånd og for adgang til rådgivende 
folkeavstemning også etter krav fra et mindretall i Stortinget.” Bondepartiets program Stortingsvalget 1953…  
5  Cfr. Høires program ved stortingsvalget 1945. 
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1952. The majority, formed by the bourgeoisie parties and the Communist 
representative, proposed that it were put into action in cases of stalemate and when 
certain issues should be put forward to the voters, in a sort of substitute of a 
plebiscite. The majority rule was divided on the issue of who would hold the authority 
to request it, the government or the Storting. At the end, the Labourite minority 
managed to block this proposal.1 
 The opposition brought about the question on plebiscites in the debate on the 
main issues of the times. In the debate on the Lex Brofoss 1947, a fervent advocate 
of plebiscites in Høyre, Storting representative Smitt Ingebretsen, showed us again 
what the aims behind the recourse to a plebiscite were. Namely, to guarantee that 
the proposals of the opposition were taken into account in the key issues; and to put 
issues forward to the voters directly, so the odds of the opposition might improve. 
The decisive issue to vote on in a referendum, in the words of Smitt and his Høyre 
fellowmen, was the alternative between socialism and democracy:2  
Jeg skulle ønske at vi i dag hadde hatt anledning til folkeavstemning, og en 
dag får vi se å få det inn som et ledd i vår konstitusjon. Jeg tror at ved en 
anledning som denne skulle man appellere til folket. Ingen av oss kan vite 
hvor flertallet er, vi kan tro det ene og vi kan tro det annet, men det skulle 
være anledning til å spørre direkte i en sak av så vidtrekkende betydning som 
dette (…). Da burde også folket vårt fått en klar og grei problemstilling så det 
selv fikk velge om det ville følge den gamle linje eller om det ville følge den 
sosialistiske linje.3 
 
In June 1952, Smitt Ingebretsen suggested in the Storting that, since there 
was no consensus among all parties, a plebiscite on the electoral question was 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Nordby. I politikkens sentrum… P. 123-136. 
2  This is another topic to discuss later. Høyre put it this way, but the other bourgeoisie parties did not see 
it that simple. Venstre considered it a decision among three options: the socialistic (Labour), the conservative 
(Høyre), and the social liberal (Venstre and eventually the other middle parties too). Cfr. Valgprogram for 
Venstre 1949. 
3  Stortingets handlinger 1947. Tidende. Kgl. prp. om lov om prisregulering og annen regulering av 
ervervsmessig virksomhet. June 24th, 1947. 
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necessary to have voters decide between a fair representation in the Storting and the 
“extra” support Labour got with the prevailing scheme.1 
The National Assembly of Venstre in 1952 proposed advisory referendums on 
the issues of the annulment of the Bondeparagraf, the electoral system, and the price 
and rationalisation laws.2 In addition, it reminded that to establish plebiscites 
constitutionally would strengthen democracy. However, when the price law was 
finally handled in the Storting in February next year, Venstre decided not to put 
forward the demand of a plebiscite, even though there were some among the 
Storting group in favour of it.3 
 
Constitutional Order, Parliamentarian Rule, and Labour’s Mandate: The Issue 
of Division of Power 
Constitutional order and parliamentarian rule, assumed pillars of Norwegian 
democracy, did not seem to the opposition to harmonise in the political praxis of the 
post-war era. It has already been mentioned that this question was put forward to the 
public opinion. It is clear that the argumentation of the bourgeoisie parties to this 
respect revolved around their claims of concentration of power by Labour. 
Let us begin our analysis of the opposition views with some articles written in 
Samtiden, since they provide us with a context lacking in the electoral propaganda.  
                                                 
1  ”Det er to prinsipper som står klart mot hverandre. Mindretallet vil ha en sammensetning i Stortinget 
som svarer til sammensetningen i folket mens Arbeiderpartiet vil ha et ’styretillegg’, for å bruke deres eget 
uttrykk (…). Og når det ikke har lykkes å avgjøre partiene imellom om det skal være et styretillegg eller ei, da er 
det naturlig å vende seg til folket og spørre hva det vil”. I kamp for frihet og folkestyre mot statsdirigering og 
byråkrati. Høyres innsats i Stortinget 1952 og 1953. En oversikt ved Birger Gotaas. ?, Høires Landsstyre, ?. P. 
173. 
2  Cfr. Venstre. Årsmelding for 1952. Oslo, Arne S. Mørk, 1953. 
3  Cfr. Nissen. "Stortingets Venstreforening“. In: Det norske Storting gjennom 150 år. Oslo, Gyldendal 
norsk forlag, 1964. Vol. IV. 
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When Nissen stated that the parliamentarian rule was not constitutionally 
grounded and that a constitutional revision was necessary,1 he continued a pre-war 
way of thinking towards a delimitation of the Storting’s area of influence for the sake 
of higher administrative efficiency. The bourgeoisie opposition would not be 
consequent with this line in the years to come. The parliamentarian question was 
going to be reformulated. 
 In the Norwegian parliamentarian tradition, the Storting ruled over the 
government, in spite of the fact that the constitution required a division of power that 
would assure a system of “check and balances” and prevent abuse of power by any 
of the constitutional powers. When rationalised, this contradiction was open to 
different solutions: either the status quo of parliamentarian rule or a turn to a stronger 
government.  
Labour’s recourse to enabling acts, supported by all parties during the 
reconstruction period, but then attacked as unnecessary and harmful if they were to 
become permanent controls, determined the opposition’s stance in favour of the road 
back to Storting rule. The enabling acts allowed the central administration to make 
decisions in the economic area outside the parliamentarian arena. The delegation of 
power to legislate, to set taxes and to allocate public funds from the Storting to an 
administration monopolised by Labour in the economic area became the engine that 
propelled the constitutional debate.  
The issue that limited the pattern of political consensus of the times, according 
to the political opposition, was: should the government have the main role and 
decision power in the organisation of the economy at the expense of the private 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Nissen. ”Demokratisk…”.  
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initiative? Did Labour have a constitutional mandate to operate deep changes in the 
economic structure of the country? 
The debate on the constitutionality of the delegation of power of the Storting 
would be coloured by the claims of a threat of bureaucratic rule and administrative 
abuses. It was not a debate on specific paragraphs of the constitution, for the most 
part, but one on the spirit of the constitutional order, in the face of the incoming 
economic changes. We will go over this point later in this work. 
 In 1953, Trond Hegna, on the Labourite side, defended the opinion that 
parliamentarism indeed required a majority rule to work.1 This was a point of view 
attacked by the opposition since the beginning of the post-war era. Already immersed 
in the enabling acts debate, in 1949, a voice from the extreme right, Per Vogt from 
Farmand, was not alone in stating that a party in absolute majority broke the logics of 
parliamentarism.2  
In the same year, a rather radical academician, Johan Vogt, elaborated and 
complicated further the question. Democracy, he wrote, was the “folkestyre” 
delegated to elected representatives.3 Until here, Norway was evidently democratic. 
However, this representation took place within the context of party machineries 
where oligarchies dominated. There was a latent threat of a party oligarchy that could 
get enough popular support and parliamentarian basis, to establish itself as a 
dictatorship. In this context, real democracy, and thus parliamentarism and 
constitutionality, implied that power should not be concentrated. On the same lines, 
democracy relied on the prevalence of a set of Liberal individual and minority 
freedoms (Human rights, rule of law, and intellectual freedom), which could be 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Hegna, Trond. ”Regjeringsparti og…”. 
2  Cfr. Vogt, Per. “Valgets krav”. In: Samtiden, 1949. 
3  Cfr. Vogt, Johan. ”Hvor meget skal vi betale for hva vi kaller frihet?”. In: Samtiden, 1949. 
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summed up in the right to opposition to the power holders.1 In this case, Labour. We 
find such arguments appear constantly in the bourgeoisie opposition’s propaganda. 
Victor Mogens too, in 1951, tried to solve the primary contradiction between 
constitutionality and parliamentarian rule under the criteria of opposition to power 
concentration.2 Norwegian democracy, he wrote, implied both the constitutional order 
and a parliamentarian tradition not grounded in the constitution. There was a need of 
adjustments in this arrangement to preserve the division of power and avoid the 
danger of abuse. The current system privileged the right of the majority party. Which 
way to go? Parliamentarism should suffer for the constitution to prevail: 
Dette parlamentariske prinsipp, med regjeringen som stortingsflertallets lydige 
tjener, fører til at det parti som har parlamentarisk flertall, behersker både 
Stortinget (og dermed lovgivningen og budsjettet) og regjeringen (og dermed 
utnevnelsen av embetsmenn, bl. a., høyesterettsdommene). Den utøvende og 
den dømmende makts uavhengighet blir derved fiktiv. Den gjensidige kontroll 
mellom de tre statsmakter som grunnloven forutsetter blir eliminert.3  
 
 If the recourse to dissolution of parliament and referendums, advocated by the 
political opposition, was regarded as a tool against deterioration of the democratic 
order, enforcement of the duty of an independent and impartial Supreme Court to 
revise all laws approved by the Stortinget before they were sanctioned by the King 
became another opposition’s cause. 
 Venstre representative Chr. Oftedal in an article from 1953 agreed that Labour 
had destroyed the division of power the constitution demanded, and added that the 
most important task then was to give back to the Storting and the Supreme Court the 
ability to supervise the work of the government.4 Parliamentarism should fade away. 
                                                 
1  ”Demokrati betyr ifølge denne andre utlegning i første rekke opprettholdelse av de såkalte umistelige 
menneskerettigheter, rettssikkerhet og åndsfrihet, det vil si, retten til opposisjon mot de makthavende”. Ibidem. 
P. 232. 
2  Cfr. Mogens, Victor. ”Konstitusjonelle garantier”. In: Samtiden, 1951. 
3  Ibidem. P. 330. 
4  Cfr. Oftedal, Chr. S. “Stortingsvalg og…”.  
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His proposal of a plural government, commented before in this work, was 
complemented with one on the extended use of investigations by the Storting 
committees to fulfill that same supervision. 
It is interesting to see how the way back to a Storting rule could be pursued 
with arguments opposed to parliamentarism. All paradoxes gain meaning when 
keeping in mind the purpose they serve, namely, to break the One-party rule, and the 
fact that the bourgeoisie parties were not making any electoral progress.  
 Let us go now over the claims of the opposition parties in the electoral 
material. 
The bourgeoisie opposition did not manage to form, if ever attempted to in this 
period, a single block. And, although the One-party rule reflected in the constitutional 
issue indeed put them on the same side, there were some visible differences here as 
well. In the same fashion, the bourgeoisie opposition did not seem to have 
succeeded in making this the most relevant issue for the public when casting their 
votes.  
 Høyre had been a party used to recurring to constitutional guarantees as 
cautions directed to protect the privileges of officials and economic interests. What in 
the beginning was meant as a hindrance to democracy, had changed during the 
turbulent Depression years to a defense of democracy before the threat of 
dictatorship.1 Høyre will extend this formulation in the post-war debates. In its 1945 
election programme, not permeated yet with the problem of Labourite majority, but 
still bringing up war issues, it reads: 
Høire vil verne grunnloven og folkestyret så enhver trygt og fritt kan hevde sin 
politiske oppfatning. Grunnlovens karakter som grunnlov må ikke ødelegges 
ved en lettere adgang til å forandre den. Ingen form for diktatur og sensur må 
tåles.2  
                                                 
1  Cfr. Seip, Jens Arup. ”Høyre gjennom hundre år”. In: To linjer i norsk historie… 
2  Høires program ved stortingsvalget 1945. 
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Later on, Høyre enlarged the scope of its speech about the threat of 
dictatorship and its defence of constitutionality and parliamentarism. The right to 
criticise the power holders appeared as well as a concern. The prerogatives of the 
Storting on the organisation of the national economy were highlighted in the 1949 
election programme: 
Høire verner om Grunnloven og folkestyret... 
Stortingets lovgivnings-, beskatnings- og bevilgningsmyndighet må hevdes 
uavkortet. Systemet med fullmaktslover (Lex Thagaard m.v.) som flytter viktige 
avgjørelser fra Stortinget til departementer og direktorater er ukonstitusjonelt 
og udemokratisk og vanskeliggjør den offentlige kritikk. Ingen form for diktatur 
eller sensur må tåles.1 
 
Hambro, in his usual role of protector of the Storting, claimed the same year 
that it was important: ”å vinne folkestyret tilbake for landet og igjen gi Stortinget den 
plass det skal ha etter vår konstitusjon både når det gjelder lovgivningsmakten og 
bestyrelsen av landets pengevesen.”2 Gotaas proudly wrote that “Det har vært Høires 
oppgave i denne periode [1945-1949] å stå vakt om forfatningen og folkestyret og om 
Stortingets rettigheter overfor et overmektig regjeringsparti…”3 
The centre parties did not emphasize the issue of protection against 
dictatorship in their 1945 programmes. That would change in the next election period, 
by a debate on the Lex Brofoss, which continued the Lex Thagaard on state price 
control. 
The Bondeparti reacted strongly to the delegation of power to the 
administration, not to governmental intrusion in the economy as such, in its election 
programme of 1949: 
                                                 
1  Høires program ved stortingsvalget 10. oktober 1949. 
2  Fra fellesprogram til partidiktatur. En kamp mot socialismens oppmarsj under gjenreisningens maske. 
Oversikt Høires arbeid på Stortinget 1945-49. ?, Høires Landsstyre, 1949. P. 319. 
3  Ibidem. P. 462. 
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Bondepartiet vil arbeide for å styrke den husbondrett Stortinget etter Grunnlov 
og tradisjon skal ha. Dets makt skal ikke begrenses, verken av et 
forvaltningsbyråkrati eller av de store organisasjoner. Stortingets lovgivende 
og bevilgende myndighet skal ikke kunne delegeres.1 
 
The Bondeparti included in its 1949 program a defence of the independence of 
the judicial system from the administration and asked for all administrative decisions 
to be given a legal foundation publicly.2 
Meanwhile, the Kristelig Folkeparti empasized  in its 1949 programme the right 
of the political minority to oppose and express itself: ”Flertallstyre i samsvar med 
folkeviljen, men også med mindretallets rett til å legge fram sitt syn og hevde sine 
meninger.”3  
Venstre did not elaborate on this issue yet in its 1949 programme, but made 
evident its opposition to the delegation of power from the Storting as unconstitutional 
and dangerous to the division of power. In a brochure written by Worm-Müller, 
chairman of Venstre, it reads: 
Venstre vil stå på vakt om grunnloven og passe på at ikke Stortingets 
myndighet undergraves av en stadig sterke sentralisert administrasjon og at 
ikke viktige avgjørelser gjennom en utstrakt fullmaktslovgivning unndras 
Stortinget, domstolene og folkets kontroll...4 
 
He also touched the issue of the democratic mandate of Labour to carry out a 
structural change in the economy: 
[Folkestyret] forutsetter at et flertall i Stortinget, som ikke har flertall i folket, 
ikke kan foreta en omveltning i de politiske og økonomiske forhold.5 
 
The ongoing debate on the contradictions between constitutional order and 
parliamentarian rule did not show up on the surface of the propaganda material of the 
                                                 
1  Til vern og trygd om heim og bygd. Bondepartiets valgprogram 1949. ?, Emil Moestue A/S, 1949. 
2  Cfr. Til vern og trygd… 
3  Kristelig Folkeparti. Program ved stortingsvalget 10. oktober 1949.  
4  Worm-Müller, Jac. S. Venstre. Oslo, Norges Venstrelag, 1949. P. 6. 
5  Ibidem. P. 5. 
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opposition. Both were consecrated principles that were profitable to advocate. 
Pointing out those contradictions would have disturbed the purpose of emphasizing 
the prerogatives of the Storting, in order to prove Labour’s policies questionable to 
the public eye. However, that debate was not ignored. Simply, the role of the Storting 
was placed beyond it and shown as a matter of fact. Thus, the Bondeparti stated in 
its 1953 election program: 
Den rett Stortinget etter Grunnlov, tradisjon og folkestyreprinsippet har som 
lovgivende og bevilgende myndighet hevdes uavkortet. De folkevalgte organer 
–ikke administrasjonskontorene- skal ha den avgjørende myndighet i 
samfunnet.1 
 
Høyre and the Kristelig Folkeparti wrote on the same lines in their 1953 
programmes.2  
In regards to the other main issue discussed here, Venstre went easier on the 
delegation of power to the administration on its 1953 programme and called for an 
open administration rather than excluding delegation as such: 
Vigtigere administrative avgjerder må grunngis, og det må bli letter høve til 
etterprøving. Spørsmålet om åpen administrasjon skal greies ut.3 
 
By this time, Venstre had adopted a friendlier attitude towards state 
regulations as an effect of the change in the chairman position—Bent Røiseland 
succeeded Worm-Müller—and the take-over by the radical group that supported the 
new chairman.4 However, in coming to terms with delegation of power, Venstre did 
not break from the bourgeoisie point of view, but made clear a prevailing trend that 
had been obscured by electoral considerations on the opposition side.  
                                                 
1  Bondepartiets program stortingsvalget 1953.  
2  Cfr. Høires program 1953. Dreyer, Stavanger, trykt som bilag til ”Vårt programblad”, 1953; and 
Kristelig Folkeparti. Program ved stortingsvalget 12. oktober 1953.  
3  Valgprogram for Venstre 1953.   
4  Cfr. Rovde, Olav. Venstre i prislovdebatten 1952-1953. Hovedfagsoppgave i Historie. Oslo, 
Universitetet i Oslo, 1972. ”Bakgrunn og byrjing”. 
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Contrary to what one reads in the opposition’s propaganda, we can assume 
that the bourgeoisie opposition was aware of the fact that delegation of power in 
certain areas, as long as it happened under supervision by the Storting, was not 
unconstitutional. It did not necessarily break with the principle of division of power. It 
seems too that it was widely understood that delegation of power was necessary and 
inescapable for the economic goals ahead. The demand of a more open 
administration in this sense reflects best the question to solve. This is perhaps what 
we should see as the main objective behind the rhetoric in the speech of the 
opposition parties. 
 
Delegation of Power and Constitutionality 
There are questions in this chapter that we have answered only partially. One of 
them was whether delegation of authority from the Storting to the central 
administration was unconstitutional. Keilhau, a non-partisan opposition writer, stated 
that such delegation was not grounded in the constitutional jus neccesitatis, as 
Wilhelm Thaggard had stated in defence of the price control laws and in response to 
Keilhau’s criticism,1 but was a matter of natural law.2 We wrote before that if the Lex 
Thagaard had been approved and put into effect right after the end of the occupation 
without parliamentarian debate, the subsequent developments of state regulations 
followed strictly the established legislative procedures.3  
                                                 
1  Cfr. Thagaard, Wilhelm. “Herr Keilhau på krigsstien”. In: Samtiden, 1952. P. 409-422. Thagaard 
responded to an article called “Planøkonomi og prisdirektorat”  by Keilhau (In: Samtiden, 1952. P. 343-359). 
2  ”[Thagaard] finner nemlig at forordningen av 8. mai 1945 (altså den første Lex Thagaard) var begrunnet 
i den ekstraordinære situasjon; det vil si at Regjeringens adgang til å gi den må søkes i den konstitusjonelle 
nødrett. Men denne er ikke grunnlovfestet i Norge. Den er naturrett—og ikke noe annet enn naturrett”. Keilhau. 
”Prisloven, naturretten …”.  
3  Although it is a claim by Labourite followers, I have not found evidence to doubt it. Cfr. Larssen. ”Etter 
Stortingsvalget”. In: Samtiden, 1953. P. 541-551. 
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Wilhelm Thagaard had replied Keilhau reminding him of the control power the 
Storting was granted over the regulatory organs and of the inescapable necessity of 
such delegation. 
…den loven som flertallet foreslår, i vesentlig grad er å anse som en 
rammelov. De viktigste generelle reguleringer forutsetter særskilt samtykke fra 
Stortinget enten i form av plenarvedtak, slik som de andre medlemmer av 
flertallet har foreslått, eller ved særlover slik som jeg har ment det mest 
praktisk. 
… 
Lovforslaget inneholder også bestemmelser om utvidet parlamentarisk kontroll 
med bruken av de reguleringsfullmakter som foreslåes lagt til administrasjonen 
(…). Når Stortinget delegerer lovgivningsfullmakter til administrasjonen, er det 
fordi Stortinget finner at det er mest praktisk at bestemmelsene gis av de 
administrative myndigheter. Det forslaget går ut på er å skape et fast grunnlag 
for at Stortinget kan føre kontroll med hvorledes lovgivningsfullmaktene blir 
brukt.1 
 
It was not during the Labourite golden period the first time in Norwegian 
history that general enabling acts had been instituted.2 However, the contemporary 
debate on the subject suggests that there was, indeed, a sort of legal vacuum 
regarding the delegation of authority to administrative organs. Thagaard stated on 
the proposal on a permanent Price law: 
Bortsett fra plikt til meldning om avgiftsordninger etter prisloven, har vi hittil 
ikke hatt faste lovregler om kontroll med utøvelsen av delegert 
lovgivningsmyndighet. Også her er det altså spørsmål om en vidtrekkende 
reform.3 
 
As mentioned before, the debate about the constitutionality of the delegation 
of power revolved around an interpretation of the “spirit” of the constitution more than 
on analysis of the text.4 In the same fashion, the claim that delegation of power 
                                                 
1  Thagaard, Wilhelm. Op. Cit. P. 421. 
2  Nordby registers as the first enabling acts in Norway the concessions laws of 1909 and 1911, regarding 
acquisition of estate and regulation of waterfalls correspondingly, and asserts that the enabling acts in the 
Labourite golden period constituted a more quantitative than qualitative change. Cfr. Trond Nordby (red.). 
Arbeiderpartiet og planstyret 1945-1965. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1993. Nordby, ”Statsutviklingen under 
Arbeiderpartiet”.  
3  Thagaard. Op. Cit. P. 421. 
4  Lindebrække put it this way in his rationalisation of the issue when applied to the enabling acts: “Det er 
ikke først og fremst de juridiske betraktninger som her er avgjørende, men (…) et prinsipp som ikke har funnet 
formelt uttrykk i Grunnlovens skrevne ord, men som i virkeligheten bærer alle bestemmelser i Grunnloven. 
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eroded the parliamentarian rule clashed in principle with that on the constitution 
establishing a division of power. The second had run previously in direction to ask for 
more power to the government at the expense of the Storting. To make these two 
issues point to the same direction, namely, the way back to rule by the Storting, was 
the logical result of the political opposition’s quest to prove questionable the 
constitutional mandate of Labour to exercise changes in the economic structure of 
the country. The bourgeoisie parties enriched their political capital advertising 
themselves as protectors of both constitutionality and parliamentarism. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Skulle vi gi prinsippet grunnlovsparagrafsform—og det kan bli nødvendig å gjøre det for å minne om 
Grunnlovens dypeste vilje og mening”. Lindebrække. Tro og tillit… P. 92. 
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CHAPTER III. THE BOURGEOISIE PARTIES AND CORPORATISM 
 
Labour’s Making. Corporatism in Post-war Norway 
The corporate plans that Labour made in the Blåboka—a nickname given to 
Fremtidens Norge, a plan to cope with the tasks of reconstruction after the war—
conceived a synthesis between a planned economy and public regulation, on one 
side, and personal initiative and political freedom, on the other. A compromise 
between capital and labour, arranged in close collaboration with the state. In this 
context, the Storting should limit its authority to set the guidelines the government 
had to follow, allocate money and keep the administration under control.1  
All these plans were never carried out completely, but they were pretty 
influential in the making of the Common Political Programme (Fellesprogrammet), 
which established the National political and economic guidelines of the reconstruction 
period. Even more important, it instituted corporatism as a duty of the government. 
Although the programme reflected the Labourite position rather than a common 
proposal, and it is difficult to pinpoint when the programme’s “spirit” was put aside 
later in the post-war era, it is a valuable indicator of the political consensus of the 
times.  
The Common Political Programme indeed shows that the goals of a welfare 
state had been accepted by all parts, and that a mixed economy was seen as the 
best means to achieve them. Universal employment and increased production in a 
context of fair distribution of wealth for all constituted from then on not a radical point 
of view, but the core of the centre towards which all politics tended in the post-war 
Norway.  
                                                 
1  Vid supra “Some Traits of Corporatism in Norway”. Cfr. Nordby. Korporatisme… P. 54-55. 
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It reads in one of the programme’s paragraphs: 
For at vårt samfunn kan fore en effektiv og målbevisst politikk med dette 
formål [øking av produksjon og retterferdig utdeling] for øye og nytte ut all 
privat og offentlig virkelyst, initiativ og foretaksomhet fullt ut i tillitsfullt og 
planmessig samarbeid mellom staten og de private interesser, omorganiseres 
sentraladministrasjonen og utstyres med de nødvendige organer for denne 
oppgave. Det opprettes bransjeutvalg i alle næringer og et samarbeidsråd som 
skal være Regjeringens rådgiver i økonomiske, finansielle og næringspolitiske 
spørsmål. I sentraladministrasjonen gis det plass i ledende stillinger også for 
folk fra det praktiske liv, og i utvalg og råd får staten sine egne representanter. 
De øvrige medlemmer av utvalg og råd oppnevnes av Regjeringen blant folk 
som er pekt ut av næringslivets og arbeidernes og funksjonærenes egne 
organisasjoner. Reglene for myndighetsområde og arbeidet fastsettes av 
Stortinget.1 
 
 This paragraph touches the main traits of the corporate arrangement in the 
making: the expanded role and size of the central administration, the formal 
cooperation and coordination between private enterprises and public offices, the 
representation of organised interests, the rule of experts, and the ultimate pre-
eminence of the Storting.2  
As one could expect, the political debate to come did not revolve around the 
legitimacy of these principles but on the way to put them in practice, in other words, 
on the ruling strategies. The public regulations and control of the economy that 
followed in consequence remained out of significant criticism in the first two years of 
the post-war era, the most critical for the recovery of the country, since their 
convenience was evident. And cooperation and coordination in economics and 
politics were repeatedly invoked in the political debate all along the period studied 
here, if with corresponding different connotations, by both ruling and opposition 
parties. 
                                                 
1  Fellesprogrammet. “Økonomisk politikk”. In: Norsk innenriks.… My underlining. 
2  This pact among elites, a deal at the top, presented in Norway the main features Harold Perkin refered 
as those of a “professional society”. The political struggle during the period here studied reflect the dispute 
between private and public professional he wrote about in his two most famous books. Cfr. Perkin. The Rising of 
the Professional Society..., and also The Third Revolution (Routledge, an imprint of Taylor & Francis Books 
Ltd., 1996). 
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 Nonetheless, as stated in the contents of the Common Political Programme, 
the actual shape of the corporatism put in practice after the war was in most part 
Labourite initiative and making. At the outset of the war, the bourgeoisie parties had 
little chance to impose their views or to reach an electoral breakthrough that 
separated Labour from power. Labour was much better prepared than the rest of the 
political forces in Norway and managed to outplay them. It enjoyed the advantage of 
not having interrupted its work during the Nazi occupation.1 Its close relationship with 
the Landsorganisasjon (LO), the main Trade Union, made Labour co-participant of 
the power and reputation that the unions managed to mantain. The Labourite elite 
was more politically conscious than the others, met the end of the war with a well-
crafted programme, and was ready to assume the political responsibility ahead. 
Labour’s programmes were oriented to the future and did not recoil on issues related 
to the war, as for example, Høyre did in their 1945 election programme.2 Labour was 
also under a young elite ready and eager for change, a point in favour in a context 
where the pre-war political ways were not modern enough to face up to the political 
tasks ahead. Last but not least, Labour was benefited by the increasing number of 
industry workers in the country, and the lowering of voting age to 21, with Labour 
being the favourite option of young Norwegians.3 
                                                 
1  “[Arbeider]partiet kunne (...) høste fordelen av at arbeiderbevegelsen i motsetning til de andre politiske 
strømningene hadde maktet å opprettholde en illegal virksomhet i Norge og blant fanger på Grini og i tyske 
konsentrajonsleire, i tillegg til en ganske omfattende politisk aktivitet knyttet til LOs sekretariater i Stockholm 
og London. Både Venstre og Bondepartiet kom svekket ut av krigen. Deres fremste ledere var enten døde, som 
J.L. Mowinckel, eller brakt i vanry av sin holding under okkupasjonen, som Jens Hundseid. Høyre hadde også 
alvorlige lederproblemer”. Even Lange. Samling om felles mål. 1935-1970”. Oslo, H. Ascheoug & Co., 1998. 
(Ascheougs Norges Historie, v. 11). P. 122  
2  Cfr. Lyng. Brytningsår. Erindringer 1923-1953. Oslo, J.W. Cappelens Forlag AS, 1972. ”Det radikale 
gjennombrudd”; and Høires program ved stortingsvalget 1945, where there is an appeal to voters to consider the 
results of an investigation to find out who was responsible of the 1940 events leading to the failure to resist the 
German invasion, “Oppgjøret etter krigsårene”, and meant to point out Labour’s guilt and Høyre’s solid stance 
before the circumstances. I relied on John Lyngs’s description of the advantages Labour enjoyed, since it is a 
first-hand source enriched with insight knowledge of politics and written when time allowed a perspective, 
features that make up for the partisan side of it. 
3  Cfr. Bergh. Op. Cit. “Samling om Arbeiderpartiet”. 
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 The Arbeiderparti had become by now sophisticated machinery with a 
hierarchical structure and strong discipline within its ranks. And in this solid structure, 
the Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen was the keystone. Lyng described him as a 
master in cooperation and teamwork, a “maskin-politikker”,1 a man of the times2 in 
comparison with the old-fashioned politics Hambro continued in Høyre.  
Einar Gerhardsen’s contribution to the political developments of the times can 
hardly be underestimated. His pause in the executive and transfer to the Labour’s 
group in the Storting from November 1951 meant in fact a lessening in both the 
control ambitions of the party and in the Machiavellian strategies.3 
 Gerhardsen assembled a large staff that made of his office one able to control 
and evaluate the materials from the different Ministries as efficiently as never before, 
and compete with them in expert judgement and political initiative.4 Even more 
important was the fact that Prime Minister Gerhardsen, and later Oscar Torp, 
prevailed over the Labourite Storting group. This last event permeated the political 
scenario in the post-war era. 
 Corporatism in the post-war Norway was the core of the “economic 
democracy” the party promoted.5 Nordby points out an essential feature of post-war 
corporatism in the country, namely, the movement in two directions: rule of experts 
                                                 
1  Lyng. Op. Cit. P. 132. 
2  A foreigner, Connery, saw in him a politician that ruled the country in a paternalistic fashion, the hero 
in the paradise of the common-man (Cfr. Connery, Donald S. The Scandinavians. London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 
1966. “Norway. The Golden Mean. Einar Gerhardsen”). Unfortunately, we cannot start an analysis of the main 
personalities of the opposition. The sources used in this work do not give enough references on the political 
features of other opposition leaders, namely, the party chairmen Hambro of Høyre, Trædal of the Bondeparti, 
Nils Lavik of the Kristelig Folkeparti, and Jac. Worm-Müller and Bent Røiseland of Venstre.  
3  Cfr. Nordby. Korporatisme… P. 64-65. 
4  Cfr. Lyng. Op. Cit. ”Stortinget –partier og personligheter.” 
5  “...’økonomisk demokrati’. Dette var et begrep med skiftende innhold, men på denne tiden [rundt 1949] 
ble det særlig brukt om et utvidet samarbeid mellom staten og organisasjonene i arbeids- og næringslivet, altså 
en form for korporativ ledelse av det økonomiske liv”. Bergh. Op. Cit. P. 191. Sejersted broke down the 
economic policies of Labour under the category “economic democracy” in corporatism, socialisation, public 
controls and regulation, and democracy within the firms. Cfr. Sejersted. Op. Cit. ”Modernisering og 
selveierdemokrati”. In this work, though, the term “corporatism” means the consultation and cooperation organs 
as well as the public controls and regulations in the economy. 
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and consultation of the parts involved.1 This embraced an expansion of the 
administration to organs where hearings and negotiations took place. It also made a 
new bureaucracy of experts that cohabited with the old one, and which, contrary to 
the previous, was eager to avoid public supervision and control. Labour under 
Gerhardsen’s influence used this development for its purposes of consolidating 
power and getting approval to governmental policies.2 
 In the case of the state councils, which grew in number considerably,3 they 
were appointed by the central administration, which also decided their tasks and 
duration. The proposals a council could come up with were not binding and it was up 
to the administration to take them into account.4 In few words, their work empowered 
the government. This was the case of the Samordningsråd, where the office of the 
Prime Minister was heavily involved and openly manoeuvred to get the participant 
organisations under political control.5 
 Nonetheless, the pre-eminence of the Storting was not challenged in principle 
or in the legislative routine. Although the first step into corporatism in Norway, the Lex 
Thagaard, came along with the Liberation day, without parliamentarian debate, the 
delegation of power to the diverse offices dedicated to enforce the regulations was 
carried out following the complicated procedures of Storting approval.6 As the period 
went on, Labour had to honour the prerogatives of the Storting in more explicit ways 
to cope with the political needs of the moment, as was the case with the proposal by 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Nordby. I politikkens sentrum… “Innledning”. 
2  Ibidem. “Maktens deling etter systemskiftet”. 
3  ”Nedsettelser av statlige utvalg skjøt fart under Arbeiderpartiets storhetstid. I 1936 hadde det vært i alt 
261 utvalg (permanente og midlertidige). Den ’arven’ Arbeiderpartiet etterlot seg, var i 1966 kommet opp i 954”. 
Idem. P. 184. 
4  Idem. “Innledning”. 
5  Vid Supra. Chapter 1. “Opposition or Complement…”. 
6  Cfr. Larssen. “Etter Stortingsvalget”. In: Samtiden, 1953. P. 541-551. Larssen was editor of 
Arbeiderbladet. 
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the Sjaastad committee on a permanent price law.1 It did not exclude the fact, 
though, that the Labour majority in parliament allowed the party to keep this instance 
under political control. 
 The opposition criticised heavily the Labourite plans on corporatism for 
privileging industrialisation through big corporations, as well as supporting the 
merchant navy and the export industry. The opposition had a strong case when 
affirming that the strategy led to a centralisation of the administration in Oslo.  
 So far, we have made abstraction of one trait of the Labourite rule. It had 
come to be evident before the debate of the enabling acts in 1953 that Labour tended 
to the centre of politics. If it pushed for public regulation and controls, it did not 
attempt to socialise all means of production. A planned economy implied coordination 
and cooperation, not a nationalisation crusade, as the path of socialism.2 
Furthermore, it relied on private initiative to a greater extent to that the bourgeoisie 
were usually ready to acknowledge, and never planned to promote a massive take-
over of the economy.3 
 The business interests widely accepted the corporate arrangement as 
profitable and cooperated in general terms with the administration. However, they did 
not give up other channels of political pressure or their ambitions of a corporatism fit 
to their specific interests. Libertas exemplifies it very well. Industrial circles had 
launched plans for a development in big corporations in accordance to Labour’s 
                                                 
1  Vid infra. Chapter IV. ”Ideology in Action. The Enabling Acts Debate”. 
2  Cfr. Bergh. Op. Cit. P. 168. 
3  The opposition had to acknowledge this fact sooner or later. In 1953, analyses of the renewed Labour 
majority within the opposition did it. Before the election, in an election newspaper, Erling Wikborg from the 
Kristelig Folkeparti wrote an account of this and other features of the prevailing political consensus. Cfr. Erling 
Wikborg. “Skillelinjer I dagens politikk”. In: Oslo Kristelig Folkepartis valgavis 1953. Oslo, A/S 
Indremisjonstrykeriet, 1953. 
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plans, but with a decision-making structure where the authority laid in business 
interests’ own hands.1 
 It was not surprising. As Seip stated in his renowned essay, Labour had 
managed to reach an agreement between capital and labour that finally excluded 
industrial conflict and prevented economic crisis. A satisfying deal oriented to 
increases in production and better living standards for larger segments of the 
population; a crucial advantage for Labour in the pursue of electoral victory. Labour 
became a great provider that could afford the luxury of ruling the country 
paternalistically. 2 
  
Political Opposition and Corporatism 
The bourgeoisie parties criticised the post-war corporate arrangements for 
disempowering the Storting and, they claimed, leading to dictatorship. Did they, 
however, oppose corporatism as such? Now it is time to see how the bourgeoisie 
parties interpreted the corporate needs of the system.  
In general, the bourgeoisie parties took for granted a corporate arrangement, 
but lingered away from the Labourite extreme of the pendulum in different degrees. 
And they altered their stance with time. When it came to political propaganda, in 
general terms, their reaction against the closed state regulation of the economy 
aggravated all the way from the times when reconstruction needs made consensus 
prevail until the end of this period, 1953, when a settlement was reached regarding a 
price control law.3 
                                                 
1  Sejersted wrote to this respect: “Dette var en linje fra de planer som var lansert av sentrale 
næringslivsfolk, og som ble særlig klart uttrykt gjennom Studieselskapet for norsk industri. Dette var planer for 
en samordnet storindustriell utvikling på linje med Arbeiderpartiets planer, men med en beslutningsstruktur som 
la myndigheten i næringslivets egne hender”. Opposisjon og posisjon… P. 34-35. 
2  Cfr. Seip. To linjer i norsk historie… ”Fra embetsmannsstat til ettpartistat…” . 
3  Vid infra. Chapter IV. ”Ideology in Action. The Enabling Acts Debate”. 
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 It is not possible here to go over the whole account of the development of the 
opposition’s speech. Running the risk of oversimplifying, here comes a description in 
general terms. Let us start with the end of the pendulum opposite to that of Labour.  
For an urban party concerned for business and functionaries’ interests, Høyre 
had a hard time coping with the new political demands of the times. Høyre tried to 
represent best the private initiative, but in spite of its reputation, it hardly reproduced 
conveniently the main concerns of the business community. This became clear as to 
a corporate approach. The pre-war leadership that made their way almost intact to 
the period after liberation carried a heavy luggage of Liberal philosophy. Hambro, an 
academician, was its main character. 
There was, of course, a process of development of the political speech within 
the ranks of Høyre. The arrival of representatives John Lyng and Sjur Lindebrække, 
the first being vicechairman of the party from 1950 while Hambro spent long periods 
abroad, reshaped Høyre’s speech and oriented it towards corporatism. It was from 
1947 on that cooperation and collaboration on economic matters gained a fixed place 
in Høyre’s agenda, thanks mainly to Lindebrække’s initiative.1 A focus on consumers’ 
interests and a struggle not against regulation as such but against detailed controls 
also gained momentum. 
A simple example of how Høyre evolved its views on corporatism as seen by 
the following. For the first Storting election after the war, Høyre included in a 
propaganda brochure a criticism against “state capitalism” without challenging the 
needs of public regulation during the reconstruction period: 
Høire er ikke mot nødvendig regulering og samfunnsmessig kontroll på det 
økonomiske område. Men Høire er mot alle vidtgående inngrep, som kveler 
                                                 
1  ”Det er da også på det rene at det fra 1946-47 frem til 1953 i praktisk talt hver eneste innstilling fra 
Høyres fraksjon i [Finans]komiteen og under debattene i Stortinget kan henstillinger fra Høyre til Regjeringen 
om samarbeid til løsning av sentrale finanspolitiske spørsmål”. Lindebrække, Sjur. Tro og tillit… P. 131. 
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foretaksomheten og den enkeltes arbeidslyst, som gjør staten til en plagsom 
overformynder og den enkelte til en brikke i statskapitalistiske disposisjoner.1  
 
 In the early 1950s, Lindebrække reformulated the arguments in favour of a 
corporate system resting on voluntary cooperation (frivillig samarbeid) between the 
public authorities and the business community, and away from the state control 
(statlig dirigering) of the economy pursued by Labour: 
Prinsipielt sett kan de reguleringer det blir spørsmål om, gjennomføres på to 
forskjellige måter: gjennom statlig dirigering –påbud, forbud og 
straffebestemmelser—eller gjennom frivillig samarbeid mellom statsmakten 
på den ene siden og det private nærings—og arbeidsliv på den annen side. 
Det siste alternativ forutsetter, som alt samarbeid, et tillitsforhold mellom 
dem som skal arbeide sammen.2  
 
The dubious stance of the early post-war era before negotiations between the 
business community and the central administration was transformed by the group 
around Lyng and Lindebrække into a position that tried to match Høyre’s view to the 
post-war trends through a progressive view, a modern conservatism.3 
In 1945, Høyre responded to the Labourite “economic democracy” with an 
interpretation of its own, elaborated by the circle around Realph Norland. Its main 
features were the demand of decentralisation of capital and administration, along 
with an idealistic picture of a society made up of individuals owning their own means 
of production and of small enterprises.4 Høyre’s “economic democracy” also 
advocated protection of the primary sector and crafts.5 This was an alternative, based 
                                                 
1  Høire kan du stole på! Norrøna Boktr. A.s., 1945 
2  Lindebrække. ”Statsdirigering og tillitspolitikk”. In: Samtiden, 1953. P. 131. 
3  In a brochure of 1945 (Drammens Høire. Til våre meningsfeller. Handels Sc. a/s, 1945), it reads: 
”Konservatisme betyr fremskritt, velstand, øket levestandard og større folkelykke”. Nonetheless, the big leap 
towards a really innovative concept of conservatism began with the full acceptance of the welfare state by the 
party in its 1949 programme. Cfr. Høires program ved stortingsvalget 10. oktober 1949. 
4  Cfr. Fra Høires Centralstyre. Foredragsdisposisjon august 1945. 1945; and Velgeren oppslagsbok for 
Stortingsvalget 1945. Oslo, P. Soelberg Trykkeri, 1945. 
5  According to Sejersted, this is one of the points in the brochure ”Økonomisk demokrati” by Realph 
Norland from 1945. Cfr. Sejersted. Opposisjon og posisjon… ”Modernisering og selveierdemokrati”. 
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on the works by Friedrich Von Hayek,1 to planned industrialisation. It was a cry 
against big corporations, centralisation, and state monopolies.2 Here we find a strong 
defence of private property and of an economy based on private initiative in a small 
scale. There was a rather secondary concern in this argumentation that came to be 
essential afterwards when those first arguments had proved a failure. The bucolic 
dream vanished, and it was necessary to avoid being criticised as a party of the 
business community: a defence of consumers.   
 The point made was that, in an economic democracy, it was the consumers 
who decided whereas in the economic dictatorship exercised by planned economy 
the bureaucrats had the decision power.3 In 1949, Høyre advocated an economic 
system fuelled by the competition between those who produced and sold the 
products, for the sake of those who bought them and enjoyed them.4 
 According to Sejersted, the Høyre that emerged from the war had not been 
untouched by the modern economic theories that preached state intervention to 
stimulate demand. 5 But the circle in favour of this approach did not constitute a 
majority, and certainly did not get its points of view publicised in the election 
programmes. The attachment to the economic guidelines of liberalism satisfied the 
business community to a certain extent, but the radicalism of the party created a 
tension with the business interests it tried to represent. However, they collaborated 
                                                 
1  Friedrich Von Hayek is considered the key figure in the revival of liberalism in the twentieth century. 
His most famous work was The Road to Serfdom, published in 1944. Here he established that the economic road 
taken by the Western World, away from Liberal economics, went in direction of socialism and against the 
individualistic values that built up Western civilisation. 
2  Cfr. Høires program ved stortingsvalget 1945. ”Økonomisk demokrati”. 
3  Cfr. Fra Høires Centralstyre. Foredragsdisposisjon august 1945. 1945. 
4  ”Høire vil at produksjon og omsetning skal rette seg etter forbrukernes behov. Det forutsetter en sunn 
konkurranse mellom dem som produserer og omsetter varene. Bare på den måten kan forbrukerne skaffes de 
fleste, de beste og de billigste varer. Under en fri omsetning er det forbrukerne som bestemmer –under en 
statsdirigert økonomi er det offentlige kontorer”. Høires program ved stortingsvalget 10. oktober 1949.  
5  ”Høyres talsmenn var ikke upåvirket av de moderne synsmåter. De hadde nær kontakt med yngre 
fagekspertise som Erling Petersen, Thor Bang, Arnljolt Strømme Svensen og Olaf Malterud, og deres 
argumentasjon peker i retning av at også de ville hevde at de tenkte realøkonomisk og nasjonaløkonomisk, og at 
staten måtte kunne stimulere den totale etterspørsel når det var nødvendig”. Sejersted. Opposisjon og posisjon… 
P. 62. 
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with Høyre to advance their political views and granted it more money and logistic 
support that to the other bourgeoisie parties. 1 
The party did not go in the beginning for a moderate version of corporatism to 
accommodate to the times. However, Lyng and Lindebrække would do their share in 
order to shrink the gap.2  
 Venstre was a more plural party than Høyre and there internal divisions were 
customary. Within the party there were visibly two different approaches before state 
control of the economy. The Oslovenstre was more supportive of the kind of public 
regulation of the economy carried out by Labour. It was somehow influenced by the 
work of Wilhelm Thagaard, a Venstre man and chairman of the Price Directorate, and 
saw corporatism and delegation of power away from the Storting with less distrust, 
always pointing out that detailed controls were harmful. The Landsvenstre, on the 
other hand, opposed Labourite policies in the name of a freer economy. After the 
drawback in the 1949 election, the balance went on the side of the latter and its 
clearer opposition to governmental policies. It had been stated at the National 
Assembly in 1950 that the party had lost voters because of the questionable position 
the party favoured on the main National issues, which had made Venstre look like a 
satellite party of Labour. The Landsvenstre proposed a marked distance from the 
                                                 
1  Steinar Riksåsen states that in the period 1947-48 the amount of money granted by Libertas to the 
opposition parties’ press was as following: The Bondeparti received 20 000 Nkr; Venstre, 189 468 Nkr, and 
Høyre, 1 174 477 Nkr. Venstre and Høyre got also money and logistic support for the built up of their party 
organisations. The latter, of course, received also the biggest share in this area. Cfr. Libertas 1947-1953. 
Hovedfagsoppgave i Historie. Oslo, Universitetet i Oslo, 1972. ”Et år med samarbeid”. 
2  Jens Arup Seip wrote on Høyre’s stance on planning: “Partiets alternativ til statlig planlegging ble (…) 
ikke fri konkurranse, men plan i privat regi—en privat ledet planøkonomi var Lyngs formulering i 1950. 
Handling i denne retning var forberedt under krigen med ‘Studieselskapet for norsk industri’ og ble senere fulgt 
opp med ‘Næringslivets forskningsinstitutt’ støttet av Libertas”. To linjer…“Høyre gjennom hundre år 1880-
1980”.  P. 99. 
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governing party and accused the newspaper Dagbladet, regarded as the spokesman 
of the Oslovenstre, of having given the wrong impression to the public.1 
 However, after the arrival of Bent Røiseland to the position of chairman of the 
party in the National Assembly of 1952, the power relations within the party changed 
drastically. The radical wing the new chairman belonged to, along with a moderate 
group represented by Helge Seip, took over. Now state intervention was no longer 
depicted as socialism, but as continuation of the Venstre traditions of Social-
liberalism or Social-radicalism.2  
 In general, Venstre, beyond internal divisions, held a very positive approach to 
corporatism, and accepted it as the core of economic democracy. It was regarded by 
the party as a development of Liberal politics3 and the best means to increase 
production, maintain full employment, enhance fair equalisation between social 
groups and geographical regions, and avoid conflicts among the main economic 
actors. 4  
 Venstre proposed a way between Labour and Høyre in its effort to place itself 
as the true representative of the centre politics. It was called a “Liberal planned 
economy”. The main point of this plan of a mixed economy was to create and 
maintain cooperation and mutual trust among all the participants in production of the 
economy as a whole, as well as inside the workplace. It was a version that appealed 
to the business community, rewarded their leadership in industry and acknowledged 
the social compromise adopted by capital.5 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Venstre årsmelding for 1950. Oslo, Abeco Industri A/S, 1951. Such rationale continued even after 
the 1953 election. Cfr. Iveland, Einar. ”Venstre etter Stortingsvalget”. In: Samtiden, 1953. P. 603-609. 
2  Cfr. Rovde, Olav. Op. Cit. ”Landsmøtet 22.-24. mai 1952”. 
3  Cfr. Joakim Ihlen. Økonomisk demokrati og overskuddsdeling. Skien, Norges Venstrelag, 1951. Ihlen 
placed itself in the Conservative wing of Venstre. 
4  Cfr. Per Bergsvendsen. Venstre-politikk 1945-1951… 
5  ”Blant næringsdrivende er det i vår tid jevnt over den innstilling at de som står som ledere av de private 
bedrifter skal betrakte seg som forvaltere av et viktig produksjonsmiddel i eiernes, de ansattes og samfunnets 
interesse”. Ihlen, Joakim. Arbeid og kapital I. Det moderne demokrati. [Oslo], Norges Venstrelag, [1949]. P. 14.  
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 The state, asserted Venstre, should play a main role in the coordination of 
economic efforts to assure their social orientation. State intervention was well justified 
in those cases: 
Statens oppgave er å kontrollere [det private næringslivet] til beste for hele 
folket, og å supplere det der det ikke strekker til, f. eks. når det gjelder å sikre 
full sysselsetting.1 
 
Venstre considered that if production and prices had to be regulated, it should 
be under public and not private responsibility. A typical statement of the “Liberal 
planned economy” reads as follows: 
…samfunnet har ansvar for at det er plan og stabilitet i den økonomiske 
utviklingen for landet som helhet. Derfor skal det –i samarbeid med 
næringsorganisasjonene—legge vilkårene til rette for en effektiv produksjon og 
full sysselsetting.2 
 
However, Venstre marked a distance from the corporate ambitions of Labour 
by stating that Liberal planned economy was not connected but opposed to a 
scheme where the state dictated over private business, as Worm-Müller, chairman of 
the party declared in 1949:  
Vi er for økonomisk planlegging, for en planøkonomi, så fremt og så langt de 
kan forenes med de idealer og formål vi kjemper for. 
 Men vi står steilt mot en sosialistisk planøkonomi, en allmektig stat som 
lammer de personlige tiltak og som kan føre bort fra demokratiet.3  
 
Venstre’s corporatism, claimed the party, then dominated by the 
Landsvenstre, was for democracy; Labour’s, for dictatorship. As Røiseland and the 
radical wing of the party took over from 1952, as we mentioned before, the Labourite 
rule stopped being associated with socialism and dictatorship. The party welcomed 
the turn of Labour away from detailed state controls and for a more active role of the 
                                                 
1  Kortner, Olaf. Venstre. Idé og gjerning. Oslo, Norges Venstrelag, 1951. P. 59. 
2  Ibidem.  
3  Worm-Müller, Jac. S. Venstre... P. 10. 
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Storting in the economic regulations.1 Nonetheless, the party did not abandon the 
objective of differentiating its position from that of the government. In this quest, 
rhetoric came handy, as we will see in the enabling acts debate.2 
 One of the other two centre parties, the Bondeparti, a party of agricultural 
interests, saw advantages in the corporate scheme and supported a more open and 
direct role of organised interests in the political decision-making process. In the same 
fashion as Venstre, though, the party criticised the corporatism instituted by Labour 
for being an imposition over the private initiative: 
…de offentlige inngrep og reguleringen [må] få en ganske annerledes 
beskjeden plass enn de har i dag. De må ikke komme som et uventet diktat 
ovenfra men vokse fram som et krav i næringen selv, og administreres i 
samarbeid med denne.3 
 
 It was in this context that the Bondeparti made the state responsible of 
equalising standards of living for the people in different trades, in the city and in the 
countryside, but at the same time accused the Labour government of socialism. It 
was not corporatism but the Labourite version that the party put into question. 
 The Kristelig Folkeparti refered readers of its 1945 programme to the 
Fellesprogram to find out what the party stood for on economic policy. It was a sign of 
how much the party supported the prevalent economic arrangement. Although the 
Kristelig Folkeparti was the least explicit in this issue, one can infere from the many 
hints on economic questions in the propaganda material that this party was the 
closest within the bourgeoisie opposition to the Labourite economic democracy. 
 However, like the other centre parties, the Kristelig Folkeparti advocated 
enlarged influence of the business community in the corporate scheme: 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Rovde. Op. Cit. ”Prislovutvalet, proposisjonen og venstrealternativet”. 
2  Vid Infra. Chapter IV. “Ideology in Action. The Enabling Acts Debate”. 
3  Til vern og trygd… 
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Gjennom sine organisasjoner må de enkelte næringers utøvere med sine rike 
erfaringer tas med på råd når retningslinjene for vedkommende næring eller 
næringspolitikken trekkes opp.1 
 
 In resemblance to the other bourgeoisie parties as well, the party objected 
Labourite corporatism through the claim that it put aside the Storting: 
...partiet vil også forbeholde seg å øve kritikk overfor organisasjonene på 
begge sider, når de med altfor stor makttyngde vil lede politikken inn i spor 
hvor det blir organisasjonene og ikke de folkevalgte organer som bestemmer 
retningslinjene.2 
 
 In a few words, the party understood the need of cooordination and 
cooperation to meet the goals of a welfare state and showed itself very 
understanding of Labourite ways, but it opposed state control when imposed over the 
business community and seemed to challenge the Storting supremacy. 
 
Ideology and Propaganda in the Bourgeoisie Parties 
The previous section is meant to help understand the context in which the opposition 
speech on corporatism and One-party rule developed in the electoral propaganda. 
What the opposition made of that takes us back to Seip’s theory; corporatism and 
One-party rule formed a single unit and led to a single outcome: disruption of the 
parliamentarian system.  
 This was the primary point of conflict. In politics, conflict is usually over 
dimensioned; disagreements are exaggerated, cases overrated, and ideology is 
stressed to a maximum. This is what we find too in the debate around corporatism 
and One-party rule in relation to the parliamentarian order. 
 
                                                 
1  Kristelig folkeparti program ved Stortingsvalget 12. oktober 1953.  
2  Ullmann, Ragnar. ”Kommunevalget 8.oktober”. In: Kristelig Folkepartis valgavis i Oslo 1951. Oslo, 
Vårt Lands Trykkeri, 1951. 
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a) The concept of ideology 
But what is indeed the meaning of ideology? In politics, we tend to identify it with a 
political theory, a party programme, and so on; and we always associate it to a 
particular interest and to a deviation from facts. There is, in my opinion, some of truth 
in these assumptions: Ideology blurs facts and responds to concrete interests, but it 
depends mostly not on what is said but on the usage a statement is given and the 
concrete context.1 Defending the market economy and private initiative for the sake 
of economic vitality can be right or wrong, and is not necessarily an ideological 
statement. Exaggerating the importance of private initiative as producer of wealth and 
demanding a turn back to a free market economy to empower business interests 
within a corporate scheme where Liberal capitalism was buried long time ago, and 
where proletarian rule is only a fancy ghost, is definitely ideological. Ideology is a 
very important part of political capital. Ideological statements are the daily bread of 
politics and no party or politician can go about without them. Keeping this in mind we 
can understand, for example, how after a long succession of Storting debates on a 
price law in which free economy was obsessively defended against so-called socialist 
inroads, John Lyng could affirm in an internal meeting of Høyre in 1953 that between 
his party and Labour’s proposals there was just a difference of degree.2 
 
b) Bourgeoisie parties and ideology around corporatism 
In general terms, during the period 1949-1953, which embraces the three first 
Storting elections of the post-war, the bourgeoisie parties opposed mainly the 
                                                 
1  Ideology is commonly used when referring to a set of ideas. That is, in our opinion, wrong. We would 
rather use the term “point of view”, or simply “ideas” for this case.  
2  “Det var en lang vei fra ’Lex Brofoss’ in 1947, via Sjaastad-komitéens forslag og til Arbeiderpartiets 
moderate forslag til bare en prislov i Stortinget. På et styremøte i Høyres stortingsgruppe kunne Lyng hevde, 
under henvisning til at utsagnet måtte bli innen fire vegger, at det i realiteten ’bare var en gradsforskjell’ mellom 
Høyres og Arbeiderpartiets forslag”. Sejersted. Opposisjon og posisjon… P. 108-109. 
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concentration of power in Labour hands under the ideological assumption that the 
growth of the state was inversely proportional to individual freedom.1 In this fashion, 
we see the struggle put in terms of democracy versus the threat of dictatorship, a 
crusade not only against excessive economic controls, but also against socialism.2 
 We find a recurrent analogy between Labourite policies and a hidden, slow but 
secure, path to socialism. And also an analogy between what happened in the war, 
nazism, and what happened in the Soviet Union, communism, and what could 
happen under the Labour rule. The assimilation of these three different types of One-
party rules allowed the opposition to elaborate on the dialectics of power 
concentration in the hands of a political party: 
 …verden kjenner heller ikke noe eksempel på at statsdirigert planøkonomi og 
sosialistisk tvanghusholdning kan gjennemføres innenfor rammen av det vi i 
Vest-Europa forbinder med en demokratisk forfatning.3  
 
 On the other hand, we run across the manipulation of elements of the classical 
Liberal speech on democracy, freedom and market economy. This characterises the 
speech of Høyre for the most part, but we find it also in that of the other bourgeoisie 
parties. When it came to criticise and oppose the enabling acts, they came handy. 
The debate on the price law in 1952-53 witnessed a wide use of them to weaken 
Labour’s position.4  
 
                                                 
1  ”Jo mer allmektig staten blir, jo mer maktesløst blir det enkelte menneske”, as Høyre put it in its 1949 
programme. Høires program ved stortingsvalget 10. oktober 1949. There a lot more examples, but it is 
impossible, and unnecessary, to make reference to them all. 
2  The terms used are “sosialisme” and ”statsdirigering”, associated with the bureaucratic rule and 
concentration of power, and opposed usually to “democracy” and healthy “public control”. 
3  Velgeren oppslagsbok for stortingsvalget 1945. Oslo, P. Soelberg Trykkeri, 1945. P. 10. A Høyre’s 
brochure. 
4  Vid infra. Chapter IV. “Ideology in Action. The Enabling Acts Debate”. 
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The threat of dictatorship and the Storting 
The main complaint remained the same all along this period: “Idag er situasjon at når 
vi vet hva Arbeiderpatiet vil, da vet vi hva resultatet blir.”1 This statement by Hermann 
Smitt Ingebretsen from 1952 reflected a common assumption on the opposition side. 
Nonetheless, was it indeed dictatorship? 
The insinuation did not get to be a plain accusation but the statement of a 
probability: threat of dictatorship. It was intended to make the voters understand that 
the path the Norwegian economy was following led to the end of democracy, and a 
renovated Labour majority in parliament could well complete the way.  One example 
among many: 
…er Venstre redd for at den veldige maktkonsentrasjonen på statens hånd i 
lengden kan true de individuelle rettighetene som liberalismen framfor alt vil 
verge. Vegen er ikke lang fra det sosialistiske velferdsamfunnet –hvordan det 
nå vil bli—til den totalitære staten.2  
 
This was seldom taken as a claim of factual dictatorship, but it did lead in 
some cases to complaints that individual freedom was at stake and that the mentality 
proper to what we could term an open society was vanishing.3 
 The Storting was the guarantor of political freedom. If the opposition was right 
and the Storting was being put aside, the elected representatives had therefore no 
real power. We would be talking, in fact, about the opposite of democracy. 
When Jens-Arup Seip wrote about the Storting “in political exile”,1 he found the 
right way to summarise the best arguments of the opposition in just one sentence. 
                                                 
1  I kamp mot frihet og folkestyre…. A quotation from a contribution in the Storting in June 1952. 
2  Kortner, Olaf. Venstre. Idé… P. 69. 
3  A brochure by a doctor, a Venstre woman, Karoline Mathisen (Sannheten lever videre… om den 
individuelle frihet sett I forhold til vår tid. Tromsø, Troms Fylkesvenstrelag, 1951.), argues that a mass mentality 
had already spreaded in Norway. She insinuated that Labour had bought the masses with material prosperity, and 
had managed to create such passivity that criticism and opposition were neutralised. She even wrote that people 
were discouraged because: “…alle ting I realiteten er bestemt på forhånd”. In a political ad in the brochure, the 
party showed agreement with her position: “Venstre er klar over farer ved massementaliteten, gruppeinteressene 
og byråkratiet—vår tids ‘nessekongevelde’”. Such display of conservative ideology was unusual in the party’s 
speech, but shows the reach of the rhetorical arsenal of the opposition. 
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There were plenty of examples of politicians trying to achieve it first, like this of 
Venstre representative Lars Ramndal in 1951: 
Det er sagt ofte at der er i Stortinget makta burde liggja, det er her sakene 
burde avgjerast, men det viser seg at Stortinget vert set utanom i mange høve. 
Det er Prisdirektoratet som dominerer både regjering, departement og 
Storting. 2 
 
 Or Høyre’s Hans P. Lødrup in 1946: 
 
 I dag er det i folkets hus, ikke i Stortinget, avgjørelsene treffes.3  
 
 The bourgeoisie parties fancied promoting their cause as a crusade for the 
supremacy of the Storting. When necessary, the only public control the bourgeoisie 
parties accepted fully was that exercised by the Storting. The delegation of power 
from the Storting to the Directorates and other administration organs, and the work of 
state councils and other instances of consultation and negotiation, were criticised 
with words like those of Stranger’s, a Høyre man, in the 1949 Finance debate in the 
Storting: “etablering av små storting ved siden av det egentlige”.4 Even the Common 
Political Council, created under the Common Political Programme in order to reach 
consensus among the political parties, arose scepticism for the representatives of the 
bourgeoisie parties in the Storting, who called it “The High Council” where decisions 
were reached before the cases could be dealt with in parliament.5 
 
a) The bourgeoisie parties on “Democratic centralism” 
The claims of parliamentarian disruption, the consequence of concentration of power 
by a single party, could be broken down in several categories. First, the inner-
discipline in Labour ranks, the so-called “democratic centralism” was questioned. It 
                                                                                                                                                        
1  “Stortinget har vært i politisk eksil mellom Elverum og Kings Bay”. Seip. To linjer i norsk historie… 
”Fra embetsmannsstat…” P.56. 
2  Bergsvendsen. Venstre-politikk 1945-1951… P. 50. 
3  Lødrup, Hans P. ”Noen konservative synspunkter”. In: Samtiden, 1946. P. 442. 
4  Fra fellesprogram til partidiktatur... P. 364. 
5  Cfr. Lindebrække. Tro og tillit… ”Tverrpolitisk om økonomi”. 
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was not proved illegal, but it was shown as a case of corruption. As early as 1945, it 
was said by Høyre that Labour, through such partisan discipline, had power over the 
government, the Storting, the Trade Unions, and the rationing system.1 Party 
membership influenced appointments in public offices, including the Supreme Court.2 
The strong collaboration around the line set by the party elite was, if not assimilated, 
compared to communist strategies.3 
 Venstre affirmed that, on the contrary, its representatives in parliament did not 
get directives by the party and were only tied to the programme they were elected for 
and their own consciousness.4 On the same lines, Høyre presented itself as a party 
following the Liberal fashion, where their members of parliament represented their 
constituency before their party.5 We assume that the Bondeparti and the Kristelig 
Folkeparti would certainly have chosen the same description for their attitude to party 
discipline. 
 Democratic centralism embraced also the close collaboration between the 
Landsorganisasjon (LO) and the Labour party. Here the opposition cried corruption 
again. This unfair relationship, they argued, granted financing and votes to Labour 
and political power to LO, and had no counterbalance, they claimed, on the 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Til husmødre og yrkeskvinner I Tønsberg. Tønsbergs Aktietrykkeri, 1945. 
2  In the 1949 Høyre’s election programme, it reads: “Ansettelser I offentlig tjeneste må ikke skje på 
grunnlag av en medlemsbok eller som partipolitsk belønning”. Høires program ved stortingsvalget 10. oktober 
1949. In 1949, and also in 1953, the Bondeparti established in its election programme that: ”Partipolitiske omsyn 
må ikke gjøre seg gjeldende ved ansettelser i styringsverket”. Til vern og trygd…. Per Vogt stated (“Valgets 
krav”… P. 413): ”En (…) forutsetning for at det dirigerte samfunn skal kunne fungere etter de dirigerendes 
hensikter er at de rette folk sitter i de rette stillinger; derfor den tydelig markerte og kynisk innrømmede 
nepotisme som har holdt sitt inntog i Arbeiderpartiet”. Victor Mogens, Op. Cit., made the same accusation 
pointing out that Supreme Court appointments were included in the inner-corruption of the political system. 
3  Cfr. Bergvendsen. Venstre-politikk 1945-1951… “Democratic centralisme”. Also: ”I arbeiderpartiene 
som har gått lengst i en slik partidisiplin, er det en i praksis gjennomfort regel, at ingen i Stortingets eller 
kommunestyrenes partigruppe får lov til å stemme imot partiets beslutninger i viktigere spørsmål”. Lødrup. Op. 
Cit. P. 437.  
4  Cfr. Ibidem. In fact, there was a freer flow of ideas in Venstre than in other parties, as one can see in 
their political propaganda and in the Venstre-oriented publication Samtiden. 
5  Cfr. Sejersted. Opposisjon og posisjon… ”Partiorganisasjonen –et tung løft”. 
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opposition side.  It was, for them, an “umoralsk spill” that took the political power 
away from the constitutional sources to a political force without public responsibility.1 
When Libertas was made public by the Labourite press, business support to 
political organisations came into heavy criticism. The bourgeoisie parties that 
benefited from it and, as in the case of Høyre, took an active role in its creation, 
thought best to deny their collaboration. The only thing they managed to do was to 
insist that the same treatment given to Libertas be given to Labour’s press and 
Labour’s financing by LO.2 
 Collective membership in Labour granted to LO workers was heavily criticised. 
The principle of collective membership, it was said, made belonging to a Union in LO 
the equivalent to forced support to Labour: 
Venstre er mot kollektivt medlemskap i politiske partier. Vi mener det er galt å 
tvinge folk i andre generasjoner til å bli tilsluttet et parti, som de ikke hører 
hjemme i, simpelthen fordi et flertall på et møte gjør vedtak om det.3  
 
The political influence the Unions had over its members, as well as the 
propaganda LO carried out in which, opposition spokesmen accused, elections were 
depicted as a class conflict where Labour was to prevail for the benefit of the 
Norwegian working classes, were a matter of concern in the opposition’s speech.4  
                                                 
1  “...ved denne utvikling er maktens flytning fra de konstitusjonelle og ansvarlige organer til 
ukonstitusjonelle og politisk uansvarlige organer utenfor Storting og regjering ytterlige fremskyndet.” Lødrup. 
Op. Cit. P. 442. 
2  The organisation Libertas was founded in 1947, and its partner Industria, in 1948. The business 
community tried to make public its point of view on economics through the publications and research supported 
by these two organisations. Høyre got financing for its newspapers and party organisation, but had to deny 
collaboration not to help its political enemies prove that it was a party of the business community. Venstre and 
the Bondeparti received as well support from Libertas but to a lesser extent.  Cfr. Riksåsen, Steinar. Op.Cit. and 
Sejersted. Op. Cit. ”Partiorganisasjonen—et tung løft”. Venstre complained that Labour had the same approach 
towards its press: ”Forholdet til pressen, der Arbeiderpartiet har bundne partiaviser under en felles ledelse som 
ansetter og avsetter redaktører taler sitt tydelige språk”. Venstres alternativ. Oslo, Norges venstrelag, 1949. And 
that same year, it asked for the financing of the parties to be made public. Cfr. Valgprogram for Venstre 1949.  
3  Venstres alternativ… P. 14-15. 
4  “Hvis alle fagorganiserte arbeidere. Som det nylig er sagt, skal betrakte valgkampen som en alvorlig 
konfliktsituasjon hvor de har de samme plikter og det samme solidaritetsansvar som under en regulær 
lønnskonflikt, går vi et skritt mot diktaturet”. Worm-Müller, Jac. S. Venstre... P. 5. 
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 However, if the excessive influence of the unions in post-war Norway was 
criticised, the bourgeoisie parties welcomed the involvement of organised interests in 
the political decision-making process through consultation. Here too the speech on 
the role of organisations in politics was affected by the criticism to the axis LO-
Labour. Let us go over just one example. 
 In its 1949 election programme, the Bondeparti addressed the issue of 
organisations’ influence in society. The draft of the programme showed how much a 
party which was born and developed as representative of specific interest groups 
supported an open intervention of organised interests in National politics: 
I et moderne samfunn er organisasjonene et nødvendig ledd til vern om en 
gruppes felles interesser. Ut fra respekten for det enkelte menneskes rett må 
staten også på organisasjonene innrømme dem de samme rettigheter og de 
samme midler til å kjempe for sine mål. Avgrensningen må også være den 
samme, alle organisasjoner må innordne seg under vår demokratiske 
samfunnsordning og statens husbondrett. Å finne den rette avgrensning av 
organisasjonenes maktområde og deres innordning under samfunnsmakten er 
en oppgave som nå bør tas opp. 1 
 
 The final text, though, gave a very different impression and could be 
interpreted as a caution against the excessive power granted to organisations in 
politics: 
Organisasjonene, frie menneskers sammenslutning til vern om sine interesser, 
er nødvendige i et moderne samfunn. Men de må innordne seg under vår 
demokratiske samfunnsordning og statens husbondrett. Innenfor denne 
ramme skal de alle ha den samme rett til å arbeide for de interesser de er satt 
til å ivareta. Å finne den rette avgrensning av organisasjonenes maktområde 




                                                
The paragraph on the role of organisations in society in the Bondeparti’s 
election programme of 1953 went for a clearer stance against the corruption of the 
system implied by the axis Labour-LO. It reads:  
 
1  Utkast til valgprogram for Bondepartiet 1949. My underlining. 
2  Til vern og trygd… My underlining. 
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Organisasjonsretten må være lik for alle næringer og i alle yrker, og alle 
organisasjoner må stilles likt. Organisasjonene må på sin side innordne seg 
vår samfunnsordning, bygges opp etter demokratiske prinsipper og være 
partipolitisk nøytrale. 
 Ingen må tvinges inn i en organisasjon for å kunne skape seg sin egen 
virksomhet, eller for å få et arbeid. 1 
 
 We have reasons to assume that the other bougeoisie parties’ conclusions did 
not differ much from these statements. 
 
b) Bureaucratic rule and the role of the Storting 
An accusation as powerful and conclusive as that of a road to Nazism or communism 
was the implementation of a bureaucratic rule. There was less controversy over this 
point within the opposition than over others.  
All the parties seemed to agree that the transfer of power from the Storting to 
the state bureaucracy was a threat to democracy. 
We have mentioned the arrival of a new bureaucracy in the Labourite golden 
era. Mainly, the social economists that reshaped the Ministries of Finance and 
Commerce, as well as other offices, brought with them plans of coordination and 
state regulation of the National economy that fit the interests of the political elite. The 
power exercised by those functionaries over economic enterprises, an odious sign of 
pernicious state intervention in the eyes of the business community, constituted the 
rule of experts stigmatised as “Bureaucratic rule”. 
The bureaucratic rule stemmed from the administration offices where the 
detailed economic controls were enforced. The new politicising bureaucracy was 
accused of escaping public control and handling cases behind closed doors. The 
                                                 
1  Bondepartiets program Stortingsvalget 1953.  
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granting of power to this bureaucracy through enabling acts, argued the opposition, 
made this possible.1  
 During the same period they amassed too much power, the criticism 
continued, the administration concentrated in the Oslo offices, burying self-rule in 
districts and counties.2 An argument that came handy in local election campaigns.3 
 The argumentation developed even further: The administration experts were 
pushing for more unnecessary and economically harmful regulation. The bureaucratic 
rule repressed private initiative and prevented the country from reaching its economic 
goals. A growing bureaucracy, an “elefantsyke” apparatus,4 which absorbed 
manpower that otherwise would be really productive, put the entrepreneurs before 
too many procedures and administrative obstacles for them to start new businesses. 
It also created economic insecurity since it was given the power to decide economic 
changes without relation to fixed routines or market mechanisms. The economy 
would stagnate sooner or later since how, they asked rhetorically, could it be possible 
to create jobs out of bureaucratic offices?5 And how do people whose only business 
experience was theoretical could assume full responsibility and cope with the 
everyday problems of business and advance in this area better than experienced 
business leaders motivated by the prospect of profits?6 
                                                 
1  ”Venstre vil stå på vakt om grunnloven og passe på at ikke Stortingets myndighet undergraves av en 
stadig sterkere sentralisert administrasjon og at ikke viktige avgjørelser gjennom en utstrakt fullmaktslovgivning 
unndras Stortinget, domstolene og folkets kontroll…” Worm-Müller. Op. Cit. P. 6. 
2  Lindebrække stated that it was Labour’s doing and purpose ”… en tilsvarende og omfattende 
maktkonsentrasjon i kommandoplassene i statskontorene i Oslo”. I kamp for frihet og folkestyre… P. 395. 
3  For example in the Høyre’s election program of 1947 in Sandefjord: ”Sandefjords fremtid ligger ikke i 
et system av statssosialisme og statskontroll som sentraliserer all makt og innflytelse i Oslo”. Høires program 
ved kommunevalget i Sandefjord 1947. Sandefjord, Handelstrykkeri, 1947. 
4  Lyng. Op. Cit. P. 227. 
5  Cfr. Han begyndte i et skur. Oslo, Norsk Trykk & Papirindustri A.s., 1947. A Høyre’s propaganda 
brochure. 
6  A nonpartisan opposition writer, Wilhelm Keilhau wrote in 1952: “[Arbeiderpartiets] Forslaget [til 
fullmaktlovene] vil i realiteten overlate [ansvar] til noen akademikere uten selvstendig erfaring fra 
produksjonslivet, uten kjennskap til arbeidskårene, uten bransjekyndighet og uten økonomisk ansvar å skalte og 
valte med all økonomisk virksomhet i landet”. Keilhau. ”Prisloven, naturretten og liberalismen”. In: Samtiden, 
1952. P. 546. And added the following year: ”...ikke noe normalt menneske vil kunne tenke seg at 
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 The bureaucratic rule was another sign of the hidden but smooth path to 
socialism and dictatorship, according to this Kristelig Folkeparti extract from 1949: 
...og så kommer det tragiske, --det lyse, optimistiske menneskesynet fører like 
inn i tyranniet når en ikke vet andre midler enn stadig strengere kontroll, stadig 
sterkere sentralisering for å få opp arbeidstempoet, --det er der sosialiserings 
farer særlig viser seg i at det ikke er lang til diktaturet.1 
 
 A common electoral practice of the times was to show the election as the 
choice between two irreconcilable poles: democracy and socialism.2 Venstre 
stressed the gap between its approach to public or social control of the economy and 
that of the Labour government by means of this opposition, being socialism the 
hidden teleological nature of the bureaucratic rule: 
…sosialisering ikke er forenlig med økonomisk demokratisering. I virkeligheten 
er sosialisering og økonomisk demokratisering en selvmotsigelse, fordi 
sosialisering må føre til mer byråkrati og sentraldirigering og til fjernstyring av 
de enkelte bedrifter.3  
 
 It was claimed by Høyre that the business interests were tied in their 
collaboration with the administration. The risk of seeing their interests damaged, 
stated the argument, and compelled the business interests to be submissive to the 
dictates of the central administration. Again, the right to criticise the power holders 
was threatened: 
Der hvor kritikken undertrykkes, forsumpes folkestyret (...). Når folk ikke lenger 
tør ha mening om Regjeringen –av hensyn til sin karriere—og ikke tør øve 
kritikk overfor Regjeringen av frykt for å miste sjansen til å gjøre forretninger 
med den, er det fare på ferde.4 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
departementsfunksjonærer kan forstå bedre enn bedriftsledere og enkeltmenn hvordan reservene bør anvendes 
for å hindre innskrenkninger i produksjonen og fall i levestandarden”. ”Hva betyr Stortingsvalget i 1953?. In: 
Samtiden, 1953. P. 291. Keilhau was a social economist (sosialøkonom) who had colaborated with the exile 
government during the war. 
1  Ullmann, Ragnar. “På prøve”. In: Kristelig Folkepartis valgavis i Oslo 1949. Oslo, Vårt Lands Trykkeri 
A/L, 1949. 
2  It can be found in all parties. Only an example from one centre party, the Bondeparti: ”Valget står iår 
faktisk mellom folkestyre og mindretallsdiktatur, mellom demokratiet og sosialiststaten”. Til Velgerne i 
Oppland. Gjøvik, Samholds Trykkeri, 1949. 
3  Ihlen. Arbeid og kapital I… P. 16. 
4  Lindebrække. Tro og tillit… P. 42-43. A quotation of Smitt Ingebretsen. 
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 Høyre too came up with the argument that the real question of democracy at 
the moment was not a matter of class interests, the benefit of the many at the cost of 
the few privileged, but of choosing or opposing the rule of the few in the 
administrative offices over the rest of the population.1 
 There was a further elaboration that opposed two different kinds of regime, 
namely, a bureaucratic rule (forvaltningsstat), imposed by Labour, and a rule of law 
(rettsstat). 2 Among the bourgeoisie parties, it was adopted only by Høyre later on. 3  
 There was also the issue of the protection of the individual rights before 
administrative decisions that were not supervised by the Storting or the Supreme 
Court. Such decisions could break the rule of law. This gave a chance to appeal to 
the reputation of the Liberal freedoms and question the doings of the Labour 
administration. The demands of supervision by the Storting and the Supreme Court 
and of administrative openness constituted a strong argument in the repertoire of the 
bourgeoisie opposition. 
 
The Issue of Parliamentarian Control of the Bureaucracy 
We left unanswered a question that we are now able to confront: what was the point 
of the opposition in advocating empowerment of a Storting in Labour hands? It 
certainly implied a protest against the delegation of power to the administration as 
well as against corporatism under Labourite premises, but there was another reason.  
Lindebrække commented on the Common Party Council, where a number of 
decisions were reached by an assembly of representatives of all parties before they 
                                                 
1  This was the way representative Løvset from Høyre, among others, put it when questioning the 
majority’s proposal on a permanent price law in 1953: “Han konkluderte med å si at prisloven var noe mer enn et 
stykke økonomisk lovgivningsarbeid. Den er et ledd i bestrebelsene på å overføre makten fra de mange til de få, 
fra folket til byråkratene. Den er et anslag mot vårt demokrati”. I kamp for frihet og folkestyre… P. 433. 
2  Cfr. ”Rettsstat-Forvaltningsstat-Folkestyre”. In: Farmand. No. 35, August 29th, 1953. 
3  J.A. Seip wrote: “I Høyres program fra 1945 er ‘rettsstat’ (‘rettsstaten gjenreises’) på ukontroversiell 
måte rettet mot nazitidens overgrep. Fra 1961 fikk ordet en sentral plass og da rettet mot 
Arbeiderpartiregjeringens bruk av fullmaktslover”. To Linjer i… ”Høyre gjennom hundre år 1880-1980”. P. 80. 
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reached Parliament, that it had produced a healthy democratic development through 
personal contacts that help mutual trust, a better definition of party lines, and 
moderation in the government policies. He remarked that the work in the Council had 
pushed the opposition to adopt more elaborated arguments and a wiser attitude 
towards cooperation.1 Høyre, the party most consistently opposed to 
overempowerment of the administration, waved the flag of voluntary cooperation in 
the economy and in politics at least since 1949. The centre parties were just careful 
enough to condemn what they considered excesses of Labour, but hardly ever 
corporatism. A corporate arrangement was a tacit agreement. Nonetheless, there 
was an aspect the bourgeoisie parties could not come to terms with. 
 Høyre, as usual, made it very clear. The voluntary cooperation proposed by 
the party pointed out what kept it from joining the prevalent corporatism. Sejersted 
argues that Høyre considered the business community unable to make their position 
prevail in hearings and negotiations with the administration whereas the Labour 
government got stronger with such cooperation and approval. He further adds that 
the more cooperation the business interests Høyre represented had with the central 
administration, the weaker the contacts between them and the party. Compromises 
at this level had a terrible effect on the party, he concludes; once there was an 
agreement between Labour and those organisations, Høyre was tied.2 However, this 
reflected, on one side, the disagreements between Høyre and the business 
community more than any structural flaws; and on the other, the hindrance that 
                                                 
1  “Det ble skapt nærmere personlig kontakt, og tross all meningsforskjell fant selve samarbeidstanken 
dypere forståelse. Det er i seg selv en betydelig vinning for en sunn demokratisk utvikling. 
”Jeg er også sikker på at drøftelsen om samarbeid—nettopp der hvor samarbeidslinjen ikke vant frem—
ga større klarhet om årsaken til meningsforskjell og politiske skillelinjer. Det førte igjen med seg et betydelig 
innslag av moderasjon i regjeringspartiets politikk og en særlig oppfordring til saklighet hos opposisjonen”. 
Lindebrække. Tro og tillit… P. 133. 
2  Cfr. Sejersted. Op. Cit. ”Partiet i organisasjonssamfunnet”. 
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meagre electoral progress represented, since Høyre was far and away of being able 
to advance the business community interests in parliament any further. 
 The bourgoisie parties could not take fully the prevailing corporate scheme 
because it was developed under Labourite premises. In this point, the main argument 
of the opposition was that public or social (samfunnsmessig) control was best 
achieved when embodied in control by the Storting. 
The corporatism the opposition criticised was the one designed by Labourite 
experts. There were among them key personalities that would embody the ideal of 
scientists annoyed by the political pressure and oriented to results.1 However, the 
administration was well kept under political control. The new bureraucrats enjoyed 
delgated power and could not prevail over their political masters. Their so-called 
independence empowered the Labourite rule as a vehicle for concentration of power. 
The opposition parties saw the need of placing those bureaucrats under a wider 
political control in which they themselves could play a role. 
We should not take the criticism by the opposition parties to a so-called 
bureaucratic rule as an attack to the rule of experts. It was not stated that a Storting 
rule implied avoiding professionalisation of the public or private bureaucracy. The 
bourgeoisie opposition was aware of the importance of specialised expertise for a 
more efficient productive process. They only disagreed with a scheme where public 
experts took over and the private ones were relegated to a secondary position. They 
argued lack of experience and self-interest on the side of the administration 
bureaucrats, a natural hindrance to the expansion of economic enterprises. They 
lamented the routine of too much red tape, the concentration of capital, and the 
administrative centralisation they associated with public bureaucracy and the central 
                                                 
1  That is, for example, how Lindebrække describes the personality of Labour’s Erik Brofoss. Cfr.  
Lindebrække. Tro og tillit… ”Politiske alternativer”. 
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administration organs under it. But they never questioned the need of a new 
specialised bureaucracy in politics and economics.1  
The opposition maintained on this issue that there were two alternatives: to 
accept and develop the prevailing corporate system or to preserve the traditional 
parliamentarian order. As it has been shown in this work, this was an ideological 
position that somehow blurred the real interests involved in the dispute. But it was not 
a statement out of place and we should not rule out, either, the guild pride of Storting 
representatives and an honest attachment to the assembly’s mystique. There was, 
indeed, a consecrated rutinary parliamentarian approach by which it was, at least in 
paper, still possible to deal with all the administrative needs of consultation and 
expert advice, as well as with the requirement of partisan agreement that would allow 
govern ability: the work of Storting committees.  
 The work of Storting committees, where the most meaningful part of the 
parliamentarian life takes place, involves consultation from all sides in question and a 
proportional representation of all political parties, with the presence of government 
authorities.2  
On the other hand, the work by the state councils might accomplish at least 
one of these requirements, but does not imply a proportional party representation. 
The decision-making process at this level had some disadvantages. First, it 
                                                 
1  Corporatism, we have asserted before, is the brainchild of expert elites in politics and economics. It is 
not merely a natural, scientific approach to the tensions and problems of a post-industrial society, but the 
invention of a specific social group. A fairly successful approach, we should add. To what degree has it been 
developed in Norway or elsewhere out of convenience and to what degree out of the will power of the leaders of 
the professional society, is hard to say. The argument of the need of scientific specialised knowledge in all areas 
has also an ideological side and has been manipulated in order to expand the jurisdiction and power of the expert 
elite. In 1949, Per Vogt theorised on the irrational motivations of corporate development and mentioned a 
tendency to strengthen order and central authority, one coming from the 1920s, and the drive towards 
concentration of power: “Og plandirigeringen ble derfor etterhånden ikke bare mål for den økonomiske politikk, 
men også middel for den rene politikk”. Op. Cit. P. 412. 
2  “Mangeårig kontorsjef i Stortinget, Erik Mo [uttalte at]: ’Stortingets egentlige saksbehandling foregår i 
komiteene, hvor alle sider av saken gjennomgås og drøftes og hvor nye opplysninger innhentes gjennom møter 
med vedkommende statsråd og departementets embetsmenn eller med representanter for organisasjoner og 
næringsliv”. Nordby. I politikkens sentrum… P. 156. 
 78
empowered the government, and so the One-party rule, given by the peculiar 
structure and routines of the state councils in Norway. Secondly, the political parties 
enjoyed a secondary place, since the organisations they proved to represent could 
face the central administration on their own. Thirdly, and most importantly, any 
agreement reached in negotiations outside the parliamentarian arena bound the 
participants before any public debate on the matter. They could not afford to change 
their positions afterwards, either.  
In this context, the bourgeoisie parties could agree that the consensus 
reached through Storting committees was, as the lawyer Johs. Andenæs put it,1 the 
perfect solution to the problem of democracy and rule of experts. This could be 
interpreted and advertised as recourse to more comprehensive knowledge and plural 
political consultation. This is why advocating the rule of the Storting under a Labour 
majority meant empowerment of the opposition.    
 The main mechanism of the One-party rule in Norway, Labour control of the 
Storting, had been achieved and maintained through electoral victories. To this 
respect, the opposition protested against a deed, concentration of power, and 
warned against a threat, abuse of power and dictatorship. This warning can also be 
classified as ideological. Lindebrække, pondering on it years later, explained the 
situation in these milder words: 
Vi følte det slik at opposisjonen i ikke liten grad ble neglisjert –at den politiske 
beslutningsprosess langt på vei ble flyttet over fra stortingssalen i 
Arbeiderpartiets grupperom. Gjennom sitt flertall i Stortinget hadde 
Arbeiderpartiet så utvilsomt den konstitusjonelle makt—det var spørsmål om 
måten å håndheve makten på. Det er ikke riktig å snakke om maktmisbruk –
                                                 
1  “Folk som har sitt kjennskap til Stortingets arbeid bare fra avisenes referater av de store politiske 
debatter, er ofte ikke oppmerksom på at de aller fleste saker blir avgjort i Stortinget enstemmig og uten debatt på 
grunnlag av en enstemmig komitéinnstilling. I dette ligger en veldig rasjonalisering av Stortingets arbeid, som 
bare er mulig på grunn av regelen om at de politiske partier er forholdsmessig representert i komiteene. Når 
representantene vet at kyndige folk av forskjellige politiske grunnsyn har arbeidet med emnet og står sammen 
om stillingen, kan de føle seg trygge uten selv å gå alt for dypt i saken. Komitésystemet gir derfor på sin vis 
bidrag til løsning av problemet demokrati og fagstyre”. Johs. Andenæs. ”Demokrati og fagstyre”. In: Samtiden, 
1949. P. 6-7. 
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snarere en tilvenningsprosess i bevisstheten om at en beslutning av 
Arbeiderpartiets gruppe i realiteten var ensbetydende med et stortingsvedtak.1  
 
It was not a dictatorship they fought against. The term “exile of the Storting” 
comes back as a more useful description of the period and the problem in question 
when placed in the proper context. 
The political machinery of Labour was compared to that of the communist 
parties, but electoral factories did not represent the exception but the rule in modern 
party organisation. The direction of contemporary politics tended to party hierarchies 
in which a higher degree of discipline and a unity of purpose were necessary;2 parties 
where political mobilisation mattered most. The bourgeoisie ones were plainly not 
well prepared enough to match Labour in this area. They had been overwhelmed. 
                                                 
1  Lindebrække. Tro og tillit… P. 202. My underlining. 
2  As early as 1946, a man connected to Høyre, and who quoted in his article authors like Ortega y Gasset 
and Harold Laski, Hans P. Lødrup, wrote that parties had “blitt mål i seg selv, og herrer over valgene og 
velgere”. Op. Cit. P. 436. 
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CHAPTER IV. IDEOLOGY IN ACTION. THE ENABLING ACTS DEBATE 
  
Reconstruction and Lex Thagaard 
An important chapter in the history of corporatism in post-war Norway is that of the 
enabling acts instituted under the Labour administration. They represented the ruling 
approach of the party, influenced the cooperation scheme between the government 
and the business interests, and were crucial on the issue of the role of the Storting. 
The opposition had a lot to say about them—and against them. In fact, the 
bourgeoisie parties saw in the enabling acts debate an opportunity to raise a decisive 
electoral issue. They took their chances—and they failed.  
In the beginning, the enabling acts were directly connected with the problem of 
reconstruction after the war. The first task after Liberation day was to rebuild the 
areas destroyed during the conflict and put the economy fully to work again. 
Finnmark was at the top of the list. Some experts were of the opinion that it would 
take at least five years to take production back to pre-war levels. This implied a big 
mobilisation of resources and manpower, under the dangers of rampant inflation, due 
to high demand, and unemployment. A new economic crisis was not ruled out. In a 
longer run, industrial development and modernisation of the Norwegian economy 
were necessary if higher standards of living and social levelling were to be reached. 
In these circumstances, planning and public intervention were seen as unavoidable 
to control demand and coordinate state and private efforts.1 
The government in exile in London had started the legislation that would 
provide the public authorities with the proper prerogatives to begin with the 
reconstruction work. The highlight of this work was a provisional decree known as 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Lange, Even. Samling om felles mål… “Inn in det lovede land. Samling på sosialdemokratisk 
grunn”.  
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”Lex Thagaard”1 after the mastermind behind it, Price Directorate chairman, Wilhelm 
Thagaard.2  
Thagaard, a leading figure in the making of the Trust law in the 1920s, saw his 
views on direct state controls in the economy get more support in the Labour party in 
the 1930s than in his own party, Venstre. His work in the London-based exiled 
government was key in the economic policies approved. 
The decree was dated May 8th, 1945, the same date as Liberation day. It 
allowed the Price Directorate (Prisdirektoratet) to intervene in the economic 
enterprises of the country as never before during peace times.3 According to the “Lex 
Thagaard”, the Price Directorate had a mandate to take any necessary measures 
under the extraordinary situation, namely: 
a. for å regulere og føre kontroll med priser, fortjenester og utbytter av alle 
slag, 
b. for å regulere og føre kontroll med produksjon, omsetning og annen 
ervervsmessig virksomhet med sikte på å motvirke skadelige 
konkurransereguleringer eller andre mislige forhold eller fremme en bedre 
organisasjon av virksomheten eller på annen måte medvirke til å gjenreise 
eller utbygge næringslivet.4 
 
Consequently, the Price Directorate enjoyed the prerogatives to prevent a 
public or private firm from cutting down or stopping production or sale of a certain 
product or service. To make firms produce or sale a product or service to the amount, 
prices and conditions it considered best. To prevent both creation of new business in 
certain areas and the enlargement of existing ones in case of need. And to require 
firms to pay fees to be used for purposes of price control. 
                                                 
1  The official name was ”Provisorisk anordning av 8. mai 1945 om prisregulering og annen regulering av 
ervervsmessig virksomhet”. 
2  Thagaard had been a relevant figure of the radical Venstre, functionary in Venstre administrations, and 
who later joined the Labourite government. He was an advocate of direct government intervention in the 
economy to regulate competition and prices. This approach had been very popular in the 1930s. 
3  Cfr. Lindebrække. Tro og tillit… ”Kampen om prisloven”. 
4  ”Lex Thagaard” §2. In: Norsk innenriks politikk…   
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In the beginning, the bourgeoisie parties came to terms with the “Lex 
Thagaard”, but not without first expressing concern because of the delegation of 
power to the administration and for the fact that business was not represented in the 
council that elaborated the law. The needs of the reconstruction period played in 
favour of acceptance of increased state intervention and of the instruments to carry it 
out.  
Nonetheless, the issue became controversial and soon enough a matter of 
open political debate. As early as 1946, we run across statements that excessive 
state control did not lead to technological advance and better standards of living, but 
to the opposite direction. Planned economy, it was established by its most radical 
opponents, was incompatible with fixed laws and rules, and most importantly, defied 
the constitutional order and the individual freedoms. It was claimed as socialism.1 Or 
even worse, it meant nazification.2 The statement that state expansion threatened 
individual freedom came to the surface often in the speech of the opposition when 
attacking the enabling acts, but in 1945 it had not come up in the bourgeoisie party 
programmes yet, although there is a warning by Høyre against the dangers of 
socialist planned economy in its 1945 programme.3 
The enabling acts debate became the most visible sign of political 
disagreement in the period studied in this work, and reached its climax in two 
episodes in the Storting forum. The first in 1947 regarding the proposal of a new 
temporary Price law, known as “Lex Brofoss”. The next in 1952-1953, when a 
                                                 
1  In one of many examples, Cfr. Schlytter, Thomas. “Industrien og staten—og friheten”. In: Samtiden, 
1946. This article was written in response to another written by the engineer L.A. Conradi (“Industrien og 
staten”. In: Samtiden, 1946), who suported planned economy on the grounds that it enhanced more economic 
security and better standards of living for the population. It might be wrong to call Schlytter representative of the 
political atmosphere, being a rightist writer, but his statement in this article does show some of the common 
arguments the political opposition make use of in these years.  
2  Cfr. Schlytter. ”Vår økonomiske politikk”. In: Samtiden, 1947. 
3  ”All sosialistisk planøkonomi går ut over forbrukeren”. Høires program ved stortingsvalget 1945. 
”Økonomisk demokrati”. And in a brochure: “All statsdrift betyr pulverisering av ansvaret, ukyndighet og 
byråkrati, inngrep og restriksjoner”. Høire kan du stole på!… 
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permanent law on prices and rationalisation was discussed in parliament. We will 
focus mainly on the bourgeoisie parties’ contribution in these two Storting debates in 
the following section.  
 
In Defence of the Storting. Opposition Parties and the Debate on Lex Brofoss 
Introduction 
A big leap for corporatism in Norway took place in 1947, when a proposal on a new 
temporary law on prices and rationalisation, the “Lex Brofoss”, was debated in the 
Storting, and other corporate arrangements came into the picture, too.  
The National Budget, a yearly plan for the economy as a whole, was put 
forward by Erik Brofoss, the Finance Minister. He was soon appointed as the new 
head of the Ministry of Commerce, instance that became the leading planning organ 
since then. Aditionally, the cases of the branch councils1 and the Employment law 
were discussed in parliament.2 
The “Lex Brofoss” would continue the “Lex Thagaard” with certain additions. It 
allowed public authorities to intervene directly in a business to promote rationalisation 
of production, and contemplated police intervention to enforce payment of taxes and 
fees. On the other side, it established yearly reports on the taxation imposed by the 
Price Directorate to the Storting; this was supposed to represent a chance for 
parliament to exercise control on the deeds of the Directorate.3  
We have already gone over the ideological side of the burgeoisie parties’ 
speech. The reader should keep those comments in mind while reading through the 
                                                 
1  Bransjeråd. The dictionary gives us a long definition of the term: ”council appointed by the King and 
made up of representatives for a line of business or an industry and for the state, in order to further cooperation 
within the business and between it and the state”. (Haugen, Einar. Norwegian-English Dictionary. 4th edition. 
Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1996). The branch councils were instituted right after the war. 
2  Cfr. Sejersted. Op. Cit. “Økonomisk-politisk opposisjon”. 
3 ”Midlertidig lov om prisregulering av 1947”. Kapitel II, §5. In: Norsk innenriks politikk…  
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following. Let us just remark that in the 1947 debate, under a widespread consensus 
that the crisis times were still there, and an agreement on the welfare and economic 
goals to reach, the opposition tried to make the distiction between democratic 
planning and socialistic one. For this purpose, the role of the Storting, the banner of 
Norwegian democracy, became the centre of the discussion. 
 
a) Lex Brofoss and parliamentarian rule. Høyre’s contribution 
As usual, we will start with the largest opposition party, Høyre. The main public 
concern of the party as to the enabling acts was the role of the Storting before a 
bigger and more powerful central administration.  
The proposal for the new temporary Price law was dealt with in the 
parliamentary committee in charge of affairs relating to the Ministry of Justice 
(Justisnemnda), where John Lyng participated as representative for Høyre. When the 
case was later discussed in the Odelsting in June 1947, Lyng was also the main 
spokesman for the party. 
Lyng focused on the constitutionality of the enabling acts and not on the 
economic needs of the moment and the pertinence of economic controls. Lyng’s was 
the most elaborated contribution on this particular point during the 1947 debate. He 
argued that through an enabling act (fullmaktslov) a great deal of authority of the 
Storting in the economy was delegated to the government. Jurisdiction of these two 
powers was thus made unclear, which went contrary to the constitutional order and 
the parliamentarian tradition, since: 
Først og fremst at de uhyre viktige statsfunksjoner som vi karakteriserer som 
den ’lovgivende’, den ’bevilgende’ og den ’beskattende’ myndighet, skal 
utøves av Stortinget selv, etter at sakene er underkastet en åpen og fri 
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drøftelse i Stortingets frie forum, med rett for enhver av de valte 
representanter til å gi utrykk for sitt syn.1 
 
The prerogatives granted to the central administration in taxation and price 
setting, explained Lyng, allowed it to implement comprehensive measures outside of 
the Storting’s budget and jurisdiction. Those decisions took place behind closed 
doors and curtains, away from public supervision. 
He also asserted that if the Labourite majority in the Storting enjoyed, in 
principle, a mandate to carry out changes, it was within the limits of the constitutional 
framework, according to which it had also the duty of enforcing the abovementioned 
prerogatives of parliament. It was not entitled to delegate them. The Storting could 
well replace the enabling acts with special legislation (særlover), which would not 
threaten the legal and legislative system, whereas by sanctioning enabling acts, the 
Storting established an instance in competition with itself. 
Lyng criticised too the argument that enabling acts were necessary as long as 
there was still an extraordinary situation. In his opinion, if the situation was 
extraordinary in economic terms, it was not in the understanding that the Storting was 
able to assemble and fulfill its constitutional duties and carry out its corresponding 
administrative tasks.  
On the other hand, in the economic sphere, continued Lyng, the enabling acts 
broke the logics of the system. They challenged, first, the principle of legality by 
granting a public instance the power to interfere in private business and individual 
rights without reference to a law approved in parliament.2 Secondly, plenipotentiary 
                                                 
1  Stortingets forhandlinger 1947. Tidende. P. 459. 
2  “[Legalitet] er et prinsipp som har en dobbelt adresse. Det sier for det første at enhver generell regel 
som gir en offentlig instans eller en offentlig tjenestemann rett til å gripe inn i privatfolks økonomiske eller 
personlige rettssfære, skal være vedtatt av den lovgivende forsamling i lovs form. Og det sier på den annen side 
at enhver inngrep som en offentlig administrasjon foretar i en privatmanns personlige eller økonomiske 
rettssfære, skal ha en klar påvisning, en klar hjemmel i en lov vedtatt av den lovgivende forsamling”. Ibidem. P. 
461. 
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powers in the economy plagued with insecurity and impredictability a business 
environment where fixed laws and rules were vital.  
The bureaucratic rule would seriously damage economic enterprises, he said. 
The Storting work represented a much better alternative to economic issues, even 
under a Labourite majority, than the relative expertise of the administration officials. 
The highest political instance could not be challenged under the assumption that it 
could not provide the necessary expertise. To define the economic guidelines was a 
task for the elected authorities, whose representativity could not be replaced by any 
expert organ, concluded Lyng: 
Det er også en av de grunner som gjør at jeg føler meg mer betrygget når en 
avgjørelse treffes av arbeiderpartiets gruppe i denne sal, enn når den treffes 
av arbeiderpartiets regjering, at stortingsgruppen representerer en så meget 
videre skala av faglig innsikt fra alle yrker, enn den overordentlige store 
kompetanse, som kollegiet av fagministere representerer.1 
 
Next to Lyng, on Høyre’s side, Lindebrække charged with complementary 
arguments. Although he spoke on the same lines as Lyng on the representativity of 
the Storting and its preeminence over expert instances,2 he admitted that most of the 
accusations on a rule of experts in Norway were exaggerated.  
He asserted that price control was indeed necessary, but something was out 
of doubt to him: price controls should be decided in the open parliamentarian forum, 
where the opposition can make its voice heard, and that was not what the Labour 
proposal implied.3 
                                                 
1  Idem. Tidende. P. 539 
2  ”Storting er ikke bare et nominelt eller numerisk uttrykk for de politiske maktkonstellasjoner i 
samfunnet. Men det representerer vårt lands forskjellige yrker og næringer og alle samfunnslag, og hele denne 
sum av innsikt og erfaring skal gjennom komitébehandling og gjennom debattene her i salen vurdere og avgjøre 
de spørsmålene som det her gjelder.” Ibidem. P. 489. 
3  “...det er min overbevisning at en økonomisksosialisering av vårt land bidrar til å undergrave evne og 
vilje til åpen og fri opposisjon og dermed bidrar til å undergrave vesentlige forutsetninger for vårt demokrati”. 
Idem. P. 487. 
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Another key point in Lindebrække’s contribution was “...den statsdirigerings- 
eller sosialiseringslinje som Regjeringen går inn for”.1 He connected this with the 
issue of the constitutional role of the Storting, too. One of his leading arguments was: 
Det første problem er dette: Hvilket behov er det idag for kontroll og regulering 
av yrkeslivet? 
Og det annet problem er dette: Av hvem og på hvilken måte skal denne 
kontroll og denne regulering besluttes og gjennomføres?2 
    
He answered to the first question saying that the need of controls and 
regulations was different in all economic areas. And to the second, that the 
constitution granted only the Storting with the powers of legislation, allocation of 
public funds and setting of taxes. The enabling acts could take the Storting away 
from its rightful place in financial policies.  
The economic issue, according to Lindebrække, was not really a question of 
economic effectiveness, but one on governing principles. Depriving the Storting of its 
lawful prerogatives threatened the very nature of democracy, he said: 
...vi mener at det er Stortinget, og Stortinget alene, som skal vurdere og 
avgjøre prinsippene i reguleringspolitikken og trekke opp rammen for den. Og 
det må Storting gjøre ved spesiallover og ved spesialbestemmelser for det 
enkelte næring.3 
 
The reports by the Price Directorate to the parliament were, he claimed, simply 
not enough and did not solve the essential constitutional question.4 
On the side of the old members of the elite of the party, Hermann Smitt 
Ingebretsen defended Høyre’s point of view on economic democracy5 and 
complained that the business community had not taken part in the making of the law 
as it corresponded in peace times. He used stronger words than Lyng and 
                                                 
1  Idem. P. 486. 
2  Idem. P. 487. 
3  Idem. P. 489. 
4  ”Det er klart at stortingsmeldinger og stortingsinterpellasjoner og stortingsforespørsler både prinsipielt 
og praktisk på ingen måte kan erstatte selve Stortings lovgivende og bevilgende myndighet”. Idem. P. 489. 
5  Vid supra. Chapter 2. “Opposition and Corporatism”. 
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Lindebrække and called Labour’s policies a “reaksjonær revolusjon”.1 A resource to a 
referendum, he added, would be a good democratic solution to the debate.2 
 
b) The role of the Storting in a planned economy. Ventre’s contribution 
Venstre, concerned about its centre party role, and in the name of social liberalism, 
presented a more moderate criticism of the enabling acts, but was no less strict as to 
the pre-eminent role of the Storting.  
Venstre was clearly in favour of economic regulations, and in the case of the 
“Lex Brofoss”, it just made a distiction between the public controls it advocated and 
the “sosialisering av samfunnet”3 Labour intended to accomplish. Venstre claimed to 
want to bring the Storting completely into the picture to take charge of the guidelines 
of the planned economy so as to make it really democratic. 
Lars Ramndal was chairman in the Justisnemnda at the time and was also the 
main spokesman for his party in the debate. First, Ramndal asked whether there was 
need for extra regulation and whether regulation was a measure in time of crisis or a 
goal in itself. He answered to the first with a negative; some of the existing regulatory 
measures should indeed be lifted. The second was a rhetorical question, and he just 
added the extraordinary controls did nothing but to extend the crisis period. 
He argued that the common man should be protected against economic 
policies that privileged big capital and centralised decisions in Departments and built 
up a bureaucratic rule. 
                                                 
1  St. forh. 1947. Tidende. P. 503. 
2  On details about Smitt Ingebretsen’s proposal on a referendum, Vid Supra. Chapter 2. ”Three Issues of 
Parliamentarism…” 
3  St. forh. 1947. Tidende. P. 456. 
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However, since economic controls could not be ruled out, the Storting should 
take over their making. This was the opposite direction, he claimed, to the one taken 
by the administration and its questionable legality and constitutionality:  
Det lovframlegget ein har her, Ot. prp. nr. 152 og inst. O.X., meiner vår 
fraksjon tek bort frå Stortinget for mykje av den makt Stortinget skal ha, det 
legg makta i hender som vi meiner det ikkje er vanleg å leggja ho i etter norsk 
lov. Eg kjenner til at det er dei som meiner at makta bør delegerast endå 
vidare. Det er overlag interessant at Prisdirektoratet i sitt framlegg, som er 
prenta som vedlegg til Ot. prp. nr. 152, går inn for å delegera heile makta over 
til Prisdirektoratet.1  
 
The price law, proceeded Ramndal, had gone out of bounds. The controls 
over what and how much a business should produce were unnecessary and out of 
place in a price law. The firms themselves should be able to decide how and how 
much to rationalise and modernise production. 
On the side of party politics, the approval of such law, he said, could work 
against the prevailing cooperation that its party was willing to offer to the ruling 
administration.2 
Another Venstre representative, Ketil Skogen, pointed out that it was not 
certain whether the Storting could provide the law protection against state 
intromission in the rights of the citizens. There was a risk, he said, that the current 
development ended up in a police state and dictatorship. And asked: “Er staten til for 
menneskjet, eller er menneskjet til for staten?”3 Nonetheless, in Venstre fashion, he 
acknowledged that it was not an issue of deciding whether Norway should have 
regulations and planned economy, but an issue of how far it should be taken, and of 
                                                 
1  Ibidem. P. 455. Ramndal added: “...vi kan ikkje skjøna, vi kan ikkje tenkja oss, at det er i samsvar med 
vanleg norsk rett og med konstitusjonell rett at til dømes ei føresegn eller eit vedtak, eller berre eit reglement frå 
Prisdirektoratet, skal avskipa lovføresegner som Stortinget tidligere har gjevi”. P. 458. 
2  “Når vi etter drøfting ikkje fann at vi ville gå på denne vegen, var det av vi så langt som mogleg ville ta 
eit sakleg samarbeid med dei som i dag sit ved makta. Vi ville ikkje i utengsmål koma med framlegg som kunne 
takast  opp slik at vi ville bryta samarbeid”. Idem. P. 455.  
3  Idem. P. 492. 
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how beneficial a bureaucratic rule would be for the economy in the international 
context.  
 
c) The individualistic point of view. The Bondeparti’s contribution 
The Bondeparti adopted a more Liberal position. The tendency in the enablig acts 
debate was in this case towards sympathising with Høyre’s position on defence of the 
private initiative. On these lines, Lars Trædal on behalf of the Bondeparti came up 
with a more Liberal speech than that of the other centre parties. He described 
Labour’s proposal for a price law as the collectivistic outlook at work. Such view, he 
continued, challenged the Liberal principles on politics and economics. In it, the 
Storting delegated its regulatory powers to potentially dangerous instances: 
Det […] som gjev seg av dei synsmåtane eg har peika på, er dette: Folket som 
skal inn under regulering, må sjølv avgjera og ha hand om dette livsviktige 
spørsmålet. Det folkevalte organ, Stortinget, lyt derfor vera vár med å overføra 
reguleringsmakt til personar og institusjonar som kan få øve til å øva urett og 
gjera skade ved evneløyse eller maktmisbruk.1   
 
           A modern society, he stated, required economic controls, price control 
included, both in crisis and normal times, but to a different degree in every case. He 
implied, as well, that the enlargement of the state economic controls in Norway was 
not rational but political. It was the collectivist point of view at work.  
His party, on the contrary, advocated the individualistic point of view and could 
not agree with such premises that might result in abuse of power. 
The Bondeparti considered regulations a necessary evil to prevent abuse by 
the private intitiative, but no more. The state should limit its role, instead, to give the 
right conditions for that private initiative to flower: 
                                                 
1  Idem.  
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...vi held det for å vera avgjerande politisk visdom til kvar tid å finna den rette 
avgrensing mellom staten og individet sitt maktområde (…). Det positive krav 
til staten er etter vårt syn at staten skal—ikke konkurrera med individa og 
skapa motsetningstilhøve til dei, men derimot leggja vilkåra til rette så det 
kallar på og ankar deira verketrong.1 
 
The majority proposal, he concluded, intended to reshape Norwegian 
democracy, and its approval meant a plenipotenciary power for Labour to proceed 
with its revolutionary policies. 
 
d) The radical social point viewpoint. The Kristelig Folkeparti’s contribution 
The Kristelig Folkeparti, following the principles of its “radical social viewpoint”, 
adopted a position openly in favour of economic regulation, but joined the rest of the 
bourgeoisie parties in asking for a Storting command over the economic regulations, 
in criticising the use of detailed controls, and in warning about the danger of a 
bureaucratic rule.2  
On those lines, representative Erling Wikborg claimed that the Price 
Directorate carried out too many detailed controls in too many cases, but stressed 
also the importance of state control mechanisms to prevent an economic crisis. 
Norway had not come back to a “normal situation”, and there was no more free 
market to rely on in order to achieve the economic goals: 
Jeg tror ikke at den såkalte frie konkurranse ville kunne nå å gjennomføre de 
mål jeg har nevnt, den har jo også for en stor del opphevet seg selv. Derfor 
står vi vel nærmest ved et valg mellom de store sammenslutningers og 
bransjers regulering og den mer samfunnsbetonte reguleringer. Vi kommer 
ikke forbi at vi til en viss grad må legge en plan for utbyggingen av vårt 
næringsliv.3 
 
                                                 
1  Idem. P. 474. 
2  Representative Einar Hareide from Kristelig Folkeparti asserted that: ”Det er ei overmåte farleg 
utvikling dette med den byråkratiske lina i norsk politikk i dag”. Idem. P. 533. 
3  Idem. P. 537. 
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However, if controls were vital, the Price law had a political side perhaps more 
important than the economic one, said Wikborg, and here the Storting should 
preserve its role before the administration: 
Fullmaktsloven åpner adgang til skritt av mer politisk enn næringsbetinget 
natur, og her gjør det seg gjeldende ikke liten engstelse ute i folket. Det er 
derfor nødvendig at Stortinget nøye følger utviklingen og treffer avgjørelsen i 
alle de tilfelle der det ikke er tvingende nødvendig å legge den til andre 
myndigheter.1  
 
The party claimed to remain among the centre parties on this issue, but it 
seems that after the voting in which the “Lex Brofoss” was approved, they accused 
the Kristelig Folkeparti of having taking sides with Labour. The stance of the Kristelig 
Folkeparti, it was written for the local elections propaganda, was different from, on 
one side, that of Labour and the Communist Party’s, and on the other, that of 
Høyre’s: 
[Kristelig Folkeparti har gitt] et eget forslag til prislov som for det første ikke 
inneholder de rigorøse bestemmelsen i Lex Thagaard, for det annet tillater 
småbedrifter å starte uten særskilt tillatelse, og for det tredje uttalte at 
Stortinget etter hvert skulle avgjøre for hver enkelt næringsgren om 
reguleringstiltak er nødvendig, og hvilke prinsipper en eventuell regulering skal 
foregå etter, mens Arbeiderpartiet og kommunistpartiet har gitt Regjeringen og 
Prisdirektoratet fullmakt til å foreta slike reguleringer.2 
 
The Kristelig Folkeparti tried, in fact, to place itself in between the conservative 
and radical political positions in Norwegian politics, without taking a more critical 
stand before the government. A strategy that did not please either Høyre or the 
Bondeparti. 
 
A New Context. The Period Between the Big Debates 
In the 1947 debate, constitutional and parliamentarian arguments ran above 
economic ones in the bourgeoisie parties’ speech. The constitutionality issue was put 
                                                 
1  Idem. 
2  ”Redegjørelse om Lex Thagaard”. In: 20. Oktober. Valgavis for Kristelig Folkeparti i Aker og Oslo. 
Oslo, A/S Morgenpostens trykkeri, 1947. 
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straight. The role of the Storting in the economic policies became the centre of the 
debate. How much it affected the public opinion is difficult to say. What is evident is 
that it did not help the bourgeoisie position advance in the next Storting elections in 
1949.  
In between the two main episodes of the enabling acts debate, the controversy 
continued, but the circumstances had changed. Physical reconstruction was finished 
around 1950, and the production levels reached by this date overcame those of the 
pre-war times. The extraordinary regulations of the first years were reconsidered, but 
it was not clear yet which of them should be taken away.  
Most importantly, there was a reconsideration of the economic strategies 
within the Labour leadership and the core of the experts in the administration. It had 
to do with a shift in priorities and orientations in the political agenda of the ruling 
party. As increasing production was regarded as the means to socialism, and the 
cooperation with the business community showed more practical to achieve the goals 
of industrialisation, a turn away from Thagaard’s influence took place. Key characters 
Erik Brofoss, head of the Minister of Commerce, and Finance Minister Trygve 
Bratteli, disagreed with the approach preserved by Thagaard, in which legislation and 
direct state intervention were the best means to strengthen the economy. Close 
cooperation between the central administration and business organisations, they 
thought, could do the trick better.1 At the same time, the Defense Minister, Jens Chr. 
Hauge, led a group of Labour politicians who favoured more room to market 
mechanisms than to direct intervention.2 The scepticism from within the party would 
only grow, as the final debate got nearer. 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Lange. Op. Cit. ”Blanke ark og fargestifter. Styringsmodellen finner sin form.” And Bergh. Op. 
Cit. “Produksjon—veien til velstand”. 
2  ”Som Rune Slagstad har påvist, vokste det fram en indre opposisjon i Arbeiderpartiet, der Jens Chr. 
Hauge [forsvarsminister] var den drivende kraften. 
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 For a nation that tried to build a bridge between East and West, at the end, 
Norway had to take sides. Alignment with the West brought along a change of 
orientation also in the economic area. The Marshall Plan, that granted aid to Norway 
since 1948, affected the choice of economic strategies to follow.1 The American 
corporate approach influenced the making of the Norwegian one. Americans were 
not the advocates of free market rules the Norwegian extreme Right would like them 
to be,2 but their approach to industrial harmony was more oriented to voluntary 
cooperation with business interests, and they pressed Norway to lift up direct controls 
as quickly as possible. As a matter of fact, the ongoing cooperation between LO and 
the big Norwegian corporations materialised in the American-sponsored Norsk 
Produktivitetsinstitutt (NPI), which opposed further state inroads in the economy.3 
The participation of Norway in the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC), founded as a result of the Marshall Plan, and the consequent requirement of 
more openess in the international market would also influence the outcome of the 
debate on the enabling acts.4 Liberalisation of the economy was welcome too as a 
means of the planned economy. 
There were some events in the political arena that shaped the background of 
the debate of the fifties. The Justice Minister, O.C. Gundersen, made public in 1950 a 
                                                                                                                                                        
     … 
 ”Framfor noe tilhørte han en gruppe politikere innen Arbeiderpartiet som var kritisk til det mest 
vidtgående statsstyret regjeringen la opp til, og som i stedet ønsket å gi mer rom for markedsløsninger. Med 
tanke på den pågående debatten over pris- og rasjoneringslovgivningen, mente de at den beste strategien for øke 
produktiviteten var å legge til rette på bedriftsnivå snarere enn å gripe til statlig styring”. Lange, Even. Op. Cit. 
P. 60-62. 
1  Nordby mentions the American pressure to go further in the economic controls contained in the 
enabling acts.  “At den dramatiske omleggingen fant sted akkurat i 1952, må forstås i lys av de betingelsene 
amerikanerne, i tilknytning til Marshall-programmet, satte for å gi Norge teknisk og økonomisk bistand”. 
Nordby. ”Korporatisme…” P. 62. He also wrote that this represented a choice between the Soviet and the 
American models. Also, Cfr. Lange, Even. Op. Cit. “Inn i det lovede land”. 
2  Farmand always pointed out that the huge American economic development was caused by free market 
strategies in order to back their claims that Norway should go the same way. 
3  Cfr. Lie, Einar. Ambisjon og tradisjon. Finansdepartementet 1945-1965. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 
1995. ”Striden om pris- og rasjonaliseringslovene”. 
4  Cfr. Lange. Op. Cit... ”Samarbeid ute og hjemme.” 
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proposal called “Om særlige rådgjerder under krig, krigsfare og lignende forhold”, 
best known as ”Den svarte loven”. This proposal of an enabling act contemplated 
extraordinary faculties for the government in case of war. It seems that those 
faculties were not favoured by all sides, while some circles traditionally close to 
Labour opposed them. Radical intellectuals argued against it, and so did the 
Justisnemnda, where Labour enjoyed a majority. The Justice Minister and the 
government were in a difficult position, and finally Prime Minister Gerhardsen backed 
down. The strategy Labour followed was to work out in parliament a new proposal 
acceptable to all parts,1 a significant step that showed the inclination of Labour to 
safe political solutions.  
In 1952, the Supreme Court faced the issue of constitutionality of the Price law 
in a concrete case. In a plenary session, the Supreme Court decided that the fees 
imposed to the whale companies under the enforcement of the Price law were not 
unconstitutional.2 This decision influenced the emphasis granted to the constitutional 
issue in the speech of the opposition in the debate to come. 
 
The Bourgeoisie Parties’ Position Between the Two Storting Debates 
In the years between the approval of the Lex Brofoss and the proposal by the 
Sjaastad committee, Høyre kept criticising the resolutions of the Price Directorate. 
Lindebrække stated in 1951 that the Finance Department had the constitutional 
responsibility of mastering the economic controls and the Directorate did not.3 
Following the new trends within the party, representative Guttorm Granum proposed 
during a Storting session in February that year that the Finance Department in 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Lyng, John. Op. Cit. ”Den svarte loven”. 
2  Cfr. Sejersted. Op. Cit… ”Konflikten om fullmaktslovgivningen og den konstitusjonelle utviklingen”. 
3  Cfr. To år i opposisjon mot en overmektig sosialistflertall. Høires innsats i Storting 1950 og 1951. En 
oversikt ved Birger Gotaas. ?, Høires Landsstyre, 1953. P. 319. 
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cooperation with the business community established a Council with representatives 
of the private sector and the authorities with the mandate to put forward proposals on 
price resolutions that could enhance consumers’ interests.1 In the debate on the 
budget of the Price Directorate in June that same year, Hambro admonished the 
government and the Finance Minister to inform the Storting on the work of the Price 
Directorate, since it was unknown to which levels the decisions there were taken.2 
Venstre criticised detailed controls further in 1949 with an argument that had 
become popular among the opposition parties, namely, by asking for regulations in a 
framework shaped mainly by the monetary, financial and taxation policies of the 
government. The firms should adapt to them on their own.3 This, stated the party, 
was a better strategy to guarantee full employment than direct state intervention.  
In its 1949 programme, the party asserted that indirect controls would also 
increase pleasure in one’s work, entrepreneurship and personal responsibility, in 
other words, the inner forces of economic progress, and concluded: “Målet er fritt 
valg av yrke og varer”.4 
The party still maintained that private initiative alone could not achieve full 
employment, and only public control and planning could,5 Venstre continued its 
opposition to the regulations on production contained in the Price law.6 Including the 
distinction between the kind of the regulations Venstre wanted (samfunnskontroll) 
and the ones Labour had imposed (samfunnsregulering or samfunnsdirigering).7  
                                                 
1  Cfr. Ibidem. P. 216-218. 
2  Cfr. Ibidem. P. 319. 
3  Cfr. Venstres alternativ… P. 9-11. 
4  Valgprogram for Venstre 1949.  
5  Cfr. Olsen, Oscar. Venstre og sosialpolitikken. Oslo, Norges Venstrelag, 1949. 
6  In 1951, the party stated through Olaf Kortner: ”[Venstre] ville ikke gi myndighetene rett til å forby en 
virksomhet å stanse eller innskrenke driften, heller ikke rett til å tvinge en virksomhet til å produsere bestemte 
varer eller tjenester til priser og vilkår som staten skulle fastsette”. Venstre. Idé og… P. 63. 
7  Olsen. Op. Cit. P. 68-69. 
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In 1952, the party stated that a big case like the enabling acts should be put 
forward to the voters in a referendum.1 
In regard to the enabling acts debate, director and Venstre man Joakim Ihlen 
wrote in 1953 that it was cooperation between state and business, and within the 
workplace, what could secure full employment and effective rationalisation of 
production. Such cooperation, it was implied, should be informal and voluntary, and 
only for special circumstances there should be legislation on it.2 He stated that the 
ruling party itself had come to this conclusion.  
Voluntary cooperation in economic planning seemed to have been widely 
accepted by all the bourgeoisie parties by the time the next round of the 
parliamentary debate began. On these lines, the Bondeparti requested in its 1949 
programme more freedom for the private initiative and that controls and regulations 
were to be set and administered in cooperation with the business community.3   
The Kristelig Folkeparti contributed to the criticism by complaining about the 
size and composition of the new administration. Decentralisation, filling up of forms 
limited to the minimum feasible, and a taxation system that did not discourage 
individual initiative or jeopardise production, were some of the demands of the party.4 
 
Towards the Final Consensus. The 1953 Debate.  
Introduction 
After the approval of the “Lex Brofoss” a committee was appointed in 1947 with the 
instructions of  elaborating a proposal for permanent price and rationalisation law. 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Venstre. Årsmelding for 1952.  
2  ”Så vidt jeg forstår er en også på arbeiderpartihold blitt klar over at rasjonalisering av næringene bare 
kan skje ved samarbeid mellom næringene selv, mellom disse og våre myndigheter og at bare under spesielle 
forhold kan bli bruk for særlover”. Ihlen, Joakim. Økonomisk demokrati… P. 7.  
3  Til vern og trygd… 
4  Cfr. Kristelig Folkeparti. Program ved Stortingsvalget 10. oktober 1949. Erling Wikborg. ”Kristelig 
Folkepartis hovedlinjer ved stortingsvalget 1949”. In: Kristelig Folkepartis valgavis i Oslo 1949. Oslo, Vårt 
Lands Trykkeri A/L, 1949. 
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The Sjaastad commitee, named after the LO lawyer Gustav Sjaastad and under the 
influence of the head of the Price Directorate, Wilhelm Thagaard, included 
representatives of the business community as part of the minority group.1 
Trond Bergh affirms that Sjaastad and the Labour government had been 
concerned, a few years prior, about the constitutional problems and the issue of 
individual rights involved in the enabling acts legislation. Labour wanted to be 
regarded as a democratic and legally responsible party.2 There were signs of more 
political carefulness in the work of the Sjaastad committee. It increased the control by 
the Storting over the administrative organs empowered by the acts. So argued 
director Thagaard: 
Lovforslaget inneholder også bestemmelser om utvidet parlamentarisk kontroll 
med bruken av de reguleringsfullmakter som foreslåes lagt til administrasjonen 
(…). Det forslaget går ut på er fast grunnlag for at Stortinget kan føre kontroll 
med hvorledes lovgivningsfullmaktene blir brukt.3   
 
The committee came up with a proposal of two separate laws in March 1952, 
one for price control, and the other for rationalisation of production.4 The last of them 
confronted fierce opposition. 
It was very difficult for Labour to defend the proposal on rationalisation of 
production. Up to 1952, rationalisation had not played a significant role in the 
economic policies. There was no administrative apparatus to enforce the regulations 
in this area, and by 1952, it became evident that there would not be any. There was 
not any real enthusiasm in Labour for a rationalisation law.5 
                                                 
1  They were the director Paul Frank from Norges Handelsstands Forbund, the attorney Arne Poulsen from 
Norges Håndverkerforbund, and the directors I. H. Støre and Jens Wilhelmsen from Norges Industriforbund. 
Cfr. Norsk innenriks politikk... ”Prisloven av 1953. Sjaastadkomitéen—sammensetning og fraksjoner”. 
2  Cfr. Bergh. Op. Cit. “En retrett”. 
3  Thagaard. ”Herr Keilhau...”. P.421. 
4  ”Lov om fremme av rasjonalisering, bedre organisasjon og utbygging av den økonomiske virksomhet”. 
5  Cfr. Lie. Op. Cit. ”Striden om pris- og rasjonaliseringslovene”. 
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The executive reconsidered the political risks involved and amended what the 
commmitte had put forward. Torp’s government made public its proposal on a Price 
law in September 1952. The Rationalisation law was discarded, but some of its 
elements were attached to the Price law proposal. Overall it was a more moderate 
version of what the Sjaastad committee had put forward.1 The Finance minister, 
Bratteli, presented it to the Storting, and then the government proposal was sent to 
the Finance committee, which made public its own contribution on March 4th, 1953. 
The debate in the Odelsting began on May 28th.2 
The defence of the traditional role of the Storting on the opposition side 
continued in the parliamentarian debate, but it lost preeminence before the economic 
issue and the tacit agreement that there would be some sort of extraordinary powers 
in the state hands. The bourgeoisie parties, with the exception of Venstre, came up 
with a more Liberal speech in the 1953 debate, and other issues came forward, 
namely, ways for an effective control of the administration by the Storting, the 
protection of the individual before an administrative decision, a demand for a more 
open administrative decision-making process, cooperation between government and 
business in the making of the economic policies, and the recourse to mainly 
macroeconomic regulations in the economic planning. 
 
a) Trust to the business community. Lindebrække and Høyre’s contribution 
Sejersted states that, previous to the Storting debate on a permanent Price law, 
Lindebrække suggested searching for an opportunity for bourgeoisie cooperation.3  
He argued that the party should join the minority fraction in the Sjaastad committee 
and support the proposal of a Trust law complemented with a temporary Price law. 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Lyng. Op. Cit. ”Striden om Lex Thagaard og reguleringslovgivningen”. 
2  Cfr. Lindebrække. Op. Cit. ”Kampen om prisloven”. 
3  Cfr. Sejersted. Op. Cit. 
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Lyng suggested, on the other hand, a Trust law where some considerations 
regarding the need of further economic regulations in the first phase were 
contemplated and which would make a temporary Price law superfluous. The party 
leadership was divided. Hambro went for Lyng’s proposal whereas Stranger and 
Smitt Ingebretsen supported Lindebrække’s. This last proposal became the party’s 
position during the debate.1  
Once in the Storting session, Lyng assumed again the role of opponent to the 
price legislation due to constitutional concerns, whereas Lindebrække’s contribution 
to the 1953 debate revolved more around the economic side rather than on the legal 
issue. 
The constitutional issue had the same rationale as in the 1947 debate. It reads 
in Høyre’s program of 1953: “Systemet med fullmaktslover er udemokratisk og 
ukonstitusjonelt, det flytter viktige avgjørelser fra Stortinget til departementer og 
direktorater og stenger for fri og våken offentlig kritikk”. 2 The party stated in the same 
document that it still wanted to annul the permanent price legislation and give the 
Storting the ultimate authority in economic issues. The permanent Price law, it was 
stated in a brochure, was fundamentally wrong because it put the Storting aside:  
Hvorfor er Høyre mot prisloven når partiet selv sier det er for kontroll med 
priser og bransjesammenslutninger? 
Høyre mener at vårt land skal styres av folkets representanter i 
Stortinget, og derfor er vi imot at en betydelig del av Stortingets myndighet 
overlates til reguleringen og prisdirektoratet og setter disse i stand til 
fullstendig å omforme landets økonomiske struktur. 3 
 
Since the constitutional aspect of the debate, mainly the defence of the role of 
the Storting, does not differ substantially here from the 1947 position, we will focus 
now on Lindebrække’s contribution. 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Ibidem. ”Konflikten om fullmaktslovgivningen og den konstitusjonelle utviklingen”. 
2  Høires program 1953. This was indeed the same elaboration by Lyng from 1947. 
3  Spørsmål og svar. Stortingsvalget 1953. Til bruk for tillidsmenn. Oslo, S. & Jul Sørensen A/S, 1953. 
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Lindebrække tried to prove how the Price law did not fulfill the two purposes it 
was supposed to, namely, keep prices down and ensure full employment. It had been 
the Marshall Plan, he claimed, that saved the Norwegian economy. The economic 
argument to extend the extraordinary powers to the government was, thus, 
inoperative. 
He claimed that Høyre’s proposal was all about taking power from the 
bureaucrats and transfering it to the consumers.1 He proceeded, then, to explain 
what he called “våre egne positive forslag” with the goal of: “å skaffe forbrukerne de 
fleste, de beste og de billigste varer etter forbrukernes egen vurdering av ønske og 
behov”.2  
“Modern Liberal economic politics”, he argued, required a voluntary 
cooperation between the public administration and the business community. 3 
Lindebrække developed the theme of “Trust” (Tillit), which he explained in several 
ways. One of the most glamorous: “...frihet under demokratisk kontroll”.4 The state, 
he claimed, should give private initiative free room, and let the market rules work and 
intervene only when that trust had been betrayed: 
Vårt forslag bygger på tillit til forbrukernes evne til selv å bestemme over sitt 
daglige liv og på tillit til at alle grener av norsk næringsliv, i jordbruket, i 
skogbruket, i fiske, i handel og industri og i skipsfart, har evne og vilje til å fylle 
sin oppgave som forbrukernes tjener i samfunnsholdningen.5 
 
                                                 
1  Lindebrække’s speech was later published as a brochure with the title: Markedet og forbrukerne skal 
bestemme—ikke myndighetene og direktørene. Høires alternativ til prisloven: En storstilet maktoverføring fra 
myndighetenes kommandosentraler til frie forbrukere. Sjur Lindebrækkes innlegg i prislovdebatten (Positiv 
Politikk. Nr. 10, July 1953. Tønsbergs Aktivtrykkeri).   
2  Stortingets forhandlinger 1953. Tidende. P. 360. 
3  Ibidem. Tidende. P. 362. 
4  Idem. P. 363. 
5  Idem. P. 363. 
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In his concept of economic democracy, the interests of the business 
community were identified with those of the consumers, a term which, on Høyre’s 
lips, seemed to have embraced both individuals and the common men.1 
The alternative he presented to a permanent Price law was the continuation of 
the Trust law along with temporary and extraordinary legislation in order to protect 
consumers in extraordinary situations.  
 
b) An active Storting. Venstre’s contribution 
Venstre approached the enabling acts question in 1953 from a very different position 
from the one it held in 1947. Around the time the Sjaastad-committee proposal was 
made public in 1952, chairman Worm-Müller resigned from his position on the 
grounds that he could not bring the party together in the regulation issue. In the next 
National Assembly, the party elected Røiseland as chairman, a member with an 
opposite stance on state intervention.2 
 Along with Røiseland, an alliance between radicals and moderates displaced 
the conservative wing of the party from the top. Consequently, Venstre left behind the 
conservatives’ approach of taking sides in the dispute against Labour. The party 
should now reaffirm its place in the centre, separate from Høyre’s unconditional 
support to freedom for business interests, and emphasize the need of public control 
of the economy. 3  
There would not be a joined bourgeoisie block on the enabling acts issue in 
parliament. However, the party could not just back a Labourite proposal. In order to 
                                                 
1   The use of the term “consumer” represents a step ahead in the Liberal speech. The earlier defence of 
the minority before the dictatorship of the majority addressed the individual and not the common man as such; 
that is to say, it refered more to the entrepeneur than to the wage earner. The turn of Høyre, a conservative party, 
to embrace vaguely the man in the street in its speech is connected to the ambitions of the party to become a 
National party not suspected of a class orientation and seen as another defender of the welfare state without 
giving up the support to business. 
2  Cfr. Rovde. Op. Cit. “Sjaastad-innstillinga”. 
3  Ibidem.  ”Sjaastad-innstillinga”, and “Landsmøtet 22.-24. mai 1952”. 
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establish distance from Labour, and from Thagaard, the party would come up with its 
own alternative. A council was formed for such purpose. The composition of this 
council reflected the change in power relations within the party.1 Radicals and 
moderates had the majority, whereas conservatives remained isolated. 
Paul Ingebretsen was named chairman of the council for a Venstre’s proposal 
on a Price law in 1952.2 The final proposal of this council accepted a permanent price 
law as a means for public regulations, but at the same time demanded that such law 
restrain from application to other economic purposes different from price setting, and 
also that its extraordinary powers were limited.3  
In Ingebretsen’s contribution in parliament, the supremacy of the Storting 
played a big role. He also adopted the principle of the defence of the consumer as a 
key issue regarding a Price law.4  
Ingebretsen stated that free market was a relative entity, and one could not 
really talk about free competition any longer, but only about “healthy” (sunn) 
competition. There were many factors that worked against a healthy competition in 
the context of free price setting. In this context, the duty of the state was to prevent 
negative or irrestricted competition.  
Detailed economic controls had gone too far, for too long, but it was not 
pertinent to lift them all up at once either. It was still necessary to hold a public price 
control: 
...[man] må fortsatt ha prislovbestemmelser. Problemsstillingen blir altså ikke 
det alternative: Enten prislov eller ikke prislov? Det blir: Hvilken prislov? Og 
hovedspørsmålet blir da hvor begrenset den bør være, eller hvor vidt den bør 
                                                 
1  Idem. ”Prislovutvalet, proposisjonen og vestrealternativet”. 
2  Cfr. Venstre. Årsmelding for 1952.  
3  Cfr. Rovde. Op. Cit. ”Prislovutvalet, proposisjonen og vestrealternativet”. 
4  Ingebretsen wrote a brochure on the Price law where he explained Venstre’s position in more detail. As 
to consumers’ role in the economy, he wrote: “Forbrukernes frie valg skal bestemme sammenstningen og 
mengden av produksjonen”. Venstre og prisloven. Utgitt av Norges Venstrelag. Skien, Polikarp Pettersens bok & 
Aksidenstrykkeri, 1953. P. 11. 
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gå, med andre ord, hvilket innhold loven bør ha. Hvilket navn en bruker, 
trustlov eller prislov, er av underordnet betydning.1   
 
He thought a good approach was to put together the Trust law along with 
provisions on price control to create a law above both the Trust and Price laws, and 
of course, to avoid a permanent price law.  
The Storting should, in his opinion, be in charge on deciding the form, 
extension and duration of price regulations. The system of reports to parliament by 
the administrative agencies empowered created only a small possibility of 
parliamentarian control that was not sufficient.  
The Storting should no longer play a passive role. The appointment of a Price 
Council (Prisråd), formulated in the government proposal, should not work as an 
independent control organ but rather help put regulations under effective 
parliamentarian control: 
For hvert år må Stortinget få seg forelagt de retningslinjer om Regjeringen 
[gjennom prisrådet] mener bør følges. Stortinget skal behandle disse og gjøre 
vedtak som fastlegger, så langt det selv finner det hensiktsmessig, om 
reguleringstiltak er nødvendig, og i tilfelle hva disse skal omfatte og hvordan 
de skal utøves. I samsvar med disse vedtakene, som er bindende, er 
fullmaktene til administrasjonen begrenset.2  
 
A further parliamentarian control should also be carried out to ensure 
protection to the citizens in case of arbitrary administration decisions.3 
The best approach to fulfill the economic goals, stated Paul Ingebretsen, was 
through financial, credit, monetary and currency policies, that is to say, the 
macroeconomic framework, and not through detailed price controls, which should 
only be put into action in case the other means failed.4 
                                                 
1  St. forh. 1953. Tidende. P. 365. 
2  Ibidem. P. 367. My underlining. 
3  ”…under hensyn til de enkelte borgeres interesser og krav på rettsikkerhet og en betryggende 
saksbehandling”. Idem. P. 370. Ingretsen elaborated more on the issue in his brochure on the Price law. Cfr. Op. 
Cit. “Fullmakter til administrasjonen avgrenses”, “Avgifter og utbyttegrensning”. 
4  Cfr. Ibidem. 
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c) Corporatism in Liberal terms. The Bondeparti’s contribution 
Jon Leirfall, spokesman of the Bondeparti, argued strongly against the proposal of a 
permanent Price law and called it “unnecessary” and “indefensible”.1 It was free 
competition what set prices best, benefited consumers, and kept businessmen from 
earning too much, he claimed. Public controls of prices had not helped hold prices 
down. It had been proven unnecessary to maintain enabling acts and a big regulatory 
apparatus: 
Vi meiner det har vori for mykje pirk og detaljarbeid, og for lite sakkunnskap, 
for lite effektivitet, for mykje skjema, for mykje vilkårlege avgjerder og for lite 
sunt skjøn.2 
 
According to Leirfall, the bureaucratic rule enhanced by the Price law did not 
produce wealth and higher standards of living; it just distributed poverty. The Price 
law was also part of a scheme that privileged the big industry at the expense of the 
small and concentrated economic activities in Oslo. In the long run, this system led to 
socialisation and strict direct controls. Trying to hold full employment through 
economic controls represented a constant threat to democratic values. Trying to limit 
the prospect of profits, as the Price law contemplated, and all bourgeoisie parties 
criticised, would repress the entrepreneurial spirit.  
As expressed elsewhere in the bourgeoisie opposition’s speech, he pinpointed 
that the economic question should be solved through cooperation between the 
authorities and the business community: 
Vi meiner at i staden for eit system med offentlege reguleringar og dirigeringar, 
burde den økonomiske utviklinga byggjast på eit samarbeid med dei 
organisasjonar som arbeider i næringslivet, på alle felt av det, og på at ein 
tekk opp til drøfting problem og tiltak som ein meinar kan og bør gjerast, og dei 
bør førast gjennom i samarbeid med organisasjonane.3 
 
                                                 
1  St. forh. 1953. Tidende. P. 371. 
2  Ibidem. P. 371. 
3  Idem. P. 379. 
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In order to protect the interests of the consumers, the Bondeparti proposed the 
use of the Trust law1 with the addition of some special laws: 
I trustlova og ei rekkje med serlover har vi grunnlag for all den priskontroll som 
trengst  for å tryggja forbrukarane mot prismisbruk under normale tilhøve, og vi 
har lovheimel for den kontrollen som er naudsynleg med 
konkurranseavgrensande samskipnader.2 
 
The additional laws should include laws on quality control to assure that 
consumers get the best products possible. With exceptional need of enabling acts, 
these should be limited to concrete situations and limited goals.  
The best means to achieve the social levelling the party traditionally 
supported, Leirfall said, was not through direct state controls, but through indirect 
intervention approved by the Storting. 
Det er [Stortinget] som skal ’fremme en rimelig fordeling av nasjonalinntekten’ 
ved ein rettferdig skatte- og avgiftspolitikk, ved sosiale trygder og ved at 
vilkåra blir lagde til rette på ein rettferdig måte for dei ymse næringene.3 
 
The Bondeparti stuck to a Liberal speech in the economic and political issues 
around the enabling acts, and supported both private enterprise and Storting rule. 
This speech did not match the actual corporate tendencies in the party. However, if 
we are to take it literally, we can describe it as corporatism formulated under Liberal 
principles.4  
                                                 
1  In another document from the Bondeparti: ”[For en sunn konkurranse] er det ikke bare Statens byråkrati 
og dets prisfordyring en må være på vakt imot, men også de private trustdannelser. Det er uforsvarlig å ha en 
prislov som gir noen funksjonærer i et direktorat all makt til å bestemme over næringslivet og binde de positive 
krefter. Men en må også sikre seg mot for vidtgående private konkurransereguleringer, og derfor må vi ha en 
effektiv trustlov og trustkontroll”. Oppland Bondeparti. Håndbok for Grendemenn. Gjøvik, Samholds Trykkeri, 
1953. P. 16. 
2  St. forh. 1953. Tidende. P. 372. 
3  Ibidem. P. 376. 
4  In an issue we cannot give more space in the main text, but we should mention, Halvor Bunkholt, 
another Bondeparti representative, pointed out what he considered the threat the enabling acts posed to the 
security of the individual before the law. The enabling acts were not usual laws, he maintained, but laws that just 
stayed behind the resolutions of the Price Directorate, investing these of authority. Cfr. The report of his speech 
in I kamp for frihet og folkestyre... “Prisloven. Store debatter.” P. 406. The Bondeparti also joined the concern of 
the security of the individual before the law in its 1953 programme and established it as one element of the 
projected social arrangement, where a steady bigger production lied along with freedom of action and social 
security. Bondepartiets program Stortingvalget 1953.  
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d) Reformulating corporatism. The Kristelig Folkeparti’s contribution 
On behalf of the Kristelig Folkeparti, representative Knut Toven repeated what its 
party had stated years before on the needs of regulations and restrictions not only 
during crisis but also in normal times. However, the question had been reformulated: 
How far should controls go in normal times? And to this respect, the situation at 
present in 1953, he said, was different from that of 1947. 
He immediately added that the state should not compete with the individuals. 
Direct intervention in the private area should be interpreted as a necessary evil. 
Private initiative should get as much room for action as allowed by social concerns, 
and the state should guarantee the conditions for it.1 
A solution to fulfill the public and individual needs was not detailed controls 
and enabling acts, but indirect macroeconomic controls: 
Vi meiner videre at en ikke skal ha detaljreguleringer. I stedet bør en søke å 
oppnå de tilsiktede virkninger ved mer indirekte ’rammereguleringer’. Men 
reguleringene må utformes slik at de samtidig med å fremme de oppsatte mål, 
også gir en videst mulig ramme for det private initiativ…2 
 
If anyway direct controls became necessary, they should be implemented 
through either special laws or direct decisions by the Storting, instead of through 
enabling acts. Here he follows the lines of the party programme of 1953:  
Utstrakte fullmaktslover kan være tjenlige i særpregede og alvorlige 
krisesituasjoner, men må ellers så vidt mulig søkes unngått, og må framfor alt 
ikke undergrave de folkevalgte organers myndighetsområder. Finnes det 
nødvendig i en krisesituasjon med større inngrep i tilvante frihetsområder, å 
dette bare skje gjennom særlig og midlertidig lov for det enkelte tilfelle eller 
ved stortingsvedtak.3 
 
The proposal of the Kristelig Folkeparti was to develop further the Trust law 
and preserve a modified temporary Price law: 
                                                 
1  ”Statens oppgave må være å legge forholdene slik til rette at det fremelsker sjøloppholdelsesdriften hos 
mennesket og lysten og viljen til å utfolde sine evner i nyskapende arbeid”. St. forh. 1953. Tidende. P. 380. 
2  Ibidem. P. 383. 
3  Kristelig Folkeparti program ved stortingsvalget 12. oktober 1953.    
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Mitt parti mener at vi fortsatt bør ha en varig trustlov, men at prisloven bør 
gjøres midlertidig, altså to helt forskjellige lover. Når det gjelder trustloven, går 
vi inn for at den bør revideres med sikte på å kunne føre en mer effektiv 
kontroll med pris- og konkurranseregulerende tiltak.1 
 
The party agreed with the appointment of the Price Council, so long as this 
instance was formed with representatives of the most important economic areas 
taking full advantage of their large expertise and representativity.2 More influence 
should be given in cases where the Storting could not intervene directly. However, 
contrary to the previous developments in the administration, the Price Council should 
not turn into a state within the state, and should give reports to the Storting about all 
its relevant decisions. 
Toven also advocated cooperation between the administration and the 
business community in order to achieve better production, a further acknowledgment 
of the corporate tendencies of the party, in accordance to the bourgeoisie 
opposition’s stand.3 Contrary to the other bourgeoisie parties, the Kristelig Folkeparti 
did not place consumers’ satisfaction as a priority: “Folkets velferd og trivsel 
avhenger nå en gang ikke bare en viss tilgang på varer og tjenester”.4 The party 
continued avoiding any connections with a conservative point of view but stating this 




                                                 
1  St. forh. 1953. Tidende. P. 383. 
2  ”Skal et slikt råd, så langt som råd er, gi strengt saklig begrunnede tilrådninger og ta eventuelle 
avgjørelser i de saker som det får seg forelagt, må medlemmene hver på sitt spesielle felt representere den 
nødvendige fagkunnskap. De viktigste næringer bør derfor være representert i rådet, og disses organisasjoner bør 
ha forslagsrett. På denne måten vil en unngå at det ved sammensetningen blir tatt altfor meget politiske omsyn. 
Eventuelle forbrukerorganisasjoner bør også ha sin representant i Prisrådet”. Ibidem. P. 384.  
3  He also showed a strong concern for the legal security of the individuals in administrative cases, and 
asked for those involved to be given the right to know the reasons for the decision taken, to express their views, 
and to complain in case the decision was negative for them. 
4  Idem. P. 383. 
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Rhetoric and Pragmatism. Final Considerations on the Enabling Acts Debate 
The bourgeoisie parties closed ranks in their support to a cooperation scheme 
between business and the central administration, which to the benefit of the first, the 
decision-making process was less dependent on fixed legislation; a corporatism that 
did not empower the Labourite rule. In order to push their interests forward, they 
made use of Liberal rhetoric as political capital and played the script of socialism 
versus capitalism, the polarisation behind which, as Perkin taught us, the struggle 
between public and private experts is hidden.  
The case of Norway is quite peculiar regarding a Cold War stand. Norway was 
slow to adopt the American model and had shown admiration for the Soviet 
achievements.1 The coming events, though, led to discard any possible resemblance 
to the Soviet system. The Cold War might not have been indifferent to the outcome of 
the enabling acts debate, but it would be surprising to know that there is evidence 
that the Labourite views in economic policies had been propelled by the capitalist-
socialist dilemma. 
 The enabling acts debates took place in a context where there was consensus 
in broad terms on the economic and social guidelines. 2 The speech of the opposition 
can be misleading; Labour had shown no signs of socialistic drives and even seemed 
ready to concede and agree. The bourgeoisie parties did not ignore these facts;3 in 
the same way, we can deduct that they were aware that delegation of power from the 
Storting to the administration was a necessary measure. 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Lange. Op. Cit. ”Blanke ark og fargestifter”. 
2   ”Om det er riktig at den organiserte kapitalisme er preget av et nært samvirke mellom politikere –
Arbeiderpartiets eller andre--, embetsmenn, ’næringslivets menn’ og organisasjonsfolk, betyr det ikke at alle 
motsetninger den imellom er fjernet. Alle ’herskende klasser’ har alltid slåss innad (…). De politiske kamper i 
etterkrigstida –om Libertas i 1948-49, om pris- og rasjonaliseringslovene 1952-53, kanskje om ’deprivatisering’ 
av bankene i 1974-1975—viser det selvfølgelige, at de forente eliter ikke er blitt én sjel i ett legeme”. Bull. Op. 
Cit. P. 237. 
3  Cfr. Iveland, Einar. ”Venstre etter Stortingsvalget”... And Wikborg, Erling. “Skillelinjer i dagens…”. 
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 Trond Bergh asserts that detailed regulation in the post-war years was actually 
never so authoritarian as the bourgeoisie parties claimed. The enabling acts were not 
enforced as expected and created a problem for Labour, which was attacked by the 
Right for maintaining laws that granted the government extraordinary powers, and by 
the Left for not putting them into action. Cooperation, regulation, and Keynesian 
monetary and financial policies, added Bergh, were strategies used as extensively as 
direct regulations since the end of the war.1   
Labour gave up the high ambitions of the Sjaastad committee and then settled 
down for a price law that avoided the direct intervention the business community 
opposed so fiercely. However, the permanent Price law that was approved provided 
the central administration with regulation resources even more extensive than those 
of the “Lex Brofoss”. It was possible to regulate prices and profits, as well as 
competition, on a permanent basis, and the fees collected could be used to level out 
differences in production and sales.2 All in all, the government settled for cooperation 
and consensus. As Finance Minister Bratteli had stated during the debate, coinciding 
with the opposition’s point of view, a price law was regarded as no more than an 
instrument among others to achieve the economic goals ahead.3 The price law would 
play a role in the background. 
More significant was the fact that the outcome of the 1953 debate marked a 
highlight in corporate developments. Instead of an open, almost official and 
constitutional corporatism as Labour seemed to have planned in the beginning, more 
informal and hidden contacts and channels between the authorities and the 
organised interests came to being.4 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Bergh. Op. Cit. “En retrett”. 
2  Cfr. Ibidem. And Lange. Op. Cit. ”Blanke ark og fargestifter”. 
3  Cfr. Bratelli’s contribution to the 1953 debate. St. forh. 1953. Tidende. P. 165.  
4  Cfr. Bergh. Op. Cit. “Økonomisk og industrielt demokrati—innflytelse og medansvar”. 
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 The outcome of the debate has been widely discussed by Norwegian 
historians and we can barely go over some points in relation to our work. Francis 
Sejersted sees Liberal scruples raised by the bourgeoisie opposition operating within 
Labour, and electoral considerations, pushing the party to withdraw.1 Lange has a 
more suggestive interpretation. He mentions several factors that influenced Labour’s 
decision. Among them, the changing position on economic approaches within the 
Labour elite, the American influence and pressure, and the International commerce 
treaties. He points out that the advance in modernisation and rationalisation achieved 
in the first years of the post-war era had stopped because of the business 
communities’ refusal to cooperate within the arrangement the enabling acts were 
creating. Labour decided to ease the tension and give up some of its drive for more 
public controls.2 By yielding, Labour saved the corporate scheme it had built up. In 
few words, the withdrawal can be seen as a display of pragmatism. 
Pragmatism, as well, is Trond Bergh’s answer to this question. He regards 
Labour’s drawback as product of tactical and political evaluations. The criticism by 
the opposition played a role only as it strengthened the dissension in the Labour elite, 
which doubted whether there was a real need for broad enabling acts. It was evident 
for the Labour leadership that cooperation with the business community was 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Sejersted. Op. Cit. 
2  “Regjering ønsket altså ikke å la det økonomiske samarbeidet gå på bekostning av offentlig styring, 
men å kombinere åpning mot større markeder med statlig styrt modernisering hjemme”. 
 …  
“Den politiske blokkeringen ble løst gjennom kompromisset om pris- og rasjonaliseringsloven. 
Regjeringen lot Wilhelm Thagaards gamle reguleringsmodell falle, men fikk gjennomslag for andre virkemidler. 
Løsningen innebar at produktivitetsproblemet kunne angripes langs en ny samarbeidslinje”. Lange. Op. Cit. P. 
160 and 165. Lange’s assumption is supported by Venstre’s threats and this Lindebrække’s warning: ”…vedtar 
regjeringspartiets flertall en varig og generell dirigeringslov som a priori forutsetter et konstant 
motsetningsforhold mellom næringslivet og staten, med fullmakter som på forhånd er formet for å slå ned på all 
tenkelig mangel på evne og vilje til samarbeid—uten at samarbeid har vært forsøkt”.  ”Statsdirigering og…”. 
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essential for best practical results and a rationalisation law and strain on a price law 
could destroy the atmosphere of cooperation.1 
Einar Lie agrees, in general terms, with the explanation of pragmatism, but he 
emphasizes that the changing outlook of the economic experts of Labour since the 
end of the 1940s helped scepticism about direct intervention grow. The regulation 
ways put forward in 1952 were regarded as out of date. The new production 
philosophy in the 1950s left the old Thagaard approach behind. Rationalisation 
directed by the state required strong public powers. The new approach: voluntary 
cooperation among all participants in the National economy. Labour did not want to 
break the cooperation atmosphere that allowed rationalisation in the previous years. 
Pragmatism in Labour, according to Lie, derives from a change of ideas within the 
Labour expert elite that had been taking place since the end of the forties.2 
We find pragmatism a suitable explanation. Labour had to cope with electoral 
considerations and the responsibilities of consensus seeking acquired during the 
corporate handlings. We could also talk about pragmatism in relation to Labour and 
the constitutional concerns.  
The party honoured the role of the Storting. It did not allow its opponents to 
play the constitutional and parliamentarian card in the political race. The weight of the 
political tradition and the Liberal values could not be challenged without losing 
electoral strength, and the party did not take risks but took the initiative at the same 
time. However powerful political machinery Labour was, it was not only limited by the 
electoral odds but also conditioned by the Norwegian political traditions and 
institutions. We have mentioned the necessary cooperation at the top to keep the 
corporate setting going, the international obligations, the internal disagreements 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Bergh. Op. Cit. “Økonomisk og industrielt demokrati—innflytelse og medansvar”. 
2  Cfr. Lie. Op. Cit. ”Striden om pris- og rasjonaliseringslovene”. 
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concerning direct controls, and of course, the pressure from the political opposition. 
In spite of these circumstances, the Labourite elite could still try to push their way 
through and get the Price law approved in the Storting without concessions. 
However, it went for consensus. The party chose to rule the country paternalistically 
and to rely politically on the assurance of economic advance and security for the 
population. 
Labour did not violate the foundations of the political institutions, and we can 
even say that it profited from them. Advancing parliamentarian control of the 
administration created to enforce economic regulations did not threaten Labour’s 
power; on the contrary, it came as a wise political move. The expert advice could 
have been very important, but the decision was political. 
Here as elsewhere we face the question of Labour’s will power. The party 
yielded, but did it concede or give up some political power? In particular, did it give 
away the power to reach the goals it had committed itself to? Was the Storting in a 
lesser “exile” after the enabling acts debate? To the best of our knowledge, the 
answer to these questions is no.  
The bourgeoisie opposition betted on the enabling acts issue as the main 
electoral one in the 1953 election. It was a mistake. Labour did not lose its majority 
but confirmed it. The voters’ main concern laid somewhere else. It was already 
evident that Norwegian politics tended to the centre and Labour did not intend to turn 
Norway into a socialistic country.1 The slogan of “Democracy or Socialistic rule” 
made no significant difference. There were no fears of dictatorship.2 It seems that the 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Iveland. ”Venstre etter Stortingsvalget”... And Wikborg. “Skillelinjer…”. 
2  “Proposisjonen til ny prislov ble feilvurdert, og motsetningene overdimensjonert”. Larssen, Olav. ”Etter 
Stortingsvalget”… 
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main 1953 electoral issue was that of well-being1 and Norwegians voted for 
continuity, since there was no other visible alternative in the opposition. Oppositions’ 
interests in looking for a way to convince the people they could administer the welfare 
state best began a bit too late. 
                                                 
1  ”Den som følger med i debatten nå før valget, må få inntrykk av at politikk i dag utelukkende gjelder 
løsningen av økonomiske og materielle spørsmål, og alt annet er bisaker”. Wikborg. ”Skillelinjer…”. 
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CHAPTER V. TWO NON-PARTISANS POINTS OF VIEW. FARMAND AND 
TEKNISK UKEBLAD 
 
The Conservative Perspective. Farmand 
Politics in Post-war Norway tended to the centre, in Labour as well as in the 
bourgeoisie parties. However, among the non-partisan political opposition, we find an 
exceptional case, a publication that kept openly at one extreme, namely, Farmand. 
Norsk forretningsblad. 
 In an analysis of speech, it is as important to find the rationale in the texts in 
question, as it is to perceive the slight differences of the language used. Farmand did 
not unveil any secrets about Norwegian politics. For the most part, it registered 
complaints common to all the political opposition with a few significant contributions 
of its own. What makes the magazine different is the language it uses; it is radical. 
 The bourgeoisie parties made strong statements in this period, as we have 
seen. At times, these were excessive and purely rhetorical. “Dictatorship”, 
“Nazification”, “Communism” were invariably shown as threats and not as 
consumated facts. In Farmand this subtle distinction is not taken away but it is 
blurred to the readers. And besides the strong vocabulary used, the context of 
Farmand’s criticism is one of a crusade that was more than political. The editorial 
staff of the magazine, it is our impression, was away from the concrete political 
handlings, where negotiation marks the tone of the debate. Theirs gives the 
impression to be an intellectual and moral point of view in support of business not 
designed by businessmen neither by professional politicians. 
 It might be subtleties, but they matter much. Language is crucial. It is so for 
those who publish any magazine or newspaper. Farmand was a spokesman of 
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business interests. It had a clear line, a straighforward purpose and a self-given 
mission to defend the free-market rules and the Liberal outlook. The language in the 
magazine conveys this meaning in a very conscious fashion. 
 A Liberal weekly, it was put out of circulation by the occupying forces during 
the war and came back to life in May 1945. There was not a rupture between the new 
era and the pre-war times. Farmand seems to have followed the same clear line 
since at least the mid 1930's, when Ph. D. Trygve J.B. Hoff took over the editor's 
position.1 In his introductory article, he described the magazine as "et organ for 
næringslivets frihet"; and so did the editorial staff as well in 1948.2 
 If we had through Thagaard’s continuity as Price director the influence of a 
1930’s economic philosophy of direct controls over the post-war Norway, Hoff’s 
editorial position embodied the continuity of thought in the weekly. However, 
Farmand updated its conservative points of view with reviews of the Liberal editorial 
production abroad,3 but it preserved the analogy between Nazism, communism, and 
regulated economy, which equalised all approaches different from liberalism to paths 
towards dictatorship. And also the assumption that the relative freedom of the 
businessman and the right to property could be identified with the absolute freedom 
of the individual.  On these lines, Hoff could come up with a sentence like this: "Både 
i diktaturstatene og her hjemme går kampen mot næringslivets frihet hånd i hånd 
med kampen mot den personlige frihet og ytringsfriheten”; and claimed about the 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Trygve Hoff. ”Farmands program –næringslivet frihet. ” ”Utdrag av dr. Hoffs programartikkel i 
’Farmand’ 1. oktober 1935”. Farmand. Nr. 7, 50-year special issue, February 16th, 1946. 
2  ”Til ’Farmand’s lesere”. Farmand. Nr. 37, September 11th, 1948. 
3  Farmand was aware of both the academical and philosophical developments abroad. We find many 
articles, both descriptive and critical, about the new sources in economic and social research, especially those on 
a re-born liberalism and the never-ending debate on the best economic approach to reconstruction and prosperity 
in Europe, as well as regular criticism against the Keynesian formulas. We read reports on the economic policies 
of different countries, particularly those of the U.S. and Scandinavia, and their practical results. There is a full 
report on the liberal conferences in Mont Pélerin and Wadham College; about this. Cfr. Trygve Hoff. “Levende 
liberalisme.” Farmand. Nr. 17, April 26th, 1947. 
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Labour government: "Nazistenes og fascistenes bestemmelser følger nøyaktig de 
samme linjer…"1 
 The logics of Farmand’s writers, allowing state control of the economic 
activities, as it happened in socialist economies, meant putting in the state’s hands 
control over the cultural and intellectual life.2 
Another main feature of Farmand’s point of view that placed the weekly at an 
extreme hardly reached by other opposition groups, even away from the Hambro’s 
Høyre it fancied, was the refusal to accept fully the welfare state and the concept of 
socialised property it brought about. 
 Once faced with the situation after liberation, the conservative stand of the 
magazine consisted also in opposing any economic control understood as 
unnecesary –and the editors saw many—in a revolutionary environment in which 
controls were political instruments.3 The magazine supported rationalisation,4 
production councils,5 and the emergency measures in the economy, but it attacked 
public regulation as guideline as well as compulsory equalisation in society.6 The 
common goal, according to Farmand, was increased production and higher living 
standards, under the condition of intellectual and religious freedom, free choice of 
good and services, and of trade and workplace. Farmand came up surprisingly early 
with the statement that consumers’ interests were to be given priority.7 All these were 
                                                 
1  Trygve Hoff. ”Farmands program…” My underlining. 
2  “I de socialistiske samfunn hvor staten fullstendig dirigerer det økonomiske liv, dirigerer de også 
fullstendig det åndelige liv. Individets rettigheter er det bare en illusjon. Denne utvikling er ingen tilfeldighet. 
Den har både politiske og psykologiske årsaker”. Farmand. “Valgresultatet”. Editorial, nr. 45, October 13th, 
1945. 
3  “Efter min mening har Farmand en stor oppgave ved å virke som kritisk organ og regulator i en eller 
kanskje litt for reguleringsvennlig tid”, wrote a new member of the editorial staff in his presentation to the 
readers in 1945. Varvin, Kåre. “Den aktuelle situasjon og Farmands program”. Farmand. Nr. 26, June 2nd, 1945. 
4  Cfr. ”Oppstilling av mål”. Farmand. Editorial, nr. 33, July 21st, 1945. 
5  Cfr. “Produksjonsråd”, Farmand. Nr. 54, December 15th, 1945. 
6  Cfr. ”Oppstilling av mål”… 
7  “For å nevne  en selvfølgelig forutsetning, må det være et produksjonsapparat som skaffer oss nyttige 
varer, varer som er efterspurt. Og det må være et apparat som skaffer oss billige varer. Det må være et 
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mainly tasks for the productive circles of society, namely, the entrepreneurs; in 
particular, the small ones.1 The role of the state should limit to support them, since it 
was to serve the members of society and not the other way around.2 
 The socialisation of the means of production Farmand saw taking place in 
Norway could only mean corruption, bureaucratisation, centralisation of the economy, 
and also low-quality products and bad service for the consumers.3 
 These are some of the recurrent topics in the magazine we find throughout 
this period. We could follow how they developed and write a compendium of 
conservative thought, but here we should circumscribe to Farmand’s elaboration on 
the one-party rule and the role of the Storting. 
 
Party Dictatorship. Post-War Norway According to Farmand 
There are several key principles in Farmand’s argumentation in these years. In this 
particular case, the most important of them is that planned economy and 
parliamentarism were irreconciliable. This corresponded with the general idea that 
economic regulations, or the growth of the state, could not be developed under 
democratic control and uphelding individual freedom at the same time. Security and 
freedom, concepts that in the language of social reformists went hand in hand, were 
for Farmand mutually excluding.4  
                                                                                                                                                        
økonomisk utbygd produksjonsapparat.” Farmand claimed that it took sides with the consumers in this and other 
cases. Idem. 
1  The references to the entrepeneurial kind in the pages of Farmand lead us to think that they praised 
mostly the small and medium enterprises; the individual in a strict meaning. Perhaps we should link this point of 
view with the “economic democracy” Høyre advocated in the first post-war years. In 1949, Farmand wrote 
about economic democracy as mainly the consumers’ right of choice instead of workers’ participation in 
managerial decisions or coordination in the National economy; and not levelling in income either. The party and 
the magazine seem to have taken the same direction. Cfr. “Økonomisk demokrati”. Farmand. Nr. 14, April 2nd, 
1949. 
2  Cfr. Idem. 
3  Cfr. “Monopoltrusler”. Farmand. Editorial, nr. 43, September 29th, 1945. 
4  In a debate between Ragnar Frisch and Thomas Schlytter in 1946, the former, a Labourite expert, tried 
to reconcile the two big concerns of the time with the statement that all economic regulations should be carried 
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 Farmand argued that under the Labourite rule, the ”dictatorship of the 
majority”, the Storting was no longer the arena of political negotiation and free debate 
but one of pure power struggle. The Labourite party machine disrupted the 
established rules of parliamentary negotiation and party organisation. Labour 
representatives were not elected because of their popularity or their public trust, but 
on the basis of their “parti-indrekretsens velsignelse”.1 Farmand reported often that in 
the Storting’s sessions Labour proved to be a highly disciplined unity that allowed 
small room for dissent and free expression within its ranks.2 Its representatives voted 
as a single man and this made its initiatives unstoppable.3 Labour’s way, continued 
Farmand, prevailed automatically in spite of the objections of the bourgeoisie 
opposition, whose proposals and criticisms were reduced to nothing. Labour 
managed, it added, to avoid any kind of investigation about the performance of its 
key members, as well as serious debate about its policies. 
 Farmand would come up with a stronger remark on the dealings in the 
Storting. The already scandalous “unanimous decisions”,4 it claimed, were fixed 
beforehand. What took place before the public eye was not relevant. 5 The real power 
game took place in the inner circles of the ruling party. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Farmand, argued that, in practice, economic regulation and democratic control were incompatible. Thomas 
Schlytter. ”Professor Frisch og demokratisk reguleringskrontroll”. Farmand. Editorial. Nr. 3, January 19th, 1946. 
In that same year, Farmand stated that "Frihet og sikkerhet er for dagens sosiale reformatorer blitt synonyme 
begreper, mens de i virkeligheten er motsetninger. De kan trives ved siden av hverandre, men når de gjør det er 
det resultatet av et kompromiss”. “Ilden som aldri dør.” Editorial. Nr. 47, November 23rd, 1946. 
1  ”Det nye storting”. Farmand. Nr. 34, August 20th, 1949.  
2  Cfr. “Subsidier, stabilisering og –Sola” [Stortingskronikk]. Farmand. Nr. 47, November 22nd, 1947. 
Farmand wrote about certain disapproval within Labour that did not make it to the surface during voting in the 
Storting.  
3  ”Det var beklagelig at votering ble et spørsmål om partipolitisk innpisking, men vi tror at debatten som 
helhet allikevel har gjort meget stor nytte. Voteringen var resultatet av rent majoritetsdiktatur, man på tvers av 
partilinjer kom det allikevel frem en mengde anker mot visse av de linjer som gjenreisningsarbeidet har vært 
drevet efter”. Farmand. ”Stortingskronikk”. Nr. 10, March 8th, 1947. 
4  Cfr. Farmand. ”Sommerens siste stortingskronikk”. Nr. 26, July 1st, 1950. 
5  “…under den såkalte ‘lille finansdebatt’ (…) . Man kan trygt si at debatten munnet ut i ingenting; alt 
som ble sagt og besluttet var bestemt på forhånd. Det er da man kan si: hvorfor snakker man i det hele tatt? 
“Budget og bevilgninger er faktisk bestemt lenge før de kommer til Stortinget”. Ibidem. 
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The level of parliamentarian debate itself had been lowered, according to the 
magazine. Questions of principles were rarely discussed as propaganda tended to 
occupy their place. Debates in the Storting were described often as disappointing 
and no longer objective.1 Labour, as a rule, put more emphasis on deluding the 
opposition than on convincing it.2  
Labour, proceeded Farmand, had also managed to take over the work of the 
Storting committees. Theoretically, it was through them that the consultation and 
negotiation among the different political forces took place. Labour nullified such 
process with the formation of committees where it could be sure it would enjoy the 
majority it needed to keep its advances unchallenged.3 
 In the same manner, established Farmand, the legislative control over the 
decisions reached in the departments and councils granted by the Labour rule was, 
at best, inadequate, if not illusory. The claims of the economic planners that the Price 
Directorate had been placed under the supervision of Parliament were misleading; in 
practice, it did not go beyond a ”meaningless control afterwards”.4 Those affected by 
an administrative decision were only granted a limited appealing opportunity that, in 
fact, left them defenceless before those decisions.5 
                                                 
1  Cfr. “Stortingskronikk”. Farmand. Nr. 15, April 12th, 1947. 
2  Cfr. “Subsidier, stabilisering og –Sola” [Stortingskronikk]. Farmand. Nr. 47, November 22nd, 1947. 
3  ”’Farmand’ har gang på gang satt fingeren på at offentlige komiteer sammensettes slik at man på 
forhånd vet, at flertallsinnstillingen vil være overensstemmende med Arbeiderpartiets synspunkt. Vi har ikke nok 
kjennskap til politisk praksis til at vi tør si om dette er anstendig eller ikke, men det må iallfall være tillatt å 
fastslå at en flertallsinnstilling under slike forhold har meget liten saklig vekt”. Farmand. “Ensidige komiteer”. 
Nr. 50, December 13th, 1947. When discussing about the probable designation of a new committee to revise Lex 
Thaggard: ”kommisjonen vil vel –som sist med Thagaard-kommisjonen—bli sammensatt på en slik måte at 
arbeiderpartiene kan være på den flertallsinnstilling de ønsker”. ”Stortinget svekker sig selv”. Editorial. Nr. 26, 
June 28th, 1947. 
4  ”Siden planøkonomene stadig peker på at den folkevalgte lovgivende myndighet vil ha kontroll over 
Prisdirektoratets virksomhet, er det en verdifull påvisning, at dette i praksis bare vil arte sig som betydningløs 
efterkontroll.” ”Næringsorganisasjonene protester.” Farmand. Nr. 6, February 8th, 1947. 
5  ”I spesielt viktige og prinsipielle saker kan naturligvis en interpellasjon i Stortinget tenkes, men det er 
tvilsomt med det partisystem vi har, om dette vil føre frem f. eks. overfor en partifelle og en regjering med et 
sterkt flertall i Stortinget. Under alle omstendigheter ville en slik fremgangsmåte ta lang tid, og næringslivet kan 
ikke vente på denslags langsiktige avgjørelser.” Thomas Schlytter. ”Professor Frisch og demokratisk 
reguleringskrontroll”. Farmand. Editorial. Nr. 3, January 19th, 1946. 
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 Farmand claimed in 1949 that the Labourite regime tried to monopolise the 
appointments in the administration to secure the system. This, which not represented 
open corruption, was a practice with negative consequences that took place in all 
departments and work areas in the administration. The party loyalty had substituted 
the requirement of expertise in these positions.1 
According to Farmand, Norway suffered a “party dictatorship”. Real 
parliamentarism was gone, as the division of power had been sacrificed.2 The 
Labourite Storting group had the legislative power in its hands, and at the same time, 
it obeyed the government. Particularly, the Primer Minister. The inner corruption of 
the system due to the over concentration of power affected the role of the Supreme 
Court as well. The Judicial power was not up to defending the rights of citizens to 
freedom, security and property any more. The judges were party people and just too 
concerned with the wishes of the majority.3 
The weekly also complained about the secrecy in which certain affairs were 
handled in the government. Mainly, secrecy in the state cabinet and in the everyday 
dealings between the party and the Landsorganisasjon.4  
                                                 
1  Cfr. ”Nepotisme”. Farmand. Nr. 7, February 12th, 1949. Also Cfr. “Ny direktor i Statistikk 
Sentralbyrå”. Nr. 18, April 30th, 1949. This article goes around the appointment of Jakob Bjerve to the 
mentioned department over Erling Pettersen, whom the magazine considered best for the position and excluded 
because of his lack of Labourite allegiance. 
2  ”…fem og åtti-mannsgruppen forkaster ethvert tenkelig forslag fra opposisjonen [I Stortinget], hvor 
gode og fornuftige de enn kan være i seg selv. Det vi nå har, er derfor et rent partidiktatur, og det er en situasjon 
som selvfølgelig har såre lite med virkelig parlamentarisme å gjøre”. ”Festningen som ikke overgir seg”. 
[Stortingskronikk]. Farmand. Nr. 16, April 21st, 1951. 
3  ”Når makten konsentreres så sterkt på én hand som tilfellet er i dag, er den enkeltes rett til ’frihet, 
sikkerhet og eiendom’, sterkt truet. Domstolene alene kan ikke opprettholde forsvaret av disse goder. Dommerne 
er selv mennesker og partifolk, de må ta hensyn til folkemeningen selv om den er forbigående. Vi har i dag 
endog eksempler på at dommerne fordømmes, hvis ikke dømmer som flertallet vil.” ”Er Grunnloven død?”. 
Farmand. Editorial. Nr. 19-20, May 10th, 1947. 
4  ”Det var en meget interessant tale som Landsorganisasjonens sekretær Gunnar Braathen holdt i Bergen 
søndag. Man må beundre sekretæren for hans oppriktighet. Han innrømmet at ’der eksisterer et daglig og intimt 
samarbeid mellem Landsorganisasjonens leder og Regjeringen’. Senere fremgikk det at dette intime samarbeide 
ikke alltid foregikk åpent, idet han fortalte at ’Landsorganisasjonen måtte tre fram, ikke offisielt, men I 
korridorene.” ”For høie lønninger?”. Farmand. Nr. 42, October 18th, 1947. 
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The magazine insisted that Labour formed a government from the Union 
movement. It was a symbiotic relation; the economic support from LO1 and a 
centralised leadership were the built-in advantages of Labour over the rest of the 
political parties and one important reason of the political imbalance in the nation. 2  In 
return, LO reached complete power over the Norwegian economy.3 And the alliance 
had an objective, Labour and LO conspired together to institute socialism in Norway.4 
Outside the institutionalised political arena, in the struggle to win the public 
opinion, the socialist front monopolised power too. Farmand considered that the 
Labour and Communist parties had been carrying out an impressive propaganda 
campaign in the industry, in the press and in the streets, to promote socialisation5 
and to disable and intimidate the political opposition.6 
In 1952, Farmand accused the ruling party of trying to monopolise the 
propaganda in the press, adding that the modern media had created a new arena for 
politics, political debate and propaganda. These were also moving to a great extent 
to the radio and films; and here as well Labour ruled, unchallenged by any opposition 
                                                 
1  ”…betaler medlemmene av landsorganisajonen en fast kontingent pr. måned, respektive 10 og 5 øre for 
helt –og halvbetalende medlemmer, til Det Norske Arbeiderpartis presse – og opplysningsvirksomhet” 
 ”Reservasjonsretten til tross, --viser det seg altså at de lønnstakere som er organisert i den politiske 
fagbevegelse, så vel direkte som indirekte støtter partiet”. ”Landsorganisasjonen og de ’gule’.” Farmand. Nr. 44, 
November 4th, 1950. Also Cfr. “Organisasjon-tvang?” Editorial. Nr. 51, December 17th, 1949. 
2  ”Ingen politisk interessert kan unngå å se de åpenbare fordeler som systemet gir en strengt sentralisert 
partiledelse, og unngå å forstå at det parti som kan gjøre regning med fagforeningenes økonomiske støtte har en 
betydelig fordel overfor alle andre partier, som i den politiske renslighets navn betakker seg for noen form for 
kollektiv støtte utenfra.” ”Valglov og demokratiske garantier” [Stortingskronikk]. Farmand. Nr. 28, July 11th, 
1953. Also, Cfr. ”Den store maktfaktor”. Nr. 27, July 2nd, 1949. 
3  Cfr. ”Organisasjons-tvang?” Farmand. Editorial. Nr. 51, December 17th, 1949. 
4  Cfr. “Stortingskronikk”. Farmand. Nr. 42, October 19th, 1946. Where Farmand reported that 
Gerhardsen and Brofoss stated outside the Storting arena that Labour was a socialist party and its program the 
socialisation of Norway. 
5  ”Fra socialistisk og kommunistisk hold drives for tiden en imponerende propaganda. Kvantitativt og 
kvalitativt. På alle fronter og i alle former. Særlig driver Arbeiderpartiet propaganda for prisregulering, 
planøkonomi og kollektivisme. De få ganger i måneden vi lytter til radio, drives det propaganda både i foredrag 
og kommentarer, ja endog i hørespill. Enten det nu er med hensikt eller ikke.” ”Synet på propaganda”. Farmand. 
Nr. 22, May 31st, 1947.    
6  ”Vi vil ikke –må ikke—la oss intimidere av regjeringspartiets og regjeringspressens beskyldninger for å 
motarbeide gjenreisningen.” ”Det politiske demokrati i fare.” Farmand. Editorial. Nr. 39, September 28th, 1946. 
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and conquered the popular vote.1 Radio, films and television gave the government 
new advantages and opportunities to hold power as no other regimes before.2 
When Arbeiderbladet and Dagbladet denounced Libertas in 1948, Farmand 
criticised these newspapers for contributing in this way to the constant persecution of 
business interests. Farmand took on the side of Libertas under the assumption that it 
represented a legitimate defence of those business interests before the Labour 
propaganda, and compelled the sponsors and beneficiaries of such enterprise to 
admit their participation openly and guiltlessly. They argued that “…forretningsfolk 
ikke gjort annet enn hva Arbeiderpartiet har gjort i årevis”3 using the taxpayers’ 
money.4 Besides: “Det er på tide det private næringsliv får noen som kan nøytralisere 
foredragsflommen fra Regjeringens medlemmer og profesjonelle talerør”.5 
Farmand criticised the Fellesprogram as being used as a means for the 
Labour Party to get the opposition to obey. Farmand also argued that the bourgeoisie
opposition suffered from defeatism, and that was why it did not try to recover power. 
It also pointed out that such political climate rested on the wrong assumption, explic




capable of achieving the goals of social and industrial peace.6 
                                                
 po
 
1  ”I gamle dager hadde en regjering i et parlamentarisk styrt land så å si bare en valplass. Det var 
parlamentssalen, Stortingssalen. Der måtte den finne og der måtte den vinne hel folket, men der måtte den også 
krysse klinger med skarpe opposisjonsførere hvis ord ble hørt og lest like godt ut over landet som noe 
regjeringsmedlems. Her var det duell og kamp.  
”I dag er det annerledes. Teknikken, samfunnsutviklingen og samfunnsvanene har gjort at regjeringen 
har kunnet skaffe seg en valplass utenfor Stortingssalen der ingen opposisjonsfører får slippe til, men der 
regjeringens egne medlemmer uten anstrengelse og uten å tenke på annet enn å belegge sine ord og sine 
ansiktsuttrykk noenlunde vel kan skaffe seg hele folket som stumme tilhøre”. ”Demokratisk overbalanse”.  
[Stortingskronikk]. Farmand. Nr. 26, June 28th, 1952.  
2  Cfr. Ibidem. And it added: ”Og når systemet og mulighetene også utenfor Stortingssalen utnyttes på den 
oksvikse måte, lurt, seigt og tungt, da tar systemet overbalanse.” 
3  “Ikke du –bare jeg.” Farmand. Editorial. Nr. 43, October 23rd, 1948. 
4  Cfr. “More statsbetalt propaganda.” Farmand. Nr. 49, December 4th, 1948. 
5  ”Ikke du –bare jeg.” Farmand. Nr. 43, October 23rd, 1948. 
6  Cfr. ”Den politiske opposisjons plikter.” Farmand. Editorial. Nr. 43, October 23rd, 1948. 
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Political cooperation, Farmand elaborated further in 1951, meant that the 
opposition should shut its mouth and stay still.1 Even worse: cooperation with Labour 
was suicidal.2 
 
An Irreversible Turn. Farmand and the Enabling Acts 
It is not difficult to guess that the position of the weekly regarding the enabling acts 
left no place for concessions. The weekly has hundreds of contributions on the topic, 
but we will just mention a few aspects of that long argumentation.  
By approving enabling acts, the Storting betrayed itself. Farmand asked 
rhetorically: “hvor mange slike fullmakter Stortinget kan gi, og på hvilke områder, uten 
at det mister den kontroll som Grunnloven og et demokratisk styre forutsetter."3 And 
warned about the effects the enabling acts would have in the context of an over-
expanding public sector: the Storting would be unable to fulfill its role as before. 
Not only did the Storting lose its legislative and taxatives capacities with the 
enabling act on price control, several areas regulated by laws would be organised by 
bureaucratic instances through rules instead of laws. Delegation of power meant in 
practice bureaucratic rule.4 
Farmand claimed that a price law undermined the principles of democratic life, 
in particular the right of property and the defence of individual rights before the state 
power. These considerations, stated Farmand, would have pushed the conscientious 
                                                 
1  Cfr. ”Fiskenæringen under diktaturet”. Farmand. Editorial. Nr. 4, January 27th, 1951. 
2  “Samarbeid (…) er selvmord”. ”LO regjerer vårt land”. Farmand. Editorial. Nr. 35, September 1st, 1951. 
3  ”Fullmaktstyre – rettstat”. Farmand. Nr. 11, March 14th, 1953. In italics in the original. 
4  “Stortinget var lovgiver nr. 1. Idag er forholdet et annet. Et dominerende trekk ved vårt 
lovgivningsarbeid er den overhåndstagende delegering av lovgivningsmyndigheten til statsrådet (dvs. til flertallet 
i Regjeringen), departementene, direktoratene, kommunestyrer, fylkemenn eller politiet. De nevnte institusjoners 
regulerende bestemmelser kaller seg ikke loven, men vedtekter, regler og forskrifter, men for 
samfunnsmedlemmene har de lovs kraft. 
“Et annet og iøynefallende trekk er dette; mens de forholdsvis fåtallige bestemmelser som blir utferdiget 
av Stortinget er et produkt av et lovgiverkollegiums arbeid, er de langt flere regulerende bestemmelser fra de 
øvrige offentlige organer enkeltmannslovgivning.”. ”Fullmaktsloven og norsk rettsvitenskap”. Farmand. Nr 31, 
August 1st, 1953. 
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group within the ranks of Labour to object to the proposal of a rationalization law in 
1952.1 
The editors of Farmand glamorised the model of free enterprise, where 
monopolies and cartels were fought. Free enterprise, with its supposed rewards to 
the best individuals, was the ultimate source of prosperity.2 The state had an 
obligation to secure that competition was not limited.3  
The weekly tried to convince its readers that capital, division of labour, 
specialisation and technical abilty, all key elements of a rational enterprise, had been 
underestimated in the name of equalisation and redistribution.4 The business 
entrepeneurs5 and the management had been directly undermined; and consumers 
had to suffer the results.  Equalisation attacked wealth producers and rewarded badly 
merit and productivity. Farmand finally stated that liberalism and redistribution were 
incompatible.6 
Economic controls were all negative; even regulation of the market by the 
private sector or an agreement of mixed economy was counterproductive. When 
criticising the new majority proposal for a permanent price law in 1952, Farmand 
wrote that: 
                                                 
1  On the debate after the speech from the throne (Trontaledebatten) in 1953 wrote Farmand: ”Der var 
mengder av selvfølgeligheter og tro vesentlige innrømmelser, som klart viser at partiet i noen grad er blitt skremt 
av sine egne retningslinjer. Det vil ikke bli fremmet forslag om en generell rasjonaliseringslov, og 
trelastrasjoneringen vil bli opphevet.” (underlined by Farmand.) ”Valget 1953: forpostkamper i Stortinget” 
[Stortingskronikk]. Farmand. Nr 7, February 14th, 1953. Also Cfr. ”Uønsket verdensrekord”. Editorial, Nr. 9, 
February 28th, 1953. 
2  This is stated in many articles of Farmand.  The magazine also published ads of companies that shared 
its point of view. On this issue of helping the poor by punishing the rich, as they saw it, there is a very large 
speech in an ad by Anth. B. Nielsen & Co. Limited A/S, ”Kan vi leve av å barbere hverandre?” Farmand. Nr. 15-
16, April 9th, 1949. On the defence of the consumers Farmand claimed to carry out, the criticism against the 
enabling acts, and the expansion of government they brought about, see: ”Et centralt spørsmål”. Nr. 7, February 
12th, 1949; ”Fra forbrukerfronten”. Editorial. Nr. 32, August 9th, 1952, and ”Det er folket det gjelder”. Editorial. 
Nr. 50, December 13th, 1952. 
3  Cfr. ”Kampens moral”. Farmand. Editorial. Nr. 37, September 13th, 1952. 
4  Cfr. ”Økonomisk demokrati”. Farmand. Editorial. Nr. 14, April 2nd, 1949.  
5  Farmand called these ”idégiverne, initiativtagerne, risikotagerne og arbeidsskaperne”, ”promotorene”, 
”sparerne”.  ”Norge undergraves”. Farmand. Editorial. Nr. 6, February 11th, 1950. 
6  Cfr. ”Demokrati eller sosialisme?” Farmand. Nr. 38, September 17th, 1949. 
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Det det dreier seg om er ikke noen statsdirigering, men utelukkende et intimt 
samarbeide med næringslivet for å systematisere alle de 
konkurransebegrensende overenskomster som næringslivet elsker. Det 
gjelder ikke fritt næringsliv kontra dirigert, men bare om det er staten eller de 
private som skal foreta reguleringene.1 
 
The editors of Farmand had noticed a change in the concept of property taking 
place in the Western world. This turn towards the socialisation of property was 
revolutionary and unacceptable. And the implementation of a permanent price law 
would make it irreversible in Norway.2  
 
Welfare State and the Rule of the Law 
The interventionist state, wrote the editors in 1949, had been incorrectly 
characterized as welfare state, a positive term, but a term that Farmand sometimes 
typed with quotation marks. There was nothing in between socialism and capitalism, 
according to Farmand. It was the road to socialism. And one could hardly see 
communism differentiated from socialism in these pages. Being this the situation, the 
welfare state meant lower living standards for all.3 In 1951, Farmand added that the 
welfare state, with its limitless hunger of administrative and judicial positions, was the 
best ground for realist law scholars, those who were behind the enabling acts.4 
In 1953, Farmand went over the term “Samfunnsmessig” and described it as 
the concept that the power holders use to defend their socioeconomic points of view. 
                                                 
1  ”Operasjon ’Høsttåke’.” Farmand. Editorial. Nr 40, October 4th, 1952. 
2  A permanent price law ”gir begrepet ’eiendomsrett’ et nytt og hittil ikke akseptert innhold.” ”Uten 
skam.” Farmand. Editorial. Nr. 13, March 29th, 1952. 
3  In one illustration taken from an American publication, in this case by George Peck, there is a lift out of 
whose doors come out two individuals, each trying to get a worker to get on. “Going down”, at whose door 
stands the political planner, ”Lefty”, is the welfare state, whilst the way up belongs to the “Opportunity state”, 
where a common citizen, “most of us”, awaits. Farmand. Nr. 37, September 16th, 1950. Farmand printed a good 
deal of illustrations from foreign publications, especially American. Through them, Farmand could express even 
better its opinions in the black and white it fancied. They are very interesting and show a dimension of Farmand 
worth studying but large enough to be avoided here.    
4  Cfr. ”Lovene og velferdsstaten”. Farmand. Nr. 49, December 8th, 1951. In this same article one can find 
a criticism of the realist point of view in legal theory, which meant for the magazine the theory in which law is a 
reflection of power relations. 
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They did not see a clear definition of the term, but they connected it to the 
“niveleringspolitikken for å heve levestandarden” which the government practiced at 
the expense of increasing production and productivity.1 
Another interesting term is “Folkestyre”. In 1953, under the uproar caused by 
the attempt of Labour to make further inroads in the bank system --attempt justified 
as the expansion of the “folkestyre”--, Farmand wrote that they understood this 
concept as it was implied in the constitution, namely that “Folket utøver den 
lovgivende makt ved Stortinget…” and “Dens motstykke blir her en forvaltningsstat 
med all mulig frihet for forvaltningen (departementer, direktorater osv) i sitt skjønn 
ved avgjørelser av individuelle tilfelle”.2 Let us see in more detail what this 
“Forvaltningsstat” was all about. 
Eight years of criticism against the Labourite rule brought about the use of 
many different terms to describe and denounce the Labourite ways. The analogies 
and dichotomies Farmand was so keen to use were refined with the adoption of 
terms from the “law theory” jargon. “Democracy” versus “Bureaucratic rule”, 
“Liberalism” versus “Socialism”, and so on, were now formulated in the opposition 
“Rettsstat” (state governed by law) versus “Forvaltningsstat” (“state ruled by the 
bureaucracy” or “police state”) or “Fullmaktstyre” (“administration by enabling acts”). 
That is to say: “Forbinder man med en rettsstat en stat hvor statens oppgave er å 
skape og anvende rettsregler, finner denne stat som sitt motstykke en 
forvaltningsstat som har som første oppgave å forestå alminnelig kulturpleie (politi, 
skole, kirke og medisinalvesen osv.).” And: “Rettstaten blir da i samsvar med det 
liberalistiske system og forvaltningsstatens fremste oppgave skulle da bli å begrense 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Bernt Egelund. ”Hva er samfunnsmessig?” Farmand. Nr. 16, April 18th, 1953. 
2  ”Rettsstat – Forvaltningsstat – Folkestyre”. Farmand. Nr. 35, August 29th, 1953. 
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friheten og regulere eiendomsretten med --, som det har vært påstått – ‘samfunnets 
interesse for øyet’.”1 The term “forvaltningsstat”, of course, fit Post-war Norway best.2 
This theory incorporated the legal issue aroused by the intervention of legal 
experts in the proposals on permanent price and rationalisation laws. Farmand 
quoted the advocate Jens Christian Mellbye in his statement that the Stortinget would 
be reduced to a “lesesirkel” in a “Fullmaktstyre”.3 The new categorization established 
that: 
Fullmaktstyre er et styre hvor det konstitusjonelle øverste organ –i vårt land 
Stortinget—gjennem fullmakter overdrar en del av sin forvaltningsmakt heller 
sin lovgivende myndighet til andre statlige organer som departementer eller 
direktorater. I enkelte tilfeller kan det også gi en utvidet fullmakt til 
utenforstående institusjoner som f. eks. bøndenes samvirke-organisajoner.4 
 
 This theory had the advantage of building up a model in which the delegation 
of power to the administration did not represent a recourse of the parliamentarian rule 
but an alien proceedure that led to its disintegration. The Conservative viewpoint had 
found expert consent. 
 
The Bourgeoisie Parties and Farmand 
Farmand had an irregular relation with the bourgeoisie opposition. The magazine 
supported Høyre in most cases but stuck to its principles and criticised the party 
when it seemed to leave behind any Liberal foundation. But if there was a party with 
affinities with the weekly, it was certainly Høyre. In the several reports of the sessions 
in the Storting, Venstre was scorned for its dubitative stand before Labour, while the 
Bondeparti and the Kristelig Folkeparti had a minor role in the eyes of the editors. A 
                                                 
1  ”Rettsstat – Forvaltningsstat – Folkestyre”… 
2  Ibidem. 
3  Idem.  
4  Idem. Sejersted inherits the logics implicit in this theory. In my interpretation of his model of corporate 
pluralism, this opposition of terms is included in a dialectics, liberalism versus realism, where the synthesis was 
precisely the solution of the main issue (“demokratisk kontroll av forvaltningen”) in the enabling acts debate. 
Sejersted. Op. Cit. P. 117. This coincidental similarity at the distance with an Høyre sympathizer as Sejersted 
speaks indirectly about the ideological links of the party and the weekly. 
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similar treatment was given to the spokesmen of the business community. Farmand 
supported them as long as they kept in line with the magazine. The weekly 
repeatedly criticised the bourgeoisie parties for their lack of cohesion and 
determination, and their willingness to negotiate what Farmand regarded as non-
negotiable. 
In 1949, Farmand was too eager to predict the beginnning of the end of the 
Labourite rule in the Storting, and saw in many a debate an incipient vote of distrust 
to the government.1 A year later, 1950, it even affirmed that the majority was in 
retreat,2 but found disappointing the lack of clear and frontal conflict between what it 
claimed should be a joined bourgeoisie front and the majority in the Storting. The 
majority remained and Farmand would not have it any better for the rest of this 
period. 
 
An Experts’ Perspective. Teknisk Ukeblad 
It is important for this work to record the viewpoint of one professional association. 
Teknisk Ukeblad was the spokesman of Den norske ingeniørforening and Den 
politekniske forening.  
Engineers have been traditionally an expert group with high reputation in 
society. That is why we chose Teknisk Ukeblad over other expert groups’ 
publications. We should point out, though, that engineers were not as influential as 
social economists were in post-war Norway, but we reckon their opinion was still of 
certain value in politics. On one side, we read that engineers did not occupy, in the 
                                                 
1  Cfr. ”Regjeringen på defensiven” [Stortingskronikk]. Farmand. Nrs. 15-16, April 9th, 1949; and 
”Stortingskronikk”. Nr. 19, May 7th, 1949. In this last article, representative Lyng’s proposal to reduce the 
amount of money granted for price and rationalization controls was interpreted as a motion for vote of no 
confidence. 
2  Cfr. The comments on the Finance debate of 1950 in ”Stortingskronikk”. Farmand. Nr. 12, March 25th, 
1950. 
 130
opinion of the weekly, a position in the public or private administration equal to their 
education and role in society;1 and there were some who claimed that the expertise 
they possessed should be used more widely in politics.2 On the other, we run across 
a reference on how a governmental Decentralisation Committee in 1946 consulted a 
group of associations, in which the Ingeniørforening was included, on how to make 
the public administration more flexible and efficient.3 Another lets us know that the 
Commerce Department asked his association, among others, for a proposal for an 
appointment in some branch councils in 1947. Among these representatives of the 
state and private administration were engineers who belonged to the Norwegian 
Engineers’ Association.4 The Association’s expert opinion was not decisive, but it 
was taken into account. 
Teknisk Ukeblad provided us with a non-partisan approach to the issues 
Norwegian industry faced in the post-war era. When it comes to questions that are 
also political, the weekly made it a point to show the positions on both sides, but 
managed to keep a line of its own. If we are to define this line, it was support to 
cooperation and coordination between public and private interests in order to achieve 
a more rational approach to higher production. An experts’ solution that turned out 
not to be really apolitical.  
                                                 
1  Cfr. ”Ingeniører og administrasjon”. Teknisk Ukeblad. Utgitt av den norske ingeniørforening og den 
politekniske forening. Nr. 41, 93rd year, October 10th, 1946. And “Staten og ingeniørene”. Editorial. Nr. 45, 93rd   
year, November 7th , 1946. 
2  Cfr. Torgensen, N.M. ”Flere ingeniører i politikken?” Teknisk Ukeblad. Nr. 47, 99th year, December 
18th, 1952. 
3  Cfr. ”Desentralisering av den offentlige forvaltning”. Teknisk Ukeblad. Nr. 22, 93rd year, May 30th, 
1946. 
4  ”I statsråd den 12. september er opprettet tre bransjeråd for henholdsvis papir-, cellulose- og 
tremasseindustrien, sagbruk og høvlerier og tekstilindustrien. 
 ”Handelsdepartementet har anmodet N.I.F., NITO og Norges Arbeidslederforbund om å framsette 
forslag til den ene funksjonærrepresentant med varamann. 
 … 
 ”Både blant Statens og bedriftsledelsens representanter er det flere ingeniører M.N.I.F.” 
”Bransjerådene”. Teknisk Ukeblad. Nr. 39, 94th year, September 25th , 1947.  
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The weekly promoted industrial expansion on the side of the private initiative, 
but its position was quite different from Høyre’s or Farmand’s, and closer to 
Venstre’s. Teknisk Ukeblad saw planning and regulation as correct rational 
strategies, as well as cooperation in the economy as a whole, and between 
administration and labour inside the firms. 
As to reconstruction tasks, the magazine did not feel uncomfortable with 
governmental lead, a comprehensive planning, and the new instruments the 
administration required to fulfill its duties. It praised both the importance of the 
contribution of economic organisations and individuals under the regulatory role of 
the state. There was no conflict between state and private business in principle. The 
state could enhance private industry while intervening when proper. And private 
enterprises had, or should have, a commitment to social well-being.1 
On these same lines, for example, the magazine acknowledged the work of 
the Studieselskapet for norsk industri, an organ that intended to be a channel of 
expert advice and proposals of industrial cooperation and coordination at private and 
public levels—a true expression of professional ideals.2 In the same way as this 
organisation, the magazine preached a private-run corporatism. 
A debate between Thomas Schlytter, a usual Farmand contributor, and J. 
Bache Wiig, a well-known member of the Norwegian Engineers’ Association and 
writer of Teknisk Ukeblad, helps us understand the distance between these two 
publications around economic policies. The debate was ignited after a Bache Wiig’s 
article in which he stated that state partial or total ownership of certain firms did not 
represent any danger to the National economy. As long as a firm was run in a 
                                                 
1  ”Vi må igjen forlange av bedrifter, forretninger og enkeltpersoner at de ikke arbeider for høye 
fortjenester alene, men også ut fra faglig ære og av hensyn til vårt samfunn”. Løken, Hallvard. ”Gjenreisingen”. 
Teknisk Ukeblad. Nr. 34, 93  year, August 22  , 1946. rd nd




profitable and socially oriented fashion, it did not matter where the ownership lay.1 
Schlytter answered in a letter that, on the contrary, growing state ownership of firms 
was indeed part of a socialisation process; a class-oriented measure that, 
“experience” from the socialist world showed, could only lead to shrinking production, 
politically-biased decisions in economic planning, lower standards of living, and so 
on.2 It was, in other words, irrational.3 Bache-Wiig, on the contrary, thought of it as a 
pragmatic approach when the private initiative, in a little country as Norway, was not 
able to contribute with the necessary capital. Administrative capacity, in his view, was 
not necessarily different whether the state or private interests ruled a firm.4  
 
The Best Corporatism. Teknisk Ukeblad and the Enabling Acts Debate 
We can see that the stand of the magazine, a balanced interpretation of the state role 
in the economy, would be reformulated due to the ongoing political debate. The 
enabling acts debate pushed the weekly, as it had done to the political opposition in 
general, to assume a more Liberal position regarding a mixed economy. 
In general, Teknisk Ukeblad focused more on the economic consequences of 
the enabling acts than on the constitutional issue. In 1947, when the Lex Brofoss was 
discussed in parliament, the magazine reported a lecture by the secretary of the 
Norges Industriforbund, Bachke.5 The lecturer argued that the Lex Brofoss would 
institute an imbalance among the three state powers, as well as a state-directed 
planned economy. The entrepreneurial spirit and industry’s effectiveness were at risk, 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Professor Bache-Wiig. "Norsk industri og dens framtid“. Teknisk Ukeblad. Nr. 43, 94  year, 
October 23 , 1947. 
th
rd
2  Schlytter, Thomas. ”Socialisering. Åpent brev til direktør, professor J. Bache-Wiig”. Teknisk Ukeblad. 
Nr. 23, 95  year, June 3  , 1948. th rd
3  There had already been a criticism against Schlytter’s points of view on economic and social problems 
in a review of his book called Frihet eller Tvangsøkonomi. Cfr. Teknisk Ukeblad. Nr. 36, 92  year, December 
27  , 1945 
nd
th
4  Cfr. Schlytter, Thomas. ”Socialisering...” Answer by Bache-Wiig in the same article. 
5  Cfr. ”Lex Thagaard”. Teknisk Ukeblad. Nr. 38, 94  year, September 18  , 1947. th
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since the state might not be so good at coordinating the economy as businessmen 
themselves.  
Bachke used the same arguments as the bourgeoisie parties when warning 
against the threat of parliamentarian rule. This enabling act was anti-constitutional, 
he said, and had no clear limits to its power. If the law were applied in strict terms, it 
would disrupt parliamentarian order by stealing from the Storting its righteous 
prerogatives as lawmaker and as the organ in charge of establishing taxes. It would 
also leave citizens unprotected by the courts in case of administrative abuse. 
Bache-Wiig took also on the matter in the pages of the weekly that same year. 
He acknowledged that the Price Directorate had done a great job so far, but thought 
unnecessary, in order to control prices, to intervene in the industry’s right to decide 
on its own how to run business.1 And went on with stronger statements: 
Prislovens bestemmelser, som de gjelder i dag, eller som de vil gjelde om den 
endelige lov kommer til å inneholde liknende bestemmelser, betyr at den 
institusjon som skal stelle med disse saker, forutsetningsvis Prisdirektoratet 
ved dets sjef, får en myndighet over næringslivet som bare kan karakteriseres 
som diktatur. M.h.t. næringsvirksomhet lever vi da ikke lenger i et fritt, 
folkestyrt land. 
... 
Myndighetene kan gripe inn, lamme bedriften, overta den selv eller 
overlate den til andre hvis det passer myndighetene å gjøre det. 
Begrepet frihet under ansvar eksisterer ikke.2 
 
We have read such statements before. The conclusion Professor Bache-Wiig 
came up with here was that such an enabling act did not promote but hampered 
cooperation between the authorities and those affected by the law, namely, the 
business community. 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Bache-Wiig. "Norsk industri og dens framtid“. Teknisk Ukeblad. Nr. 48, 94  year, October 23  , 
1947. 
th rd
2  Ibidem. 
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He would repeat this argument in 1952, when he criticised the proposal for a 
permanent Price law. The authorities could not count on cooperation from the private 
initiative if a permanent law, in the terms put forward, was approved.1 
We find again the rationalisation in which regulation was accepted as long as it 
did not become “tvangsdirigering”; that is to say, as long as prices and production 
conditions were not fixed by the central administration alone but in close cooperation 
with the business elite. Otherwise, claimed Bache-Wiig, the economic developments 
would lead “erfaringsmessig” to dictatorship. 2 
In relation to the direction the country was taking in the economy, set by the 
enabling acts, the magazine commented or transcribed articles from American 
publications usually in a very welcoming fashion. In them, a more Liberal outlook to 
economics than the one followed in Norway was advertised. The amazing American 
progress was attributed in these articles to a freer business community supported by 
the state. The direct intervention in the private initiative and the over-taxation of 
profits were shown as opposed to the American approach:  
Den amerikanske industris sterke ekspansjon fram til dens nåværende stilling 
skyldes i første rekke den finansielle politikk den har fulgt. Den har i lange tider 
sørget for at en stor del av overskuddet føres til bedriftene for finansiering av 
utvidelser og modernisering, for på den måte å gi muligheter for stadig større 
produksjon.3 
 
The opinions of the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) were reported 
to illustrate the efficacy of a freer economy in the context of cooperation: 
ASCE’s 100-års jubileum skal bl.a. tjene til å gi folk forståelsen av at nasjonal 
fremgang er et resultat av samarbeidet mellom—og de forenede anstrengelser 
fra—ingeniøren, ledelsen, kapitalinnskyterne og de faglærte arbeidere, i en 
                                                 
1  Cfr. Bache-Wiig. "Industriens rasjonalisering“. Teknisk Ukeblad. Nr. 43, 99th year, November 20th , 
1952. 
2  ”Det er ikke priskontrollen som næringslivets menn i første rekke angriper, selv om denne i og for seg 
er problematisk, men det at man tar avstand fra er den ting at priser og produksjonsvilkår skal fastsettes av 
myndighetene. Det er på dette punkt tvangsdirigering setter inn, og det er her vanskelighetene vil melde seg.” 
Ibidem. 
3  ”Industri og velferdsstat”. Teknisk Ukeblad. Nr. 13, 98  year, March 29  , 1951. th th
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atmosfær av fri konkurranse hvor utsiktene til fortjeneste kombinert med 
risikoen for tap gir sunne forhold med like sjanser for alle.1  
 
The Norwegian Engineers’ Association showed publicly its concerns around 
the negative effects of detailed price control and exacerbated state intervention on 
the industrial life of the country in an official statement on January 26th, 1953, to the 
Finance committee of the Storting on the proposal on a permanent price law. The 
position –or opposition—of the association was stated clearly. Once more, the 
constitutional issue occupies a secondary place: 
Vi finner det derfor høyst betenkelig at Den Norske Ingeniørforening og 
liknende yrkeorganisasjoner skal stilles i en særstilling som ville bli etter 
prislovutkastet. Vår frihet til å velge virkemidler i vårt arbeid vil bli sterkere 
begrenset, og særlig vil bestemmelsene i §§ 40-42 bety et inngrep i 
foreningsfriheten sterk i strid med hevdvunnen rettsoppfatning. 
Bestemmelsene er etter vår oppfatning også i strid med Norges internasjonale 
forpliktelser. 
… 
Vi vil peke på at en detaljert regulering med sin mangfoldighet av 
bestemmelser slik som vi har hatt den under den midlertidige prislov, stiller 
betydelige krav til industriens ledelse for at den til enhver tid kan være à jour 
med de gjeldende forskrifter. 
… 
Den detaljerte prisregulering gjør det videre vanskelig å finne rom for den 
økonomiske risiko som følger med anvendelsen av nye tekniske metoder og 
innretninger.2 
 
These arguments fit in a pattern we have run across before in this work; they 
were intended to empower business interests before the central administration. 
Some weeks before the Price Law debate took place in the Odelsting, Teknisk 
Ukeblad transcribed the main contributions stated in a debate on the issue arranged 
by Den Politekniske Forening in January that year with the participation of 
government and opposition spokesmen. The main contributors on the side of the 
government were Deputy under the Secretary of State (ekspedisjonssjef) Eivind 
                                                 
1  Holst, E. ”Til kamp mot superstaten”. Teknisk Ukeblad. Nr. 32, 99th year, September 4th, 1952. A report 
on C.S. Proctor, president of the ASCE, in commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the association. 
2  ”N.I.F. og prisloven”. Teknisk Ukeblad. Nr. 6, 100th year, February 5th , 1953. 
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Erichsen and Deputy head (sjefinspektor) Øystein Gjelsvik. On the side of the 
opposition, professor Erling Petersen and director Aars-Nicolaysen.1 
One must ponder that the reasons a periodical has to transcribe an article 
from another publication, debate, or interview, is to express or revolve the periodical’s 
own point of view. This is the main motivation in the selection process. In this 
particular case, the debate itself had been a product of initiative of one of the two 
associations involved in the weekly, and it certainly served the purpose of showing 
impartiality and objectivity and at the same time supporting the associations’ stand on 
the issue. 
It is clear in this debate that there was an agreement on two points between 
the governmental and opposition experts. First, a Price law should only be an 
instrument, in pursuit of National economic goals like full employment and increasing 
production. The main tools should be the right financial policies, that is to say, indirect 
controls. Conflict between the central administration and business would have 
negative repercussions for both sides. Macroeconomic controls would enhance 
cooperation and coordination in the National economy. 
 Secondly, delegation of power by the Storting should be accompanied by an 
enlarged control capacity of the Storting over the administrative organs in question. 
Experts on the opposition pointed out the unclear limits of the extraordinary powers 
granted to the administration and the lack of protection for individuals against unfair 
administrative decisions. The experts on the governmental side replied by 
emphasizing the additional control power enjoyed by the Storting according to the 
draft put forward by Torp’s government. 
                                                 
1  Cfr. ”Behovet for ny prislov”. Teknisk Ukeblad. Nr. 14, 100th year, April 2nd , 1953. 
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Let us start with the governmental side. Erichsen responded to the 
opposition’s concerns about the negative effects of detailed controls in the economy 
by arguing that these were already being dismantled. The governmental proposal on 
a price law implied that they would be lifted even further. A price law was still 
necessary, he argued, for the sake of democracy. The disagreements among 
different trades, social groups, country areas, and so on, regarding price setting were 
in such manner solved through the intervention of a public authority. In this way, the 
increasing power of economic and professional organisations was properly 
channelled to the benefit of the society:  
...det spørsmål vi står overfor ikke er spørsmålet om et regulert eller uregulert 
næringsliv. Spørsmålet er hva slags regulering vi skal ha, private ukontrollerte 
reguleringer eller private reguleringer under offentlige oppsyn kombinert med 
ulike former for offentlige reguleringer.1 
 
Gjelvik supported this statement and added that the government proposal 
intended, in fact, to put the authority of these organisations under Storting’s control: 
...regjering hvert år skal forelegges Stortinget en melding om de retningslinjer 
regjeringen akter å følge ved gjennomførelsen av prisreguleringspolitikken i 
det kommende år. Derved blir Stortinget, som jo er folkets representanter etter 
grunnloven, satt i stand til å bedømme hvert enkelt av de retningslinjer som 
regjeringen og de underordnede organer vil benytte ved gjennomførelsen av 
denne lov.2 
 
Erichsen pointed out macroeconomic controls were now considered more 
important than direct intervention in the private firms: 
Penge- og finanspolitikken vil alltid måtte bli helt sentral i enhver fornuftig 
økonomisk politikk, og de økonomiske problemer bør så langt mulig løses ved 
bruk av penge- og finanspolitiske virkemidler. Dette hevdes også i 
Regjeringens prislovproposisjon. 
… 
…vi trenger suplerende hjelpemidler i tillegg til penge- og finanspolitiske. 3 
 
                                                 
1  Ibidem. 
2  Idem. 
3  Idem. 
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On the side of the opposition, following the speech of the bourgeoisie parties, 
the experts tried to prove that a price law was unnecessary and counterproductive, 
and therefore a renovated Trust law should then be implemented instead.  
Erling Petersen went over a list of arguments we are well informed with. He 
doubted that state price control was better than other types of price setting to achieve 
economic goals, and also that a price law would be practiced in a moderate way. It 
would institute arbitrariness and destroy the rule of law. A Trust law would serve 
consumers best. 1 
Edvard Løchen, on the other hand, stated that the proposal of a new Price law 
would give authorities a plenipotentiary power to rule over the economy replacing the 
rule of laws approved by the Storting. This development would make it impossible for 
a private person or firm to settle in court a negative administrative decision. 2 
This last debate confirms the position of the weekly, in which the concerns on 
the delegation of power from the Storting to the central administration are present but 
fall in a context where they are subsidiaries to the economic issue. What mattered 
was the search for the best agreement by which cooperation and coordination 
between the administration and business helped the economy achieve better results. 
In the belief that industry men and their experts should enjoy a larger role in the 
decision-making process. 
                                                 
1  Idem. 
2  Idem. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Our narration ended in 1953. By this date, Labour had replaced its previous 
corporate ambitions and had settled for an informal arrangement that assured 
cooperation with the business community, while indirect state regulation of business 
placed price controls in the background. The productivity approach finally substituted 
the Thagaard economic philosophy among the Labour leadership. Socialism could 
still be the goal, but the means became higher production and a mixed economy. 
Delegation of power away from the Storting to the central administration was 
compensated with a respective power of supervision over the bureaucratic organs 
involved. A surge of criticism from within Labour pushed for an acceptable solution to 
the problem of constitutionality and increasing state intervention in the economy. 
Parliamentarian concerns prevailed at the end. 
 The bourgeoisie opposition had used constitutional and economic issues to 
oppose Labourite rule. Their demands went in broad terms on the same direction as 
the developments taking place. One could think of the last developments as 
answering to a certain extent some of the demands put forward by the opposition. If 
they did, however, it seems that this was not a main motivation behind them.  
Labour managed to outplay its opponents by making their rhetoric arsenal 
obsolete and proving to be a lawful, responsible ruler. The 1953 parliamentarian 
election, coming after the constitutional debate was over, represented a big 
disappointment for the bourgeoisie parties. 
 The end of this story sends us back to the inquiry on the actual role of the 
Storting in the post-war era, which is our main concern. To give a solution to our 
problem, we made use of indirect sources in an exercise of historiography and 
History of Ideas. We went over the main theories on the subject and we questioned 
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the spokesmen of the bourgeoisie opposition. We left in the background the actual 
handlings, facts and numbers; but we got answers. Let us recount what the 
opposition sources recorded. 
 During the eight years we wrote about, the bourgeoisie opposition centred its 
speech on the role of the Storting under the Labourite majority rule. They did not 
profit from it as much as they had foreseen, and finally, the constitutional debate got 
exhausted as an electoral issue. 
The political opposition in the post-war era departed from the general opinion 
that the role of the Storting should be redefined. The Labourite take-over provoked a 
reaction in a different direction. In the eyes of the opposition, parliamentarism 
seemed to have allowed that a party with a majority in parliament could monopolise 
power, thus breaking the logics of the same parliamentarian rule. Then, 
parliamentarism should fade away for the constitutional order to prevail. During this 
period, the recourses to referendums and dissolution of parliament were not put 
forward as means to enhance govern ability, but represented an attempt to put 
brakes on the initiatives placed forward by the Labour party.  
 Following the accounts of the opposition, Labour kept the Storting under exile 
or captivity. The Storting had been disempowered in order to strengthen an 
administration also under Labourite control and to build up an alternate and 
unconstitutional power. Here the opposition sources give us a description of the 
Labour party as an electoral machine with a strict inner discipline and in which the 
Storting group followed the directives of the party elite.  
 The bourgeoisie opposition advertised itself as the defender of the Storting. 
The bourgeoisie parties and others made an effort to connect the economic and 
political issues of the times; that is to say, the issue of economic and political freedom 
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with the one on the parliamentarian rule and constitutionality of the corporate 
developments. In this quest, they made use of the Liberal principles at hand and 
developed them.  
We have to evaluate the truth in such statements. All in all, there was a 
consensus on the broad goals and means in the political scenario of post-war 
Norway. Politics from all sides tended to the centre. This consensus was limited by a 
disagreement in the economic area, namely, in the administrative strategies to run 
the mixed economy and to exercise state intervention. The political opposition—
diverse as it was and seldom working together on an issue—coincided in rallying for 
limits to direct state intervention. It intended to enhance the ability of the private 
interests to negotiate and give them freedom to decide on their own regarding 
management ways and use of profits. It rallied against a socialistic planned economy. 
The rhetoric of the opposition, when at its best, showed a dispute between 
democracy and threats of dictatorship, on one side, and between capitalism and 
socialism, on the other. In other words, the opposition focused its propaganda on a 
conflict between irreconcilable views of society. 
At times, the Norwegian Right recurred to the conspiracy theories elaborated 
abroad, particularly in America. It used and abused an analogy between Labourite 
rule and the path to socialism, but it also took advantage of the criticism to the 
corporate scheme as a whole.  
The toughest critics interpreted the lack of a deep conflict in American politics 
in the 1950s as a conspiracy of the elites. This conspiracy of the elites was 
materialised in the corporate axis. Politics in Congress were, according to these 
views, a diversion from the real power game. The voters were bought with material 
prosperity while political principles faded in the political argumentations. We read 
 142
similar assumptions in Farmand, and also in Høyre’s propaganda, and even in some 
cases in Venstre’s. However, accusations of this kind served as backing to one of 
concentration of power in the hands of Labour. The conspiracy, as they saw it, took 
place in Folkets Hus. 
The criticism to the One-party rule and to the Labourite economic planning 
resulted in a conclusion that we find all over the bourgeoisie propaganda: 
Corporatism excluded Liberal democracy. The political opposition in Norway used 
this argument against the corporatism instituted by Labour but the formulation was 
made general. Corporatism was depicted by its critics as bringing up a threat to 
public control over vital decisions at National level.  It was an ideological statement. 
The bourgeoisie opposition demanded that, as the parliamentarian tradition 
marked, consensus on the main economic and political issues be attained, 
exclusively through the work of the Storting committees and not by the central 
administration. The bourgeoisie parties saw in this approach a strategy to improve 
their influence in the political decisions due to the traditional plural composition of the 
committees. 
The realistic demand behind the speech, we reckon, was a corporate 
arrangement in which the business community was consulted and was allowed 
enough freedom to run their enterprises themselves at the same time that they 
enjoyed the benefits of cooperation and coordination of the National economy, and of 
state support. 
 As mentioned before, the bourgeoisie parties tried to make this issue a crucial 
one in the elections, but failed. The concerns of the voters, we read in some analyses 
by opposition writers after the defeat in the 1953 Storting election, were oriented 
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towards welfare initiatives and the warnings of dictatorship were of no appeal.1 Some 
analysts even stated that there was no clear alternative on the opposition side.2 The 
bourgeoisie parties should, in the opinion of one of them,3 make it a point that they 
could administer the welfare state better to make electoral inroads. This perception 
might have been true. 
  Recording the points of view of the opposition was not enough to solve our 
main problem. We had to go back to the theories we departed from. We confirmed 
our suspicion that they did not exclude each other and we could use them to give 
form to an answer of our own.  
Rokkan and Seip provided us with a contemporary view of the parliamentarian 
issue; Nordby gave us a valuable background to set the issue in a historical 
perspective. Rokkan and Nordby showed us two ways of interpreting the system; 
Seip made us aware of the actual political handlings and rightly inserted the problem 
in the context of political struggle. The following conclusions are our interpretation of 
these three theories in the light of the first-hand information recorded in this work. 
 If we think of the political scenario as a system, or to put it in less 
functionalistic terms, when we talk about the rules, the routines, and the rituals, the 
Storting preserved its centrality in politics in post-war Norway. The Storting continued 
providing the formal guidelines to follow in National politics and economics. And 
although its jurisdiction was reduced, where most detailed administrative handlings 
given to the central administration to mind and, above all, corporate arrangements 
providing a consensus source parallel to that Storting committees represented, its 
supremacy was not challenged.  
                                                 
1  Cfr. Larssen, Olav. ”Etter Stortingsvalget”… 
2  Cfr. Kandahl, Torolv. ”Et høyre-syn på valget”. In: Samtiden, 1953; Oftedal. ”Stortingsvalg og…”, and 
Larssen. Op. Cit. 
3  Cfr. Larssen. Op. Cit. 
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The corporate organs, in our opinion, did not overlap or replace the legislative 
work in the Storting. We could say that they worked along side of the Storting, without 
a constitutional mandate and, in principle, under the supervision of the Storting. We 
could well see in this process a response to the needs of a more efficient 
administration and the necessary empowerment of the executive branch Nordby 
wrote about. The absolute rule of the Storting had had meaning before as an 
instrument of the National opposition to a foreign power. However, that meaning was 
no longer operative and the Storting rule needed a counterbalance.  
However, this rationalisation makes abstraction of the actual political struggle 
of the times and the concrete results and orientations involved. It is true, to a certain 
extent, but we have to complement it and to complicate it in order to understand it 
better.  
 Our opinion in this point is that Labour respected in general terms the authority 
with which the tradition had invested the Storting. We cannot say with precision to 
what extent due to agreement with tradition or to the pressures of the political 
struggle. Labour underwent the legislative procedures to delegate authority from the 
Storting to the new administrative organs and yielded demands of clear 
parliamentarian supervision of the works by the administration.  
However, the Storting and the corporate organs served as instruments of the 
One-party rule. As long as Labour held its majority in parliament, it managed to keep 
the legislative branch on its side, as it needed to proceed with its policies. The party 
did not challenge the central role of the Storting in politics, but the Storting became a 
mechanism in the One-party rule. Not only, in practice, would the Storting not come 
up with a vote of no confidence to the government to bring it down in case of 
misdoing, a condition of parliamentarian rule, but it also helped the party get its 
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policies sanctioned. It was in this sense, we believe, that Jens Arup Seip wrote about 
the Storting in exile.  
A Storting under Labourite majority would not oppose militantly but rather 
support an administration serving the same boss, but this “inner-corruption” of the 
system did not constitute a structural feature of it. It would be wrong to describe the 
Storting in this era as a recording machine. There were accounts about the 
parliamentarian debates being increasingly less substantial and dramatic and in the 
end always being channelled towards what was convenient to Labour. We do not 
know how accurate this picture was. It seems logical that a majority party resulted in 
less heated arguments, but that does not necessarily mean lack of disagreement or 
of negotiations within parliament that could indeed influence the decision-making 
process. 
Besides, the majority was not taken for granted. It had to be renewed every 
electoral period, and although a take-over by the opposition was rather improbable, 
the claim by the bourgeoisie parties that Labour somehow had made it impossible 
were exaggerated. Electoral needs played a role in Labour’s shaping of corporatism 
in the post-war era. Again, no matter how powerful the interests that backed Labour 
were, the party needed electoral victories to keep the Storting under control and so to 
assure approval to its corporate inroads. The One-party rule in Norway might have 
implied a ruling party powerful enough to overrun the opposition, but it did not grant 
Labour control over the ballots, so it had to adapt, sometimes yield, and always take 
the initiative, to win the electoral battles. This one-party rule was not a dictatorship. 
Organised interests did not relegate party politics and continued supporting its 
electoral champions. Administrative concerns did not substitute politics, as 
corporatism did not annul the Storting. 
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It was the Labourite elite that ruled Norway during these years. We can agree 
with Nordby’s conclusions in I politikkens sentrum… that the Storting did not lose its 
centrality in politics, and that delegation of power was not an alien but necessary 
feature of parliamentarian rule. However, we have to point out that the Storting, in 
practice, lost relative power before the ruling party. The negotiating table, at least in 
the period we study, certainly empowered the organised interests by enabling them 
to hold direct contact with the authorities, but this negotiating table was a means and 
not the power centre.1  
Seip made a good point when he baptised this era a “One-party rule”, in 
particular, on the light of the political system prevalent in the pre-war period. The 
internal disagreements in the party and the unavoidable negotiations with other 
National political and economic interests do not refute the interpretation that Labour 
monopolised political power. At least not in the case of the enabling acts debate.   
Helge Pharo2 maintains that Seip’s theory is wrong since, first, the Storting 
was still the arena where many important decisions were reached; and, secondly, 
because the party was divided in several issues. Here, the picture of a powerless 
Storting and a strict party discipline vanishes. These arguments he proves in the 
case of Norwegian Foreign policy in the post-war era, in our opinion, do not 
necessarily mean that Labour had a lesser grasp on political power. Labour 
monopolised power but ruled over a democratic society. This fact set certain 
conditions to the power game. 
Corporatism as a general scheme of consultation and negotiation survived the 
One-party rule in Norway and remained in broad terms a structural feature of 
                                                 
1  This assumption, that puts Rokkan’s theory upside down, was developed by Nordby in his 
Korporatisme på norsk. 
2  Cfr. Eriksen, Knut Einar and Pharo, Helge Øystein. Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949-1965. Oslo, 
Universitetsforlaget, 1997. (Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie, 5).  “Innledning. Nye rammer og utfordringer”.  
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Norwegian politics. But in those broad terms, corporatism is an abstraction. The 
extent and form of those arrangements depended a lot on the power holders and on 
the power relations.  
Although corporatism has complicated our view of democracy, we cannot 
accept the assumption that the first necessarily opposes the latter. There are some 
examples of corporatism within party dictatorships, but that does not create a rule. 
We cannot enunciate a general law, but only learn from a particular case.  
In the contemporary Norwegian democracy, organised interests like 
employers’ associations, Trade Unions, professional, agricultural and fishing 
associations, and others, are consulted and represented in the organs where 
administrative decisions are made. This is one unquestionable feature of this 
democracy. People with equal interests should unite to make their political influence 
as effective as possible. How much the non-organised individuals lose in this context 
and how much a rule of oligarchies is preserved or extended in such scheme is still 
an issue in development.  
Democracy has for our contemporaries a meaning that exceeds universal 
suffrage and parliamentarian representation. Economic democracy complements it. 
Although the implications of the term can have different interpretations, as to the 
period we study, the opposition seemed to agree on relative equalisation between 
regions in the country, between city and countryside, and indirect—and limited—
economic redistribution. Universal social security was also taken for granted in the 
speech on democracy. Freedom from need was ultimately placed next to the Liberal 
freedoms in the speech of the bourgeoisie opposition without exception. And the 
goals implied the means for a democracy of the professional society.  
 148
Corporatism was the main of those means. We have made some remarks on 
the corporate ideology and the will power from the experts who developed it. We 
should leave to these the task of glamorising or scorning it; to tell us how democratic 
it is or how many obscure corners it creates in politics. Ours is only to understand. 
